The heightened disagreement between the United States and Israel over a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and future settlement activity in the West Bank has come to the fore. This evening the Israeli prime minister is scheduled to deliver a major policy address that is seen as an answer to President Obama’s recent Cairo speech. Mr. Netanyahu is expected to outline his policies – including specific plans and proposals – with regard to the peace process as well as other central challenges facing Israel in the...
Hizbollah and Hamas are guerilla and terrorist organizations that in less than 20 years have developed into quasi-governmental entities. They have done so in a relatively smaller area than is usually the case in guerilla warfare, and in the case of the Gaza Strip, primarily in urban areas suited to this type of fighting. Militarily, Hizbollah is a big brother of Hamas: Hizbollah is more experienced, knowledgeable, and selfassured. Nonetheless, Hizbollah is learning from Hamas’ conduct during Operation Cast Lead and is...
From early November to December 27, 2008, when Operation Cast Lead got under way, 365 rockets and 177 mortar bombs were fired at Israel; on December 20, 2008 alone, 15 rockets and 25 mortar bombs were fired. The attack on civilian life and the threat against the residential centers near the Gaza Strip and within the rocket range moved the government of Israel and the IDF to embark on Operation Cast Lead to render a blow to Hamas, responsible for the policy of violence towards Israel. The intention was to damage the...
This essay seeks to view Operation Cast Lead as a piece in a developing sequence, beginning with the second intifada and continuing through the Second Lebanon War, in terms of two major components: the military response to the threat and the public understanding of the effectiveness of the military response. There is a close symbiotic relationship between the two components because Israel’s response to the threat involves military combat elements alongside civilian stamina and defense capabilities. The two components are...
In the past two and a half years, Israel has waged two military campaigns – against Hizbollah in Lebanon and against Hamas in Gaza – and in both, the campaigns were labeled in the public discourse in Israel and abroad as wars against terrorist organizations. The use of this term to describe the enemies Israel fought and the characteristics of these battles is not only imprecise and misleading but also shrouds the character of the enemy and the nature of the confrontation in a haze, minimizes their complexity, and creates unrealistic...
At the end of the Second Lebanon War, many claimed that the State of Israel had not succeeded in strengthening Israel’s deterrence vis-à-vis Hizbollah. An examination of the organization’s response to Operation Cast Lead and a comparison with its response to Operation Defensive Shield demonstrate that Israel’s actions in the Second Lebanon War did in fact result in considerably stronger Israeli deterrence.
Since its establishment, Israel’s security policymakers believed the IDF must be prepared to face every possible threat scenario presented by the Arab states, including a war involving all Arab countries.This principle guided Israel’s position on various security issues. The IDF’s performance in the Sinai Campaign, the Six Day War, and to a large extent the Yom Kippur War seems to have proved the validity of the principle. In each of these cases, the Israeli army emerged with the upper hand, and there was little...
The arguments against attacking Lebanon as a principal objective in context of a confrontation with Hizbollah eclipse the arguments in favor of this posture. This article examines the political and strategic objectives that drive the various strategies, as well as their ethical and moral aspects and their legal, political, public appearance-related, economic, and military dimensions. The author urges an approach that focuses less on sovereign Lebanese targets and more on ground maneuvers against targets that directly serve Hizbollah...
A lively discussion has developed recently concerning the IDF’s new response policy in the event of a renewed confrontation with Hizbollah. An article in Haaretz by Amos Harel; an interview given by GOC Northern Command Gadi Eisenkot to Yediot Ahronot; the INSS Insight of early October by Gabriel Siboni; and a forthcoming piece in Strategic Assessment by Giora Eiland are among the recent forums for this debate.
Not long ago Hizbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was quoted as saying, ג€the Zionists will think ten thousand times before attacking Lebanon.ג€ Nasrallah’s remark appears to have been in reference to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s declaration, made while visiting the IDF Home Front Command, that the IDF would face fewer limitations in future confrontations. Indeed, the pressure on Nasrallah seems to be taking its toll. The Hizbollah leader is beginning to internalize what he understands as a fundamental change in...
This study analyzes the different faces of war, from the center of gravity to be attacked to the elements of decision, as expressed in familiar, symmetrical wars; asymmetrical wars against a state actor or guerilla element; and future wars.
The book includes ten analytical essays written by INSS researchers that dwell on Israel’s strategic environment in the period under review. The ongoing challenges represented by the Palestinian issue and the Iranian nuclear program are well documented, as well as developments elsewhere in the Arab and Muslim world and in Israel.
