The steps taken by Israel and the international community have thus far not succeeded in weakening the organization. This study argues that in addition to considering Hizbollah’s military power, the organization’s other assets must be taken into account, including its Iranian connection; developments along the Israel-Syria axis; and its domestic Lebanese standing. Weakening Hizbollah rests on reducing it to an unimportant actor on the regional scene, and the study offers some proactive strategies toward this end.
On October 28, 2007 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General (DG), Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, criticized the Israeli attack on a suspected Syrian nuclear site and said, “If countries have information that the country is working on a nuclear-related program, they should come to us.”[1] He then went on to argue that the Vienna-based Agency “had the authority and capacity to investigate any such information.” In view of past performance, the claim of “authority and capacity” bears...
Iran began a process of negotiations with the IAEA this summer with the aim of clearing up the lingering outstanding questions regarding its past nuclear activities. As always with Iran, this involves a complicated process, including pre-talks and then endless room for further conditions and clarifications down the road. Once again Iran dangles the bait of “cooperation” as a means of gaining valuable time for pressing its program forward. Russia and China, joined this time also by Germany, are unwilling to punish Iran...
On August 27, 2007, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published an Information Circular (INCIRC 711) that included the text of the “Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues.” Towards the end of that document, the following text can be found: “The Agency’s delegation is of the view that the agreement on the above issues shall further promote the efficiency of the implementation of safeguards in Iran and its ability to...
In early July, two events raised some optimism about the prospects for peacefully resolving the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program — the pronouncement of the Director General (DG) of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concerning the centrifuge enrichment program and the feeling that Iran, in its negotiations with the IAEA and the Europeans, had made significant concessions on the question of IAEA inspections. To buttress the impression that things are getting better, the IAEA has been promulgating several...
Given the time that has elapsed since the ceasefire ended the Second Lebanon War, a full examination of the war’s effects on both sides and on the entire region remains a challenge. However, it is clear that the processes that led to the war, the way the war was conducted, and the war’s results will have a lasting impact on the region and beyond. While it is questionable if there is a “new Middle East,” it is possible that we are witnessing significant changes such that the current Middle East is different in many ways from the one...
The facts concerning the status of Iran’s nuclear project are quite clear. Their implications are unequivocal. Yet there are those in the corridors of power that would lead us to believe that business is still as usual and that much can yet be done to reverse the situation. The following will review the facts, discuss their implications and evaluate the chances of dealing with the precarious situation at the present stage of developments.
On March 10, a one-day conference on the stabilization of Iraq was held in Baghdad. The ambassadorial-level conference included representatives from Iraq itself and all of its neighbors, including Iran and Syria, from the five permanent members of the Security Council, and from several other states. The discussions focused on the question of how to help Iraq deal with the problem of internal violence and reconcile its various ethnic and sectarian groups. Conference participants described the meeting as a positive first step and...
On March 3, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad paid his first official visit to Saudi Arabia. Those who anticipated some dramatic outcome were disappointed. Not only were no concrete agreements announced; the summit with King Abdullah did not even produce the kind of anodyne communiqué that normally follows such meetings.
A Nuclear Iran: What Does it Mean, and What Can be Done? argues that it is still possible to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, yet conditions to stop it do not currently exist, and time is running out. There is as yet no international consensus to implement effective sanctions. A military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, albeit possible, is a difficult option. Yet despite the severity of the Iranian nuclear threat, several factors could reduce the likelihood that Iran will use nuclear weapons against Israel....
If the United States organizes effective economic sanctions against Iran or especially if the Bush Administration decides on military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, Iran may try to strike back with its “oil weapon,” to suspend oil exports and disrupt oil traffic in the Straits of Hormuz, through which pass about 40% of the world’s oil trade. Activation of this threat might push the price of oil as high as $200 per barrel, with unimaginable damage to western and Japanese economies.
This study argues that it is still possible to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, yet conditions to stop it do not currently exist, and time is running out. There is as yet no international consensus to implement effective sanctions. A military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities, albeit possible, is a difficult option. Yet despite the severity of the Iranian nuclear threat, several factors could reduce the likelihood that Iran will use nuclear weapons against Israel.
