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This survey examines social and political issues and attitudes among the Palestinian public in the West Bank, against the backdrop of the events of October 7, 2023, and the Swords of Iron War. It is a unique survey focusing on the West Bank during wartime and provides an up-to-date snapshot of Palestinian public perceptions. The report presents an initial analysis of public opinion and highlights the challenges and opportunities facing Israelis and Palestinians.

Click here to download the full survey data | For the survey results in Arabic – نتائج الاستطلاع باللغة العربية

Methodology

The survey was conducted between September 1–7, 2025, in a joint effort by the Data Analytics Center and the research program “From Conflict to Resolution,” both at INSS, together with the T-Politography Group. Data collection was carried out by the StatNet Institute, led by Yousef Makladeh, through telephone interviews conducted in Arabic with 300 male and female respondents, representing the Palestinian population of the West Bank aged 18 and older. The maximum sampling error for the entire sample is ±5.7% at a 95% confidence level.

Summary of Findings

• Forty-six percent of the Palestinian public believes that Hamas’s decision regarding the events of October 7 was wrong; however, one in four Palestinians (26%) considers it the right decision.
• A majority of 57% of Palestinians in the West Bank think that the kidnapping of Israeli civilians does not serve Palestinian national goals, while 31% believes that it does.
• The two-state solution is the preferred political alternative among Palestinians in the West Bank at 52%. Another 28% back a single Palestinian state between the Jordan River and the sea without Jews, while 16% support a single bi-national democratic state. When respondents were presented with a detailed two-state package—including Israeli recognition of a Palestinian state and Palestinian recognition of the State of Israel, a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, a right of return to the Palestinian state, territorial continuity between Gaza and the West Bank, and the end of mutual claims—support for the two-state solution rose to 75%, mainly among older respondents. This support is unusually high compared to previous surveys. Indeed, answers to other questions reveal a more complex picture: 56% of Palestinians in the West Bank (mainly young people) believe that Israel has no right to exist; a clear majority of Palestinians at 70% think that Israel will not endure over time; and 50% believe that Israel can be destroyed following the events of October 7.
• Forty-three percent of Palestinians in the West Bank prefer negotiations as the preferred course of action; 25% support nonviolent resistance, and 17% favor armed struggle. The support for negotiations may be explained by another finding: 75% of respondents fear the “Gazafication” of the West Bank.
• Gaza after the war: The most popular preference among Palestinians in the West Bank is for a Hamas–Fatah unity government at 39%; 24% prefer returning control to the Palestinian Authority; 17% favor a technocratic administration under Arab supervision; and only 8% want Hamas to continue ruling. As for the disarmament of Hamas as a step toward ending the war, 43% oppose it, while 36% support it.
• On the issue of a regional alliance that includes Israel, 71% view normalization between Israel and Arab states as a betrayal of the Palestinians. However, when Palestinians are promised statehood as part of such a regional alliance, 48% express support, while 43% remain opposed.

Full Analysis of Findings

Territorial Alternatives for the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

• When the Palestinian public in the West Bank is asked to choose between territorial alternatives, 52% supports the two-state solution, while 28% backs a single Palestinian state from the Jordan River to the sea excluding Jews, and 16% supports a single bi-national democratic state. Unlike many public opinion surveys that do not present the price of a deal, when respondents were presented with a two-state package—including Israeli recognition of a Palestinian state and Palestinian recognition of the State of Israel, a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem, a right of return to the Palestinian state, territorial contiguity between Gaza and the West Bank, and the end of mutual claims, 75% expressed support, 23% opposed, and 2% gave no opinion. Support increases with age (53% among respondents aged 18–34 versus 87% among those 65 and older). High rates of support were recorded across all West Bank governorates, especially in the south and the Jordan Valley (80%).
• However, a majority of Palestinians in the West Bank at 56% (mainly young people) believe that the State of Israel has no right to exist; an overwhelming majority of 70% think Israel will not endure over time; and 50% believe Israel can be destroyed following the events of October 7. This tension and apparent contradiction in responses can be explained by the fact that the two-state formula is perceived by many Palestinians, especially younger respondents, as a temporary rather than final arrangement.
• More than half or 59% of the Palestinians in the West Bank believe that Israelis and Palestinians cannot live together with full civil equality within a single state; 40% think this is possible, and 2% did not have an opinion.

Modes of Struggle to End the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict

• In the current survey, negotiations are perceived as the preferred means to end the conflict: 43% of the Palestinian public in the West Bank views negotiation as the preferred course of action. Another 25% supports nonviolent popular resistance and 17% backs armed struggle. Only 3% expressed support for other options, and 11% said they do not know.
• Nevertheless, the public is divided over the effectiveness of armed struggle. While 50% of the Palestinian public in the West Bank believes that the armed struggle has failed and that the focus should shift to diplomatic efforts on the international stage, 43% rejects that claim. When asked about continuing a difficult armed struggle “for a future victory,” almost half at 49% supported its continuation, while 43% opposed it.
• More than half of the West Bank public (57%) believes that the kidnapping of Israeli civilians does not serve Palestinian national goals, while 31% sees it as a useful means to achieve national objectives. This finding underscores the debate among Palestinians over the effectiveness of actions that harm civilians.

The data indicate an internal division between those who support continuing the armed struggle and those who favor a shift toward diplomatic channels or nonviolent resistance (i.e., negotiations). Support for armed struggle declines with the respondent’s age, indicating a generational difference in perceptions of courses of action.

Hamas and the Palestinian System in Gaza After the War

• About half (46%) of the Palestinian public in the West Bank believes that Hamas’s decision regarding the events of October 7 was wrong, while about a quarter (26%) believes the decision was correct. A relatively large percentage of the population (28%) did not express an opinion on the matter, which may indicate public uncertainty or caution regarding the legitimacy of the attack.
• The effect of the October 7 events on the chances of establishing an independent Palestinian state is also mixed: While 35% of respondents see the Hamas attack as a step that harmed those chances, 29% believe it advanced them, and 25% think it had no real impact.
• The question of disarming Hamas as a step to end the war likewise sharpens the divide within the Palestinian public. Forty-three percent oppose disarming Hamas, 36% support it as a measure to end the war, and 21% chose not to take a position.
• As for the future regime in Gaza after the war, the preferred option among the Palestinian public in the West Bank is a unity government of Hamas and Fatah, which received 39% support. Twenty-four percent think control should be returned to the Palestinian Authority, and 17% express a preference for a technocratic administration under the supervision of Arab states. A minority of 8% support continued Hamas rule, while 12% indicated other options or declined to state a preference. Gender breakdowns reveal differences: Women tend to support a unity government (46% versus 37% of men); men express more confidence in the Palestinian Authority (27% versus 13% of women); and women show a higher tendency to support continued Hamas rule (14% versus 6% of men).

The overall picture points to a lack of clarity about the future governing arrangements preferred by the Palestinian public in the West Bank and about Gaza’s future. Alongside widespread criticism of Hamas’s decisions on October 7, there is support for Hamas’s continued political activity, together with disagreement over the preservation of its military wing and its role.

Perceptions About the State of Israel

• More than half of the Palestinian public in the West Bank (54%) thinks that the State of Israel has no right to exist, while 38% believes it does, and 8% did not express an opinion. Among 18–34 year-olds in the West Bank, the proportion opposing Israel’s existence is particularly high (75%) compared to older age groups.
• A majority of 69% of the Palestinian public believes that Israel will not exist forever, while only a small minority (16%) thinks it will; an additional 16% did not express an opinion.
• Half of the Palestinian public believes that, following the events of October 7 and the war in Gaza, it may be possible to destroy the State of Israel, while 40% thinks this is not possible, and the remainder (10%) did not express an opinion.
• Slightly more than half of the Palestinian public in the West Bank (53%) estimated that the war would end in defeat for both sides. Fifteen percent believed the war would end without a clear victory for either side, 13% expected a Hamas victory, and only 6% believed Israel would win. By level of religiosity, expectations of a Hamas victory were higher among religious respondents (17%), compared to only 2% among those who described themselves as “somewhat religious” and none among those who described themselves as “not religious.”

The findings indicate very negative attitudes toward the State of Israel, characterized primarily by the denial of its right to exist, especially among young people. Alongside the assessment that the war would not end in a clear victory, a substantial portion of the Palestinian public in the West Bank believes that, as a result of October 7, it would be possible to destroy the State of Israel.

Intra-Palestinian Politics and Institutions

• Forty-eight percent of the Palestinian public in the West Bank believes that holding elections and changing the leadership is the most essential reform needed for the Palestinian Authority to lead the establishment of a Palestinian state. However, in a separate question, about 40% said that if elections were held, they would not vote, and another 25% said they did not know for whom they would vote. The second most important priority was combating corruption and promoting internal reform (13%), followed by unity and reconciliation between factions (11%). Other priorities included a change in political and strategic approach (9%) and economic reform (3%). Another 3% mentioned other possibilities, while 14% expressed no opinion.
• The findings also indicate a clear advantage for Fatah over Hamas (26% vs. 6%).
• An overwhelming majority of the Palestinian public in the West Bank (97%) reported that they receive no support at all from civil society organizations, while only 3% said they receive such support occasionally.

These findings reflect widespread distrust in existing Palestinian institutions, alongside a demand for leadership change and elections, yet also a pattern of political disengagement, likely due to a perception of the Palestinian system as corrupt and illegitimate. In other words, there is a gap between recognizing the need for change—centered on holding elections—and the willingness to participate politically in practice.

Regional Alliances and Normalization Arrangements

• A majority of the Palestinian public in the West Bank (71%) views normalization measures between Israel and Arab states as a betrayal of the Palestinian people. Only a minority (9%) believes such steps help advance the establishment of a Palestinian state, and 7% regards them as legitimate.
• Regarding the influence of Arab states on the future of the Palestinians, 61% of respondents believe Arab countries have no decisive influence on establishing a Palestinian state, compared to 39% who attribute a significant role to them. Among younger respondents (ages 18–34), a higher proportion (52%) believe that Arab states have a decisive impact, compared to older age groups.
• The Palestinian public in the West Bank is divided over the idea of a regional alliance: About 48% supports establishing a regional alliance including Israel, the Palestinians, and Arab states, within which a Palestinian state would be established—possibly out of an understanding that this may be the only viable path to statehood today. Meanwhile, 43% of the public opposes the idea, and 9% “don’t know.”

Identity and Demography

• Religious (Muslim) identity is the most prominent component of self-definition among Palestinians in the West Bank: 52% cited it as central to their identity, compared to 39% who cited national (Palestinian) identity, and only 6% who identified ethnic (Arab) identity as central. Another 3% chose “other.”
• Regarding the demographic balance between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea (West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel), 37% of respondents estimate that there are more Arabs than Jews in the area, 25% believe the numbers are roughly equal, and 24% think Jews are the majority.
• On the economic level, an overwhelming majority (87%) of the Palestinian public in the West Bank reported that their economic situation has worsened since October 7; 12% said it remained unchanged, and only 1% reported improvement.
• A majority of 74% are concerned about the destruction of cities in the West Bank, following the devastation in Gaza (55% are very concerned and 19% somewhat concerned). Conversely, 27% are not concerned (11% not very concerned and 16% not concerned at all). The high level of concern about possible destruction in the West Bank reflects a deep sense of uncertainty that prevailed before the war ended regarding its continuation and its potential implications for the local arena.