A Nuclear Crisis in Search of a Model: Lessons from Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria

Theinterim deal signed in Geneva by the P5+1 and Iran is meant only to put “moretime on the clock” in order to negotiate a final deal – a comprehensive agreementthat will ensure that Iran backs away from its military nuclear ambitions. Asthe international community embarks on its most difficult proliferation challengeyet, what lessons can be drawn from confrontations with other determinedproliferators? What model best applies?

When internationalfocus in mid-2003 turned almost simultaneously to the Iranian and North Koreannuclear crises, diplomacy emerged as the virtually unchallenged strategy for confrontingthe nuclear aspirations of both determined proliferators. The decision topursue negotiations rather than military force did not emerge by chance, norwas it inevitable. Rather, it was a deliberate choice that was shaped in largemeasure by the dynamics surrounding the US invasion of Iraq earlier that year. TheUS choice to employ military force to confront potential WMD proliferators after9/11 had met with serious opposition well before the US decision to go to warin Iraq, and was amplified as America prepared for attack. But the final nailon the coffin of the “use-of-force” strategy came after US forces that invadedIraq failed to find the WMD that were the declared justification for going towar.

Theshadow of Iraq loomed large over efforts to confront Iran’s nuclear ambitions overthe course of the next decade, and had two decidedly negative consequences. First,it severely constrained efforts to establish firm grounds for the existence ofa “smoking gun” regarding Iran’s military nuclear ambitions. Compounding the alreadydifficult task of presenting evidence of military nuclear activities in an NPTmember state – primarily due to the centrality of dual-use technology – was thenagging insistence of skeptics that if Iraq was unfairly accused of WMDcapabilities, who is to say Iran is not similarly misjudged? It was only inlate 2011, when the full annex on the possible military dimensions of Iran’snuclear program was revealed, that the suspicions were broadly recognized as constitutinga virtual smoking gun. By this time, however, crucial years were wasted on less-thandetermined efforts to confront Iran. Second, the US military venture in Iraqproduced a gun-shy America when it came to Iran; this undermined an importantlever of pressure that could have been achieved through credible threats ofmilitary consequences for lack of Iranian seriousness at the negotiations table.Unfortunately, every presidential statement that “all options are on the table”was diluted by a US official proclaiming that another war would be a disaster.

Now thatnegotiations with Iran have produced an interim deal, the North Korean model comesinto sharper relief. Negotiations with North Korea over the past two decades produceda number of agreements that were ultimately not upheld by North Korea. The mostnotable was the deal struck in September 2005 whereby North Korea committed to abandonits nuclear program and pursue nuclear disarmament in return for economic andenergy assistance. But the deal never materialized – North Korea tested itsfirst nuclear device the following year, and since then has continued on a pathof nuclear defiance despite additional attempts to restart negotiations.

TheNorth Korean model thus demonstrates that when trying to stop a determinedproliferator, regardless of whether the approach is negotiations or militaryforce, the challenge is the same: to get the determined proliferator to backaway from military aspirations and return to its NPT commitments. As such, itis always a game of compellence.

Whenmilitary force is chosen, the element of compellence is quite apparent. But itis often overlooked in the case of negotiations, especially when diplomacy ismistakenly couched in the language of “confidence building.” But in fact, successfulnegotiations necessitate an equally forceful approach; to achieve nuclearrollback via negotiations, the international community will have to be armed (inmore ways than one) with a considerable degree of leverage. In all scenarios,the determined proliferator is trying to proliferate, and there is no deal thatwill meet its interests in this regard, unless pressure (military threats and/oreconomic sanctions) becomes unbearable. Therefore, whatever approach is taken,leverage is the key to success.

Forall the differences between the cases of Iran and North Korea, the North Koreanmodel demonstrates clearly what happens when a determined proliferator facesinternational negotiators that are devoid of any leverage for compelling it toreverse course in the nuclear realm. Once North Korea demonstrated that it is anuclear state, the military option was rendered null and void. That left only economicpressure, but the specifics of the North Korean case basically neutralized economicleverage as well. Due to Chinese and Russian fears that the collapse of NorthKorea would spark a massive influx of refugees across their borders, the two powershave been unwilling to risk creating an economic disaster in North Korea. Thishas engendered the unusual dynamic whereby North Korea is subjected tosanctions after every case of defying UN Security Council resolutions, but whenit returns to the table to negotiate, it normally receives the economicassistance that it seeks – generally in return for meaningless North Korean nuclearpromises.

The experienceof dealing with North Korea underscores the importance of the economic leveragethat the P5+1 finally gained over Iran in 2012, following the set of strong andeffective economic and financial sanctions that the US and EU put in place. Themilitary option is also still realistic enough to be on the table seriously. Ifthis leverage is squandered in return for anything less than very significantnuclear concessions by Iran, the Iranian case will very likely begin lookingmore and more like North Korea, with the international community increasinglypowerless to stop it.

Twoadditional models highlight another important lesson for those trying tonegotiate a deal with Iran: Libya (2003) and Syria (2013). The lesson of these twocases is that when pressure succeeds in forcing a state to actually make thedecision to reverse course – Libya regarding all WMD, and Syria regarding its chemicalweapons – it does not take years to finalize a deal. Indeed, the details can beworked out very quickly, and the process can begin almost immediately. In theSyrian case, for example, no one contends that the rollback is not finalbecause the knowhow to make chemical weapons is still in the minds of Syrian scientists,an argument that has lately been thrown into the Iranian debate. When a statemakes a genuine decision to roll back its program, these arguments are irrelevant– they are only raised when that decision has not been taken.