When President Obama met with the president of China in Beijing last month, he cautioned that he would not be able to block an Israeli attack against Iran much longer unless there is progress in the attempts to stop Iran’s nuclear program. This warning was intended to persuade China of the urgent need for additional sanctions against Iran. Yet even if the potential success of this warning is questionable, it raises questions about Chinese interests in Iran and the Middle East as a whole, about Israel’s place vis-à-vis...
The agenda of the Gulf Cooperation Council’s thirtieth annual summit, which ended last week in Kuwait, was particularly ambitious. Among the topics on the table were establishment of a joint economic council and connection of the inter-state electrical grids and railways. However, the credit crisis in Dubai, the ongoing warfare on the Saudi-Yemeni border, and Iran’s developing nuclear program and its negative involvement in the region – challenges that make it difficult for the states to adopt a uniform security and...
The seizure of the ship carrying weapons from Iran to Syria (intended apparently for Hizbollah via Syria) in early November revealed something of the scope of the struggle between Iran and Israel in general and on the high seas in particular, a struggle that is steadily moving upstage. However, the importance of the naval arena in the Iranian context lies not only in the foiling of attempts of weapons shipments making their way to Hizbollah and Hamas. The option of operating at sea allows Israel to refine its deterrent and offensive...
The resolution on Iran adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on November 27 includes important issues that touch upon Iran’s lack of cooperation with the agency, and the steep decline in confidence between the international community and Iran. Significantly, the lack of Iranian cooperation on clearing up questions regarding past weapons-related nuclear activity, a recurrent refrain in IAEA reports over the past two years, is raised once again in this resolution.
Since early October 2009, the talks between Iran and P5+1 (the five permanent members of the Security Council and Germany) have focused on the proposal for a circular deal: Iran would transfer some 80 percent of the low enriched uranium it has produced thus far to Russia (according to the most recent report from the International Atomic Energy Agency of November 16, Iran has to date produced close to 1,800 kg of low enriched uranium); in turn, Russia would enrich the uranium up to a 20 percent level and move it on to a third country...
There are two underlying assumptions on a possible Israeli military operation against Iran. One is that we cannot exercise a military operation as long as some kind of a true dialogue exists between the United States and Iran, whether it is direct or indirect, and as long as the diplomatic avenue is such that it stands certain chances of success. The second assumption is that Israel will not be able to carry out a military operation against Iran even if the diplomatic negotiations fail without some support from the United States....
In recent years, Israel and the entire world have come a long way in understanding the essence of the Iranian threat. At the same time, Iran has made great progress in acquiring nuclear capability. There is also agreement around the world that the Iranian threat is not limited to its neighboring states.
The focus of this piece is the range of diplomatic options available to President-elect Barack Obama once he enters office in January in terms of the Iranian nuclear threat. That is, how Obama will prevent Iran from acquiring further nuclear weapons capabilities that would allow Iran to produce large quantities of weapons-grade nuclear materials. In addition, in order to be realistic about the possibility that the US will not be able to stop Iran through diplomatic means, the US strategy if those diplomatic efforts fail will be...
The emerging nuclear fuel deal between the US, Russia, France, and Iran – whether it is actually implemented or not – is shaping up as another point Iran has scored to fend off international efforts that would cease its uranium enrichment activities. Although this agreement would deplete the Iranian stocks of low enriched uranium (LEU), it would also provide Iran with fresh nuclear fuel for its nuclear research reactor. Moreover, Iran has made it absolutely clear that it has no intention of giving up either its present capabilities...
On Friday, September 25, 2009 Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it had a second uranium enrichment plant under construction. Suspicions concerning a parallel, concealed enrichment program were in fact circulating for some time before the announcement. Iran reportedly disclosed the information to the IAEA because it discovered that Western intelligence agencies became aware of this parallel program and wanted to avoid further embarrassment.
As part of the attempt to jumpstart Israeli-Palestinian discussions, the American administration has in recent months expended significant effort on persuading different Arab nations, headed by the Gulf states, to make certain gestures towards Israel. While in geopolitical terms the Arab-Israeli arena and the Persian Gulf arena are separate, the Persian Gulf states are nonetheless directly or indirectly involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and are influenced by Israeli-Palestinian relations.
Last week Iran submitted a “package of proposals for comprehensive and constructive negotiations” to representatives of the P5+1 states: US, Russia, Britain, France, China, and Germany. This Iranian proposal came in response to requests on the part of the P5+1 to conduct negotiations on the nuclear issue, yet it lacked a key ingredient: namely, any reference to Iran’s nuclear program. It raised instead a wide spectrum of regional and global challenges, which according to one commentary from the Gulf actually...
