The memorandum, which focuses on the critical challenges facing Israel one year into the Obama administration and the Netanyahu government, compiles the presentations given by the speakers at the INSS third annual international conference.
In view of the possibility of renewed talks between Iran and the “Vienna Group” (the US, France, Russia, and the IAEA) one cannot but wonder whether this will be “the real thing” or another Iranian time-buying ploy. Although at first Iran delayed the opening of talks, it later recommended to the Vienna Group not to delay the talks. Contrary to the talks that started with the P5+1 in Geneva on October 1, 2009 that were supposed to deal with the whole spectrum of issues between Iran and the rest of the world, the Vienna Group dealt...
The pattern of international efforts to confront Iran’s nuclear program has become all too familiar. The West – first the EU-3, and later the US – leads “diplomatic processes” to nowhere; Russia and China go back and forth between Iran and the West, reluctant to take too harsh a stance against Iran’s ongoing defiance, and agreeing only to belated and weak UN Security Council resolutions on sanctions; and the IAEA continues to pose questions to Iran about the military dimensions of its nuclear program that Iran avoids...
In a recent appearance before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Meir Dagan, head of the Mossad, claimed that while the Iranians are still seeking nuclear capabilities as a strategic objective, “they have encountered far more difficulties than expected and failed to advance as they had hoped technologically.” It is not clear whether Dagan was referring to technical difficulties at home or foreign difficulties, i.e., external intervention designed to affect the timetable for achieving a nuclear weapons...
On June 9, 2010, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1929, imposing a fourth round of sanctions on Iran. Twelve members of the Security Council voted in favor; Brazil and Turkey, as expected, opposed the decision; and Lebanon abstained. In the words of the resolution, the Security Council noted “with concern” that “Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related projects as set out in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803...
The May 17 signing of the agreement to transfer uranium between Iran, Turkey, and Brazil met with sweeping opposition on the part of the Security Council and aroused new international unrest. The day after the signing, the Security Council’s permanent members, including Russia and China – both of which were surprised by the development – signed a proposed resolution to impose sanctions against Iran. Since then, they have been working to curb the Turkish-Brazilian initiative. Iran, which was surprised by the speed and force of the...
Egypt’s campaign to pressure Israel on the nuclear issue, a firmly established dynamic in the weeks leading up to the NPT Review Conference (RevCon) and during the discussions that took place for close to four weeks in May, ended up overshadowing the RevCon final document. The final document, adopted by consensus, reflects Egypt’s relatively successful campaign to force the US to accept its agenda for starting discussion on a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) and for singling out Israel in the nuclear realm. Egypt stood by...
On May 17, 2010, Iran, Turkey, and Brazil signed an agreement on a swap of 1,200 kg of low enriched uranium (LEU) from Iran in return for 20% enriched uranium reactor fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Should the agreement materialize, it would be an important gain for Iran. Iran would receive fuel for a reactor that while today is used for the production of radioisotopes for medical uses, was previously used for weapons-related research activities: plutonium research and polonium-210 production, whose only use is in nuclear...
Judging by the initial dynamics, the stakes of the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) that began on May 3 are high. The basic positions of the different parties remain very much as they were at the last RevCon, held in 2005: the US wants to focus primarily on the ongoing challenge of NPT violators, especially Iran; the non-nuclear weapons states demand that the nuclear states do more to address their NPT commitments – both to disarm and to allow transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to the non-nuclear states; Egypt is leading the...
<div align=”justify”>As Iran moves closer to a military nuclear capability, and the international community demonstrates that it is ineffective—if not totally helpless—in keeping Iran from this goal, discussion on this topic has shifted disturbingly to the potential to contain a nuclear Iran. While the time may come to explore this option, we are not there yet. </div>
In an unusual statement, the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates recently compared the Iranian occupation of the three Gulf islands it claims – Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb – to “the Israeli occupation of Arab land.” Both the highly irregular statement and the sensitive analogy dramatize the concern in the Gulf that Iran, under the aegis of its nuclear program, seeks to dominate not only the region’s agenda but also Arab territory. The foreign minister’s statement prompted an immediate Iranian response in the form...
On the basis of a memo written by the US Secretary of Defense, the New York Times reported recently that “the United States does not have an effective long-range policy for dealing with Iran’s steady progress toward nuclear capability.” On the same day, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia issued a royal order establishing a science complex called King Abdullah City dedicated solely to “research and development of all aspects of nuclear energy.” Coincidence? Apparently. However, the steady progress made by Iran in its nuclear program and...
