Monitoring social media discourse among mouthpieces of the Saudi regime reveals three major trends reflecting a significant shift in how Iran, the threat it poses to the Gulf states, and ways of addressing it are portrayed.
- Iran’s real enemy is not Israel, but Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states
One of the prominent messages in Saudi discourse seeks to challenge the perception that Israel and the United States are Iran’s main enemies. According to Saudi regime mouthpieces, recent developments have exposed Tehran's true priorities: the Iranian regime’s primary enemy is not Israel, but Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states.
To support this claim, they point out that Iran and its proxies repeatedly attack targets in the Gulf states, while refraining from launching missiles at Israel. Hence, they argue, Iranian rhetoric regarding the struggle against Israel does not reflect the regime's actual priorities. In practice, Iranian hostility is directed first and foremost at the Gulf states, and particularly Saudi Arabia.
- Attacks on the Gulf states stem from Iranian envy of their success
A second trend concerns how Iranian attacks on civilian and economic infrastructure in the Gulf states—including airports, oil and gas facilities, energy infrastructure, and commercial and tourism hubs—are explained.
Saudi discourse shows a concerted effort to frame these attacks not as a sign of weakness or vulnerability on the part of the Gulf states (and Saudi Arabia in particular), but rather as a direct consequence of their economic and developmental success. According to this narrative, the Iranian regime struggles to accept the widening gap between the prosperity, stability, and progress of the Gulf states and Iran's own economic crisis, international isolation, and failures of governance.
Accordingly, strikes on civilian infrastructure, commerce, and tourism are presented as a deliberate Iranian attempt to undermine the Gulf model of success. In other words, the attacks are portrayed not as a demonstration of Iranian strength or an identification of Gulf weakness, but as evidence of Iran's envy toward its neighbors' success and a desire to undermine it.
- A shift in how to address Iran: From de-escalation and containment to overthrowing the regime
The third trend, and perhaps the most significant, is a sharp shift in messaging regarding how to address the Iranian threat.
While over the past year Saudi Arabia appeared primarily intent on minimizing friction with Iran and its proxies through dialogue, arrangements, compromises, and economic incentives, current discourse signals a fundamentally different approach.
The recurring message among Saudi regime mouthpieces is that no stable arrangement can be reached with the Houthis in Yemen or with Iran’s other proxies in the region as long as the regime in Tehran remains in power. According to this view, confronting the militias, including military strikes against them, amounts to treating the symptoms of the problem rather than its root cause.
The conclusion presented in Saudi discourse is that, as long as the Iranian regime remains in power, the Gulf states will continue to face security threats, attacks on their infrastructure, and efforts to destabilize the region—potentially threatening the stability of the regimes themselves. Therefore, they argue, the solution is no longer to seek understandings with Tehran or its proxies, but to overthrow the Iranian regime itself.
At least in the discourse, the Saudi message appears to have shifted from "How can we live alongside the Iranian regime?" to "As long as the Iranian regime exists, the security and stability of the Gulf states cannot be guaranteed."
Monitoring social media discourse among mouthpieces of the Saudi regime reveals three major trends reflecting a significant shift in how Iran, the threat it poses to the Gulf states, and ways of addressing it are portrayed.
One of the prominent messages in Saudi discourse seeks to challenge the perception that Israel and the United States are Iran’s main enemies. According to Saudi regime mouthpieces, recent developments have exposed Tehran's true priorities: the Iranian regime’s primary enemy is not Israel, but Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states.
To support this claim, they point out that Iran and its proxies repeatedly attack targets in the Gulf states, while refraining from launching missiles at Israel. Hence, they argue, Iranian rhetoric regarding the struggle against Israel does not reflect the regime's actual priorities. In practice, Iranian hostility is directed first and foremost at the Gulf states, and particularly Saudi Arabia.
A second trend concerns how Iranian attacks on civilian and economic infrastructure in the Gulf states—including airports, oil and gas facilities, energy infrastructure, and commercial and tourism hubs—are explained.
Saudi discourse shows a concerted effort to frame these attacks not as a sign of weakness or vulnerability on the part of the Gulf states (and Saudi Arabia in particular), but rather as a direct consequence of their economic and developmental success. According to this narrative, the Iranian regime struggles to accept the widening gap between the prosperity, stability, and progress of the Gulf states and Iran's own economic crisis, international isolation, and failures of governance.
Accordingly, strikes on civilian infrastructure, commerce, and tourism are presented as a deliberate Iranian attempt to undermine the Gulf model of success. In other words, the attacks are portrayed not as a demonstration of Iranian strength or an identification of Gulf weakness, but as evidence of Iran's envy toward its neighbors' success and a desire to undermine it.
The third trend, and perhaps the most significant, is a sharp shift in messaging regarding how to address the Iranian threat.
While over the past year Saudi Arabia appeared primarily intent on minimizing friction with Iran and its proxies through dialogue, arrangements, compromises, and economic incentives, current discourse signals a fundamentally different approach.
The recurring message among Saudi regime mouthpieces is that no stable arrangement can be reached with the Houthis in Yemen or with Iran’s other proxies in the region as long as the regime in Tehran remains in power. According to this view, confronting the militias, including military strikes against them, amounts to treating the symptoms of the problem rather than its root cause.
The conclusion presented in Saudi discourse is that, as long as the Iranian regime remains in power, the Gulf states will continue to face security threats, attacks on their infrastructure, and efforts to destabilize the region—potentially threatening the stability of the regimes themselves. Therefore, they argue, the solution is no longer to seek understandings with Tehran or its proxies, but to overthrow the Iranian regime itself.
At least in the discourse, the Saudi message appears to have shifted from "How can we live alongside the Iranian regime?" to "As long as the Iranian regime exists, the security and stability of the Gulf states cannot be guaranteed."