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Special Publication, February 11, 2021
Relations between Iran and the United States reached a low point at the end of the Trump administration. Harsh sanctions, the elimination of Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, billion-dollar arms sales to the Gulf states, and normalization agreements between Israel and the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain were all encouraged by Washington in the recent past.
The year 2021 began with a change of administration in the US and it will also see a change of president in Iran. The possibility of a return to the nuclear agreement, the JCPOA, is on the table, with a clear demand both for its improvement and for some reference being made to Iran’s missile program and regional policy.
This monograph comprises a collection of articles written by experts from the US, Europe, and Israel. Each article sheds light on a different aspect of the complex relations between Iran and the West, their prospects, and their implications for the wider Middle East.
The collection was edited by Sima Shine, head of the Iran Program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS).
Table of Contents:
This monograph is a special collection of articles by experts from Europe, the United States and Israel, who have been cooperating in an inter-think tank working group under the auspices of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) and Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) Israel. All articles have a focus on the Iranian issue from different perspectives. The introductory article is written by myself as one of the main conveners of the international working group, and the monograph editor.
Iran is starting 2021 after one of the most difficult periods that the Islamic Republic has known. The previous year began with the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the elite Quds Force, and the downing of a Ukraine Airlines flight, and the accompanying riots, and continued with the most dramatic and influential event the world over, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which in the Middle East affected Iran most severely. To these were added the assassination of the head of the nuclear weapons program, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, and Israel’s normalization agreements with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain, all against the backdrop of a dire economic situation and deep political polarization in Iran.
The European Union (EU) as well as individual EU member states are putting a lot of stock into improved relations with the United States under its 46th president, Joe Biden. Combating both the raging COVID-19 pandemic and the less visible, though no less pronounced, effects of climate change are at the top of the agenda. Interestingly – compared to the scale of the challenge – redeveloping a joint approach vis-à-vis Iran is a close runner-up. To do this, both sides intend to build on the 2015 nuclear deal while aiming to include regional security issues in any follow-up agreement.
The Gulf Arab states, notably, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, felt aggrieved that Iran’s regional behavior was not addressed by the Obama administration and the other P5+1 states when they signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. Although they felt relief during the Trump presidency, especially when Donald Trump withdrew the US from the agreement in 2018, their fears have resurfaced now that Joe Biden is about to enter the White House and revive the agreement. However, the environment has changed markedly since 2015, and the Gulf states are arguably better positioned now to persuade the P5+1 to address regional issues, should President Biden fulfil his election pledge.
From convergence to divergence: US withdrawal from the JCPOA With the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the unanimously passed United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), which endorsed the JCPOA, both the United States and the European Union (EU) demonstrated a conversion of their strategic approaches towards limiting the Iranian nuclear program. As a consequence, the American and European sanctions architecture towards Iran worked in parallel and affected both jurisdictions in a harmonized manner.
Ever since US President Donald Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement in May 2018, it has been assumed that American policy toward Tehran hinged on the outcome of the 2020 US presidential elections. A second Trump term, the conventional wisdom held, would mean the continuation of his policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran, whereas the election of former vice president Joe Biden would mean its end, and the US’ return to the 2015 nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
Since the end of the period between 2003 and 2005, European and French foreign policy towards Iran have followed the US lead under both Republican and Democratic administrations. The myth of European-led nuclear negotiations with Iran, conducted without interruption from 2003 to 2015, is to a significant extent the product of a rewriting of history by diplomatic actors from the Quai d’Orsay. In constructing this myth, their objective is to downplay the hardline stance taken by France on the Iranian nuclear issue before the conclusion of the Iran deal in 2015.1 It is true that the European “E3” – France, Germany, and the UK – played a major diplomatic role between 2003 and 2005 at the initial stage of the internationalization of the Iranian nuclear issue. Nevertheless, the Western strategic line has always been defined by Washington, despite a nominally independent European diplomatic initiative and a European-led administrative framework. Indeed, for reasons related to the lack of European economic sovereignty and the refusal of Europeans to really implement a policy of independence from Washington on this issue, the 2005-2007 period is marked by the end of a European alternative for a resolution of the Iranian nuclear dossier throughout a Brussels-led diplomatic process.
In 2021, Tehran will stand at a fork in the road and will be forced to choose between continued resistance or reorientation. The election to the presidency of Joe Biden in the US presents Iran with a unique chance to revisit its domestic, economic, regional, and international policies. After a grueling four years of sanctions and unrelenting pressure imposed by the Trump administration, Tehran has an opportunity to manage three interconnected crises that impact stability in the Islamic Republic – mounting international tensions, economic pain, and internal factional competition. Reducing pressure in these arenas is also necessary to also address the larger ever-critical issue of the supreme leader’s succession process.
On February 13, 2019, Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, published an “important and strategic message” to mark the 40th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution. In the message, Khamenei listed the achievements of the revolution and presented a roadmap for the implementation of the “second stage” of the revolution’s path. Regarding foreign policy, Khamenei noted that the international arena is facing an “Islamic awakening” that is based on the model of resistance to American and Zionist dominance, and that the United States and its allies have failed while Iran has expanded its presence in the region. He emphasized that no problem with the US can be solved and that negotiations with it will not bear any fruit, except for material and moral damage. To a certain extent, one can see this roadmap as the political last will of the 82-year-old Khamenei, who is nearing the end of his tenure, and it indicates his determination to uphold the values of the revolution given the significant internal and external challenges that the Islamic Republic is facing.
The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.
Publication Series Special Publication
TopicsIran