Given the time that has elapsed since the ceasefire ended the Second Lebanon War, a full examination of the war’s effects on both sides and on the entire region remains a challenge. However, it is clear that the processes that led to the war, the way the war was conducted, and the war’s results will have a lasting impact on the region and beyond. While it is questionable if there is a “new Middle East,” it is possible that we are witnessing significant changes such that the current Middle East is different in many ways from the one...
Immediately with the announcement of the ceasefire and the end of the fighting between Israel and the Hizbollah organization, both sides – as well as those who had observed from the sidelines – hurried to claim victory. Hizbollah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah declared that Hizbollah’s victory in the war was an historic event, and possibly an historic turning point in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syrian president Bashar Asad, who had not involved his country directly in the war yet did not disguise his support of Hizbollah or...
The Second Lebanon War was waged simultaneously on two fronts: the military front in southern Lebanon, where IDF forces fought in Hizbollah strongholds, and the civilian fronts deep inside Lebanon and Israel, where civilians served as combat targets for both sides. This represented a new height in the trend that has been emerging for some time, whereby the focus of the fighting in the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict transfers from a direct clash between armed forces to a mixed pattern, in which the role of civilians on both sides is...
The war in Lebanon exposed significant deficiencies in the IDF’s level of preparedness for a wide scale military confrontation. These were particularly noticeable in view of the IDF’s ongoing impressive ability to confront Palestinian terror. The discrepancy in the IDF’s performance regarding these two different operational challenges – combating Palestinian terror and fighting the Hizbollah organization in Lebanon – raises numerous questions with regard to the way the forces are operated and justifies an examination of all the...
The purpose of this essay is to analyze several prominent military aspects of the war in Lebanon and derive the main lessons from them. The essay does not deal in historical explanations of what caused any particular instance of military thinking or any specific achievement. Rather, the analysis points to four main conclusions: the importance of clear expression at the command level to reduce the battle fog; the phenomenon of military blindness with respect to the role played by short range rockets (Katyushas) in the overall military...
Comprising sixteen analytical essays and three appendices, the book explores various dimensions to the confrontation initiated by Israel on July 12, 2006 in response to Hizbollah provocation. Studying both the Israeli dimensions of the clash and the greater regional issues, the book provides a comprehensive overview of the war and posits the strategic conclusions that can be drawn from it.
The People Speak: Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 2005-2007 charts and analyzes the results of the three most recent public opinion surveys that have been conducted annually for over twenty years. It offers a profile of the Jewish Israeli body politic and gauge where the Israeli collective is positioned on a host of issues, including possible agreements with the Palestinians, territorial exchange the security fence, unilateralism, and the demographic challenge.
Ron Tira takes a critical look at dramatic changes in the Israel Defense Forces and other Western militaries regarding force structure and force utilization concepts, based on a preference for standoff precision firepower over classic maneuver. Using the Second Lebanon War as a primary case study, the monograph examines some of the limitations inherent in standoff fire capability and argues that by itself it is generally incapable of bringing the enemy to strategic collapse. Tira contends that given Israel’s security reality,...
The recent series of interviews with Syrian President Bashar Asad in Arab and Western media reveals the extent of changes in the Middle East, in general, and Syria, in particular, in the wake of the confrontation between Israel and Hizbullah in the summer of 2006. Before that conflict, Asad hardly ever mentioned “Israeli aggression against Syria that can end in war” or the “state of alert” in the Syrian army, but since then, Asad has repeatedly stressed the readiness of his military forces.
For Hizbullah and its supporters in Lebanon, UN Security Council Resolution 1701 is, if not a clear victory, then certainly the least of all evils. The main reason is that 1701 keeps the discussion of Hizbullah’s disarmament within the confines of the barren exercise known as the “Lebanese National Dialogue.” Moreover, the Resolution provides no effective mechanism for action by the Lebanese Government or UNIFIL to disarm Hizbullah or terminate its existence as a state within a state.
Although Israel’s political leadership has designated the clash with Hizbullah a “war of no choice,” it has still been obliged to define realistic objectives for the prosecution and termination of this war. These objectives must inevitably relate to the broader regional and global context of the confrontation.
In addition to the release of the two soldiers abducted by Hizbullah, the declared objectives of Israel’s military campaign in Lebanon include the dismantling of Hizbullah’s militia and the deployment of the Lebanese armed forces up to the common border. Achieving these objectives in the face of Hizbullah opposition will ultimately require some cooperation, if not from Shi’ites who provide Hizbullah’s base of support, then at least from the other main Lebanese communities: the Sunni Muslims, the Christians and...
