The Time Game with Iran

Things are heating up in the Middle-East nuclear/political arena. Iran is resisting any possibility of honestly negotiating the nuclear issue with the West/US alliance, the US is hinting at possible concessions to Iran, Israeli sources are talking possible offensive action against Iranian nuclear installations, and US officials are against such action. Egypt is confronting Iran and instability is in the air. Perhaps more than the recent US elections, the timetable is now dictated by the closing deadline of Iran's nuclear progress.

Reading the IAEA periodic reports there is no reason to change the previous estimate that Iran will have accumulated enough Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) to enable it to further enrich it and produce 25 kilograms of High Enriched Uranium (HEU), should it wish to do so, by the end of this year. This deadline is quoted by many as the latest date at which a diplomatic solution has to be arrived at. There were many calls to set a deadline for concluding the talks with Iran.

In any case, the talk about the end of this year is politically, not technically or militarily, motivated. Everybody wants to give President Obama the breathing space he needs to try to attempt and reach a "diplomatic" solution through engagement. Secretary of State Clinton's rather strange statement "We really don't know what to believe about the Iranian program. We've heard many different assessments and claims over the years" was probably designed to buy time for her president. The US intelligence community knows very well the status of Iran's nuclear project. One has to read between the lines of the official statements and testimonies to know that the situation is getting to be very serious.

Furthermore, any action that would not give the US president a minimal time for even attempting the diplomatic route that he so actively advocated before and following his election would probably be counterproductive, especially in the case of Israel, a historically close ally of the US. This does not mean that Israel would not take military action alone, once the talks had failed or if Iran was found to be much further advanced in her quest for nuclear weapons than previously estimated. The statement by US Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair that Iran may have acquired fissile materials from external sources does stress the need for urgency. Should engagement fail, Israel would be in a better position to convince the US, if not to actively support, then at least not to interfere, with any military action.

No doubt, Secretary Gates's statement that a military attack by Israel would only delay Iran's nuclear project by one to three years and strengthen its resolve is well taken. However, the alternative, if and when engagement fails to achieve its aims, is not so great either. Engagement will fail either through total disagreement between the negotiating parties, or through a US agreement to the unthinkable today – enrichment activities in Iran. This has been hinted at and then denied, but there are no serious assurances that this would not happen. US sanctioned enrichment activities in Iran will again provide Iran with the time it needs for furthering its nuclear capabilities. Iran does not have to take a decision now to actually produce nuclear weapons. All will be ready for that day at a not-too-distant time in the future. The Iranian regime's hatred towards Israel will not be lessened in any case. The threat will remain the same, or even worsen.
It is certain that once the US formally joined the European Union in the negotiations, it will take the lead role. No agreement will be reached without US consent, which will have in effect a veto power over any unsatisfactory solution. The US will therefore be held responsible for any unsatisfactory effect this could have on the regional states, and subsequently over the world's energy supply in particular and the overall security situation in general.

The need for a firm US stand at talks with Iran is essential. A weak starting position will only strengthen the Iranian stand, stated many times in recent days by several Iranian officials (although not by all), that the nuclear project is non-negotiable. Should the US proceed from this starting point it will not only lose its declared purpose to prevent Iran from achieving a military nuclear capability, but lose its standing in many states of the region, especially those bordering the gulf.

The Iranians have already made a significant gain, when the US more than hinted that there would be no prior linkage between negotiations and the suspension of enrichment activities. The Iranians are famous for their tactics in playing for time. The US must not fall into that trap. Therefore, President Obama must set himself a time limit even if he does not disclose it to anyone. One can understand why a public disclosure could be seen as presenting Iran with an ultimatum and, given the Iranian sense of pride, greatly diminish the possibility of reaching an agreement. In setting the time limit, the President must remember that any time gained by the Iranians during the negotiation process would be used to further advance their project. In addition, one must bear in mind that nothing would induce the Iranians to rollback and demolish any achievement, in materials or facilities, as a part of any agreement. This could only come about by a profound change in the Iranian regime, and even then this is not certain.

 Although for the US there is also the grave economic crisis to deal with, this will be resolved one way or the other, given enough time and allocated resources. In a way the Iranian nuclear issue is the Cuban missile crisis all over again. It will test the ability of the newly-elected US president to confront the adversary and better him. In a way this is a make or break situation for Obama.