In the three years since the Second Lebanon War there has been absolute calm on the northern border, the likes of which no one can remember since the 1970s. This reality was purchased with the lives of civilians and soldiers who fell in battle, with the pain of the injured, both soldiers and civilians, and with the cost of those whose lives were destroyed and who bear the scars and wounds of that war to this day. My heart goes out to them.
It is very difficult to analyze and understand the Second Lebanon War without understanding how the IDF entered it. By this I am not referring to the moment the decision was made to attack on July 12, 2006, rather to the processes that occurred in the years leading up to the war. In this context, it is necessary to try to understand the fields where the military was focusing its endeavors, the topics with which the army was dealing, and the outlook of the IDF’s leadership at that time. It is necessary to focus on two central,...
The following article touches on seven points that are conclusions of sorts from three central military episodes of recent years: Operation Defensive Shield in the West Bank in April 2002, the Second Lebanon War, and Operation Cast Lead. A comparison of these events allows us to formulate general conclusions relevant to similar events in the future. Six of the issues refer primarily to the past and the present, but have ramifications for the future. The seventh is an attempt to assess what would happen should a Third Lebanon War...
The heightened disagreement between the United States and Israel over a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and future settlement activity in the West Bank has come to the fore. This evening the Israeli prime minister is scheduled to deliver a major policy address that is seen as an answer to President Obama’s recent Cairo speech. Mr. Netanyahu is expected to outline his policies – including specific plans and proposals – with regard to the peace process as well as other central challenges facing Israel in the...
Hizbollah and Hamas are guerilla and terrorist organizations that in less than 20 years have developed into quasi-governmental entities. They have done so in a relatively smaller area than is usually the case in guerilla warfare, and in the case of the Gaza Strip, primarily in urban areas suited to this type of fighting. Militarily, Hizbollah is a big brother of Hamas: Hizbollah is more experienced, knowledgeable, and selfassured. Nonetheless, Hizbollah is learning from Hamas’ conduct during Operation Cast Lead and is...
From early November to December 27, 2008, when Operation Cast Lead got under way, 365 rockets and 177 mortar bombs were fired at Israel; on December 20, 2008 alone, 15 rockets and 25 mortar bombs were fired. The attack on civilian life and the threat against the residential centers near the Gaza Strip and within the rocket range moved the government of Israel and the IDF to embark on Operation Cast Lead to render a blow to Hamas, responsible for the policy of violence towards Israel. The intention was to damage the...
This essay seeks to view Operation Cast Lead as a piece in a developing sequence, beginning with the second intifada and continuing through the Second Lebanon War, in terms of two major components: the military response to the threat and the public understanding of the effectiveness of the military response. There is a close symbiotic relationship between the two components because Israel’s response to the threat involves military combat elements alongside civilian stamina and defense capabilities. The two components are...
In the past two and a half years, Israel has waged two military campaigns – against Hizbollah in Lebanon and against Hamas in Gaza – and in both, the campaigns were labeled in the public discourse in Israel and abroad as wars against terrorist organizations. The use of this term to describe the enemies Israel fought and the characteristics of these battles is not only imprecise and misleading but also shrouds the character of the enemy and the nature of the confrontation in a haze, minimizes their complexity, and creates unrealistic...
At the end of the Second Lebanon War, many claimed that the State of Israel had not succeeded in strengthening Israel’s deterrence vis-à-vis Hizbollah. An examination of the organization’s response to Operation Cast Lead and a comparison with its response to Operation Defensive Shield demonstrate that Israel’s actions in the Second Lebanon War did in fact result in considerably stronger Israeli deterrence.
Since its establishment, Israel’s security policymakers believed the IDF must be prepared to face every possible threat scenario presented by the Arab states, including a war involving all Arab countries.This principle guided Israel’s position on various security issues. The IDF’s performance in the Sinai Campaign, the Six Day War, and to a large extent the Yom Kippur War seems to have proved the validity of the principle. In each of these cases, the Israeli army emerged with the upper hand, and there was little...
The arguments against attacking Lebanon as a principal objective in context of a confrontation with Hizbollah eclipse the arguments in favor of this posture. This article examines the political and strategic objectives that drive the various strategies, as well as their ethical and moral aspects and their legal, political, public appearance-related, economic, and military dimensions. The author urges an approach that focuses less on sovereign Lebanese targets and more on ground maneuvers against targets that directly serve Hizbollah...
A lively discussion has developed recently concerning the IDF’s new response policy in the event of a renewed confrontation with Hizbollah. An article in Haaretz by Amos Harel; an interview given by GOC Northern Command Gadi Eisenkot to Yediot Ahronot; the INSS Insight of early October by Gabriel Siboni; and a forthcoming piece in Strategic Assessment by Giora Eiland are among the recent forums for this debate.