Wars are difficult and traumatic, and as such, their impact goes well beyond their immediate time frame and the people directly involved. In this sense, the Second Lebanon War is not unusual. In hindsight, and in light of the thoughtful analyses presented at this conference, it seems that the most prominent phenomenon about the Second Lebanon War is the fact that it was a watershed – a pivotal moment in which different processes ceased, accelerated, or significantly changed direction. This is true at the personal level regarding the...
In the three years since the Second Lebanon War there has been absolute calm on the northern border, the likes of which no one can remember since the 1970s. This reality was purchased with the lives of civilians and soldiers who fell in battle, with the pain of the injured, both soldiers and civilians, and with the cost of those whose lives were destroyed and who bear the scars and wounds of that war to this day. My heart goes out to them.
It is very difficult to analyze and understand the Second Lebanon War without understanding how the IDF entered it. By this I am not referring to the moment the decision was made to attack on July 12, 2006, rather to the processes that occurred in the years leading up to the war. In this context, it is necessary to try to understand the fields where the military was focusing its endeavors, the topics with which the army was dealing, and the outlook of the IDF’s leadership at that time. It is necessary to focus on two central,...
The following article touches on seven points that are conclusions of sorts from three central military episodes of recent years: Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank in April 2002, the Second Lebanon War, and Operation Cast Lead. A comparison of these events allows us to formulate general conclusions relevant to similar events in the future. Six of the issues refer primarily to the past and the present, but have ramifications for the future. The seventh is an attempt to assess what would happen should a Third Lebanon War...
Hizbollah and Hamas are guerilla and terrorist organizations that in less than 20 years have developed into quasi-governmental entities. They have done so in a relatively smaller area than is usually the case in guerilla warfare, and in the case of the Gaza Strip, primarily in urban areas suited to this type of fighting. Militarily, Hizbollah is a big brother of Hamas: Hizbollah is more experienced, knowledgeable, and selfassured. Nonetheless, Hizbollah is learning from Hamas’ conduct during Operation Cast Lead and is...
This essay seeks to view Operation Cast Lead as a piece in a developing sequence, beginning with the second intifada and continuing through the Second Lebanon War, in terms of two major components: the military response to the threat and the public understanding of the effectiveness of the military response. There is a close symbiotic relationship between the two components because Israel’s response to the threat involves military combat elements alongside civilian stamina and defense capabilities. The two components are...
At the end of the Second Lebanon War, many claimed that the State of Israel had not succeeded in strengthening Israel’s deterrence vis-à-vis Hizbollah. An examination of the organization’s response to Operation Cast Lead and a comparison with its response to Operation Defensive Shield demonstrate that Israel’s actions in the Second Lebanon War did in fact result in considerably stronger Israeli deterrence.
Since its establishment, Israel’s security policymakers believed the IDF must be prepared to face every possible threat scenario presented by the Arab states, including a war involving all Arab countries.This principle guided Israel’s position on various security issues. The IDF’s performance in the Sinai Campaign, the Six Day War, and to a large extent the Yom Kippur War seems to have proved the validity of the principle. In each of these cases, the Israeli army emerged with the upper hand, and there was little...
The book includes ten analytical essays written by INSS researchers that dwell on Israel’s strategic environment in the period under review. The ongoing challenges represented by the Palestinian issue and the Iranian nuclear program are well documented, as well as developments elsewhere in the Arab and Muslim world and in Israel.
No war in Israel’s war-filled history was accompanied by such extensive public opinion polling as was the Second Lebanon War. Indeed, more than by objective criteria, the course that the war took was determined to a large degree by the perceptions of the public on both sides. Perceptions do not necessarily reflect reality, but they have a power of their own. This essay, devoted to Israeli public opinion during and after the war, deals solely with perceptions. Closely intertwined with this phenomenon is the fact that Israeli media...
From a military standpoint, the Second Lebanon War focused on exchanges of fire between Hizbollah and Israel. The war’s political, strategic, ideological, and philosophical dimensions, both in Lebanon and throughout the region, were naturally influenced by events on the battlefield, but went far beyond them. Those who initiated the war essentially hoped to impact on these dimensions through the military factor, which subsequently assumed greater importance in and of itself, particularly in the internal Israeli context.
The 2006 Lebanon War was not just another round of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Departing from the familiar pattern of classic warfare, this was a subconventional, asymmetric war between Israel and Hizbollah, a non-state, irregular force waging a guerilla war. However, and more importantly, this was not essentially an Arab-Israeli war in the traditional sense, rather an indirect confrontation between Israel and Iran through the latter’s Shiite proxy in Lebanon – Hizbollah. For the most part, with the exception of Syria, the Arab Sunni...
