India

How do these economic giants view Israel’s war against Hamas, and why should Israel invest public diplomacy efforts in Indian and Japanese audiences?

Notwithstanding their numerous ideological differences, and against the background of the competition with China, Washington and New Delhi have launched a technology initiative. What lies behind this far-reaching initiative?

Read the INSS Strategic Analysis for 2023

The strategic assessment for Israel for 2021 is shaped by significant uncertainty in three principal areas: the level of success in coping with COVID-19; the modus operandi and policies of the new administration in the United States; and the political developments in Israel. The current assessment is based on a broader conception of national security, which places greater weight than in the past on the domestic arena and on threats to internal stability, social cohesion, values, and fabric of life. This of course does not detract from the urgency of security threats, which remain significant. In the face of this uncertainty, Israel will need to prioritize attention to the internal crisis; adjust itself to the competition between the great powers, which is affected by the pandemic; adapt to the Biden administration and coordinate with it on Iran and other issues; expand alliances and normalization agreements with additional countries in the region; and be ready for military escalation in the north and in the Gaza Strip arena, which could occur even though all of the actors involved prefer to avoid it.

The strategic assessment for Israel for 2021 is shaped by significant uncertainty in three principal areas: the level of success in coping with COVID-19; the modus operandi and policies of the new administration in the United States; and the political developments in Israel. The current assessment is based on a broader conception of national security, which places greater weight than in the past on the domestic arena and on threats to internal stability, social cohesion, values, and fabric of life. This of course does not detract from the urgency of security threats, which remain significant. In the face of this uncertainty, Israel will need to prioritize attention to the internal crisis; adjust itself to the competition between the great powers, which is affected by the pandemic; adapt to the Biden administration and coordinate with it on Iran and other issues; expand alliances and normalization agreements with additional countries in the region; and be ready for military escalation in the north and in the Gaza Strip arena, which could occur even though all of the actors involved prefer to avoid it.

India’s relations with the Arab Gulf states, headed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have improved steadily since the election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, evidenced by closer economic relations and now extending into the security-military field. The central axis of relations between India and the Gulf states was and remains the economy. India is an important destination for oil and gas from the Gulf and a supplier of workers to the region. At the same time, closer relations also reflect developing strategic concepts: Delhi relates more and more to the Middle East in general and the Gulf in particular as an essential theater not only for economic development but also for its strategic status, certainly in view of the competition with China. For their part, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi assign India a role in their “looking East” strategy and thereby seek to diversify their sources of political and perhaps also military support—a strategy that even has room for Israel.