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Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad recently concluded a two-day trip to Lebanon (October 14 and 15, 2010). While there he paid a visit both to high officials of the Lebanese state, as well as to leaders and grassroots supporters of the Islamic Republic's main local ally, Hizbollah. This trip, the first official visit by the Iranian president to Lebanon since 2005, provided the occasion for the Lebanese and the Iranian governments to sign seventeen documents on bilateral cooperation, strengthening the Lebanese-Iranian economic partnership on topics such as energy, gas and oil policy, commerce, agriculture, and joint investments.

            Although Ahmadinejad was very careful in portraying his decision to travel to Lebanon as a desire to enhance the "good diplomatic relations" between the two countries, the political and geo-strategic implications of his visit go well beyond the realm of institutional state-to-state cooperation and diplomacy.

            First, Ahmadinejad's presence in Lebanon was designed to emphasize Tehran's continued interest in playing a leading role in domestic Lebanese politics, mostly through its support of the Lebanese-Shia group Hizbollah, but also through the attempt to increase its direct influence upon the Lebanese state. In this context, the Iranian president's visit to southern Lebanon provided him with the opportunity to pledge his support for Hizbollah and to praise the group's "resistance" against Israel and the other "bullying countries" that he cast as attempting to dominate the region.

Tehran's full support for Hizbollah – a central part of Iranian foreign policy since the group's founding – acquires a much greater significance given the timing chosen to deliver this message. Ahmadinejad's visit came only weeks before the expected release of the findings of the United Nations Special Tribunal for Lebanon, tasked with investigating the assassination of former prime minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005. After five years of investigations, the Tribunal is finally preparing to release its preliminary conclusions, which will allegedly link Hizbollah officials, including senior ones, to the assassination of the former Lebanese prime minister.

In the past few months, Hizbollah's reactions to these accusations have ranged from mounting a fierce campaign to discredit the tribunal to urging the government to revoke its mandate and dismiss its findings. In addition, Hizbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah has downplayed any links that may emerge between the organization and the murder of the former prime minister, specifying that any connection would at most amount to "undisciplined members" with whom the group has no relations. Yet regardless of this intense campaign against the UN Tribunal, an official implication of the Lebanese-Shia group in the Hariri murder could have strong repercussions for the organization’s domestic popularity and legitimacy, and could drastically raise the level of confrontation between Hizbollah and the majority March 14 coalition. In turn, this could lead to a new wave of domestic instability, with the potential of producing a paralyzing political crisis and collapse of the national unity government, or even of escalating into a full-fledged renewal of inter-sectarian hostilities.

In this context, Ahmadinejad's presence in Lebanon and his declared support for Hizbollah, along with his open questioning of the international tribunal, must be read as a powerful signal to the March 14 government to refrain from prosecuting or openly implicating Tehran's local ally in the Hariri murder. Moreover, until now Saudi Arabia and Syria have been the two most involved regional actors, attempting to find a compromise between the parties on the issue of the UN Special Tribunal. The Iranian visit served to make Tehran and its stance on this issue more prominent, defusing any theory that Iranian influence in Lebanon would be in decline.

The United States also likely interpreted the Iranian president’s visit and his remarks in this light, since a few days after Ahmadinejad's departure, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman also visited Beirut, stressing the importance of the UN Tribunal and urging Lebanon to respect its mandate and findings.

Likewise with the objective of strengthening Iranian influence on Lebanon, President Ahmadinejad reiterated Tehran's offer to supply and train the Lebanese armed forces, a proposal openly endorsed by Nasrallah. On a speech on October 9, 2010 Nasrallah stated: "The brethrens in Iran are ready to participate in projects and in financing projects [to help] in equipping the Lebanese army…We have [a] lack of equipment and armament. Well there is a country which is affectionate to Lebanon which is saying I am ready [to] help." Despite the Lebanese government's refusal to accept Iranian military aid, Ahmadinejad's offer to assist the Lebanese army and to eventually replace the military aid coming from Western countries seems to further convey Tehran's decision to remain a crucial player within Lebanon.

Even more importantly, this message strengthens the idea that Iran wants this visit to be interpreted as a sign of the imminent accession of Lebanon into the "resistance axis," which at the moment includes Iran and Syria. Domestically, this idea is extremely destabilizing and divisive, as it is eagerly accepted by the Hizbollah-led opposition forces while adamantly rejected by most of the ruling March 14 coalition. Members of the March 14 coalition published a letter on the eve of Ahmadinejad’s visit accusing Iran of interfering too much in Lebanese domestic affairs and accusing the leader of the Islamic Republic of visiting Lebanon with the attitude “of a high commander to his front line.”

In sum, despite the Iranian president’s conciliatory and diplomatic tone during his meetings with members of the Lebanese government, his statements and attitude when addressing Iran’s local ally, Hizbollah, revealed a different, much less nuanced, agenda. Thus, in expressing his support for Hizbollah while criticizing the ongoing UN investigations, Ahmadinejad aimed at pressuring the Lebanese government to forgo the option of acting against the Lebanese-Shia organization. By backing Hizbollah, Iran also clarified its continued interest in playing a central role in Lebanon and its hope to increase its power and influence in the Mediterranean country.