Publications
Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2007
Comprising sixteen analytical essays and three appendices, the book explores various dimensions to the confrontation initiated by Israel on July 12, 2006 in response to Hizbollah provocation. Studying both the Israeli dimensions of the clash and the greater regional issues, the book provides a comprehensive overview of the war and posits the strategic conclusions that can be drawn from it.
Political and Military Objectives in a Limited War against a Guerilla Organization
The Decision Making Process in Israel
Deterrence and its Limitations
A Test of Rival Strategies: Two Ships Passing in the Night
The Military Campaign in Lebanon
Intelligence in the War: Observations and Insights
Israeli Public Opinion and the Second Lebanon War
The Civilian Front in the Second Lebanon War
“Divine Victory” and Earthly Failures: Was the War Really a Victory for Hizbollah?
The Battle for Lebanon: Lebanon and Syria in the Wake of the War
After the Lebanon War: Iranian Power and its Limitations
July-August Heat: The Israeli-Palestinian Arena
The Second Lebanon War: The Regional Setting
The Regional Implications of the War in Lebanon: From Radicalism to Reform
The Impact of the War on Arab Security Concepts
The International Dimension: Why So Few Constraints on Israel?