Strategic Assessment

It has been clear since the reconfiguration of American foreign policy after September 11, 2001 that the wave of violence unleashed by the intifada would not be translated into tangible political gains for the Palestinians. It has also been clear, at least since Operation Defensive Shield of April 2002, that the Palestinians would pay a rising price in both economic and human terms for the continuation of the intifada. True, terrorists could still inflict casualties on Israel, but their ability to do even that diminished in the face of ongoing IDF operations inside Palestinian cities and the progressive extension of Israel’s security barrier. Finally, it became increasingly clear during 2004 that the Palestinian leadership had no coherent political or military response to Prime Minister Sharon’s proposed “unilateral disengagement” from Gaza and the northern West Bank. Instead, Palestinian politics and society were mired in a morass of policy paralysis, diplomatic impotence, economic regression and impoverishment, administrative chaos and corruption, and growing lawlessness.