For most of the world, the Israeli disengagement from Gaza and the northern West Bank that began on Monday is an event whose outcome will directly affect the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. When analysts and policymakers ask about “the day after,” they are generally thinking about how Israel and the Palestinians will interact with each other in the future. In fact, since the disengagement was not formulated as part of a broader strategic plan; its ultimate impact on the conflict is highly uncertain and will be...
On July 20, Fatah and Hamas agreed to end several days of fierce clashes on the streets of Gaza that had erupted following an escalation of mortar and rocket attacks by Hamas on Israel and an effort by Fatah to enforce the tahdia (relaxation of the violence) agreed to by Hamas in March.
In advance of the disengagement from Gaza and the northern West Bank in mid-August, Israel is attracting what will certainly be the largest foreign media presence in recent memory. Given its dissatisfaction with press coverage of other salient episodes in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel is consciously attempting to avoid a similar outcome this time, particularly since it assumes that the images emanating from the withdrawal process will be inherently disturbing.
The recent upsurge in violent incidents has been accompanied by predictions by Israeli politicians and security officials that another round of violence is certain to erupt, either before or immediately after the Israeli disengagement from Gaza and the northern West Bank, and that it may well be even more severe than those that preceded it. According to this deterministic school of thought, a third intifada is inevitable and nothing can be done to prevent it. However, a closer examination of the common interests of the dominant...
The Middle East Strategic Balance 2004-2005 Table of Contents Introduction Part I: Middle East Strategic Assessment Chapter 1 The Middle East: Still on the Brink of a New Era / Mark A. Heller External Penetration and Pressure for Change Regional Ramifications Future Directions Chapter 2 The Ongoing Iraqi Crisis / Ephraim Kam The Role of the...
The institutionalization of Fatah mirrors the evolution of the PLO and the Palestinian national cause generally. Understanding the factors that have influenced Fatah’s politics of violence, and its political path – and the balance between the two – help to explain the political history of the Middle East in recent decades. This book documents Fatah’s rise to prominence within the variegated Palestinian national movement through a detailed analysis of the organization’s evolution – from its inception in 1959, through the climactic...
In a farewell newspaper interview last week, outgoing IDF Chief of Staff Lt-Gen Moshe Yaalon predicted that the Israeli disengagement from Gaza, if not accompanied by some ongoing political initiative, will be followed by another violent stage in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yaalon calls this next stage “the second war of terror.ג”
The Central Elections Committee of the Palestinian Authority has informed Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), the president of the PA, that it cannot carry out the elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) as scheduled on 17 July. The reason, according to the CEC, is that it needs at least two months following ratification of the new elections law to make proper arrangements. That law has passed its third reading in parliament but has not yet been signed by Abu Mazen and therefore has not gone into effect. But beyond the...
A major political-strategic objective of Hamas since its creation has been to institutionalize itself as an alternative to Fatah as the dominant force, first in the PLO and thereafter in the Palestinian Authority, as well. As an intermediate goal, Hamas leaders during the first intifada sought to be incorporated into the PLO, on condition that they be given 40% representation in PLO institutions. That demand was grounded in the degree of support among the population in the West Bank and Gaza claimed by the movement’s leaders,...
On March 17, Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad and several smaller Palestinian organizations agreed in Cairo to extend the current “lull” (tahdi’a) in military operations until the end of 2005 and to implement a series of reforms in Palestinian political institutions. This agreement constitutes a landmark in the current phase of Israeli-Palestinian relationships as well as in internal Palestinian politics.
The one-day meeting held in London on March 1 to mobilize global support for the Palestinian Authority was a fallback position for the participants, many of whom would have much preferred a full-blown international conference to make peace between Israel and the Palestinians. But when British Prime Minister Tony Blair traveled to Washington immediately after the reelection of George W. Bush in November, it was made clear to him that the American administration opposed such an ambitious venture as long as the conditions were not yet...
Following the Sharm al-Shaykh summit and the declaration of a cessation of violence issued by Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, the Government of Israel decided to release 500 Palestinian prisoners. For the time being, the release is restricted to prisoners who have not killed or assisted in the killing of Israelis and who have already served at least two-thirds of their sentence. But the Government also signaled its intention to consider further releases in the future. This decision was intended to be a gesture to...