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Over the past few years, Iran has orchestrated several influence and interference operations targeting Israeli society, with the goal of deepening internal rifts and undermining national cohesion. Iran’s activity is not aimed at supporting any particular side of the Israeli political spectrum; rather, it seeks to pit different segments of society against each other by radicalizing discourse around contentious issues. To achieve this, Iran makes contact with various individuals in Israel through digital means, attempting to deceive them into unwittingly advancing Iranian interests, such as by distributing flyers (printed under Iranian orders and funding), hanging posters, or painting graffiti.

Recently, Iran’s modus operandi has shifted: Its agents no longer conceal their ties to Iranian intelligence and now encourage their Israeli recruits to carry out increasingly daring missions. These include pushing individuals in Israel to commit acts of violence, such as arson of cars and forests, and even attempts to target high-ranking officials. During the Israel–Iran war and in its lead-up, the Iranians instructed some recruits to gather intelligence on potential strike targets.

At the same time, recent reports from the United Kingdom indicate that Iran is conducting similar interference efforts among the British public, with two main objectives. First, echoing its activities in Israel, Iran seeks to destabilize British society by undermining social cohesion and public trust in democratic institutions. Second, Iran attempts to exploit existing societal divisions to sway public opinion toward anti-Israel positions.

A July 2025 report by the British Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee ranks Iran alongside Russia as a significant threat to national security. The report emphasizes that Iran operates against the United Kingdom through its Ministry of Intelligence and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) using a wide array of methods: physical and digital espionage, assassination attempts, cyberattacks, subversion of democratic institutions, and political interference. Cyberspace is described as Tehran’s preferred domain due to its accessibility and plausible deniability. While the Iranian threat is more narrowly focused than the Russian one, it is portrayed as determined, well-resourced, and dangerous—making it dynamic, unpredictable, and hard to detect. The report also highlights Iran’s efforts to influence British public opinion, undermine political institutions, and fuel societal polarization, in part by reinforcing anti-Israel and anti-American narratives.

The report criticizes the British government for prioritizing the threat of Iran’s nuclear program while neglecting the more complex challenge of its subversive influence, along with a severe lack of dedicated expertise to understand and address this phenomenon. In the background, relations between the two countries have seriously deteriorated, mainly due to Iran’s progress in its nuclear program, Tehran’s support for Russia in the war against Ukraine, covert operations in Britain against individuals it views as hostile (including members of the Iranian opposition and exiled  journalists), and British support for moves by Israel and the United States aimed at countering Iran.

To advance its goals in the United Kingdom, Tehran uses overt and covert capabilities it has developed over the years, some of which have already been “tested” on the Israeli public. On the overt level, Iran operates the English-language channel Press TV to deliver messages on its behalf to British society. On the covert level, Iran runs fake accounts on social media, mainly on the X platform (formerly Twitter), to disseminate content encouraging separatism across the United Kingdom (such as in Scotland), thereby supporting narratives that weaken British society. It should be emphasized that Iran views the digital space as a convenient arena of operation since it can engage directly with its rivals without paying a price, due to the understanding that its connection to such activity cannot be directly proven. Iran invests significant resources in upgrading its influence capabilities, particularly on social media, using advanced AI technologies that make it extremely difficult to detect Iranian influence networks.

These activities correspond with other Iranian intervention efforts in Britain. These include suppressing the Iranian opposition in exile; intimidating journalists and activists of Iranian origin through espionage, threats, and violence (as in the cyberattack on the “Iran International” website and the leak of journalists’ personal data); and trying to influence public opinion and government institutions through registered bodies, lobbyists, and NGOs, and at times via connections with politicians or anti-Western groups. Additionally, Iran seeks to exploit the academic and cultural arena to promote its interests, taking advantage of Britain’s openness to integrate into educational and religious frameworks. This enables Iran to shape the views of the younger generation and disseminate pro-Iranian and anti-Israeli content.

It is important to emphasize that without a response, this phenomenon is likely to grow. In the digital sphere, Iran is heavily investing in upgrading its interference capabilities, particularly on social media platforms, using advanced AI technologies, which will make it difficult to detect Iranian influence networks. Iran views the digital space as a favorable arena of operation, as it allows direct engagement with its rivals at little cost, based on the assumption that its involvement in influence campaigns cannot be easily proven.

Britain has recognized the threat of foreign interference for several years now, with suspicions of Russian meddling in the “Brexit” referendum serving as a turning point in the national attitude toward the issue. However, it was only in February 2024 that the British government formally defined Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) as a strategic threat requiring an international response. In a joint declaration, Britain, the United States, and Canada stated that actions under FIMI constitute a significant threat to national security, democratic institutions, human rights, and public trust.

In recent years, concerns about foreign interference in Britain have primarily focused on Russia, while threats from China and Iran were generally perceived  as secondary. In the case of Iran, diplomatic measures were taken, such as summoning the ambassador for urgent talks, and government discussions were held about declaring the IRGC a terrorist organization and imposing sanctions on its leaders. However, these efforts did not materialize, largely due to fears of an Iranian response. British officials also emphasized the Russian–Iranian threat intended to deepen polarization in the West and exploit it for their needs. A 2020 report by the British Parliament’s Intelligence and Security Committee sharply criticized the British intelligence community's failure to identify and prevent foreign interference, particularly by Russia. In response, the government committed to carrying out intelligence reforms, including the creation of a dedicated team to assess threats from hostile states and the passage of the National Security Act (2023), which expanded the powers of intelligence agencies to address state-backed subversion.

In 2022, the British National Security Council established the Defending Democracy Taskforce, aimed at coordinating a comprehensive government response to emerging threats in this context. The program focuses on addressing disinformation, election interference, threats to public officials, and so forth. The program operates in an interdepartmental format, headed by the minister of defense, and collaborates with bodies including the National Cyber Security Centre, the Electoral Commission, the police, the intelligence community, and civil society actors. In July 2025, the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme was launched, requiring any individual or entity operating on behalf of a foreign state to report its activities in Britain. This initiative includes provisions for criminal sanctions to enforce compliance.

However, despite these initiatives, professional bodies and members of Parliament continue to argue that the Britain’s intelligence response remains partial. First, one concern is the lack of coordination between offensive, defensive, and psychological cyber activities across various government bodies, leading to duplication of roles or gaps in information sharing. Second, another concern is the absence of a coordinated and comprehensive framework for the early detection of complex disinformation campaigns, especially those that combine foreign sources with local actors. Finally, critics have also emphasized the lack of transparency and the failure to commit to regularly reporting on these threats, a shortfall that undermines public trust and prevents a full understanding of the threat. In the Iranian context specifically, the July 2025 report by the Intelligence and Security Committee points to the absence of a comprehensive strategy for dealing with the Iranian threat, a lack of coordination among government ministries, and the absence of a comprehensive and long-term response plan to confront Iran in non-nuclear arenas.

British civil society plays an important part in identifying, exposing, and halting Iranian interference attempts by filling in gaps left by state institutions. For example, independent research institutes have published reports on Iranian influence within cultural, educational, academic, and religious institutions, highlighting the indirect support of these bodies for Tehran’s policies. Recently, civil society organizations have expanded their educational activities to raise public awareness about the dangers of disinformation and foreign interference. Organizations such as the Centre for Information Resilience work to expose fake content, campaigns funded by suspicious sources, and to analyze non-authentic distribution patterns on social networks. University initiatives, workshops for pupils and students, as well as collaborations with journalists’ organizations aim to strengthen the critical abilities of the general public and to ensure that the British public discourse remains open but not vulnerable to hostile interference.

Implications for Israel

The British government’s experience in dealing with foreign interference offers several insights that Israel can adopt:

• Recognition of FIMI as a strategic threat: A key insight from the British approach, supported by other democratic countries, is the importance of defining FIMI as a strategic cross-sector threat, rather than as a passing media trend or a narrow intelligence issue. Such recognition is vital for the state to mobilize appropriate national resources, formulate a multi-layered policy, and sustain long-term international cooperation.
• Inter-ministerial institutional organization: Britain’s establishment of dedicated bodies, such as the Defending Democracy Taskforce, has helped consolidate the efforts of government agencies, intelligence services, and law enforcement bodies. In Israel, where responsibilities for addressing foreign interference are divided among various ministries, there is a need to reassess the organizational structure and internal coordination in response to this challenge. This effort should also include civil society actors, as the British experience demonstrates the importance of engaging civilian bodies in identifying disinformation, educating the public, and advising policymakers. British civil society organizations and independent research institutes participate in parliamentary discussions and operate monitoring tools with government support. Israel should establish similar mechanisms for cooperation, allowing for flexible, rapid, and decentralized responses to foreign influence threats.
• Legislation tailored to the threats: In recent years, Britain has developed a series of innovative legal frameworks to deal with such threats, including the National Security Act (2023) and the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme. Israel should create dedicated legislation that clearly defines foreign interference, provides tools for sanctions and monitoring, and balances national security with civil liberties.

In the bilateral context, the identification of Iranian interference operations in Britain and the negative sentiment among the leadership in London toward Iran create fertile ground for close cooperation between the countries to counter this phenomenon. Despite the tension between Jerusalem and London regarding the war in the Gaza Strip, it appears that, with regard to Iran, there is no significant gap between the two countries. Accordingly, it is appropriate to strengthen bilateral relations between the two countries by working together to reduce the scope of the threat. Since interference operations affect many countries around the world—most of which are not necessarily focused on Tehran’s nuclear program or its conventional military capabilities—Iran’s activity on social networks and in the cyber domain can serve as a valuable tool for Israel to illustrate the regime’s malign behavior.

The recent revelations in Britain about Iranian interference operations should not come as a surprise, as they reflect a consistent pattern of activity that Iran has used and will continue to use against any country it seeks to weaken from within. It is reasonable to assume that Iran is conducting dozens, if not hundreds, of interference operations against various countries. Recently, for example, reports have highlighted expanded Iranian interference activity in the Caucasus, along with extensive operations in Africa and Latin America. In other words, Iranian interference operations are no longer only Israel’s problem; rather, they are a global challenge that requires joint action to combat.