The Second Lebanon War lasted just over one month. Its duration was determined by a variety of factors, but primarily by Israeli’s own assessment that prolongation of the fighting would not advance any war aims even more ambitious than those that Israel had already achieved, at least not at a cost deemed acceptable to the society and political system. Unlike previous wars, Israel did not – contrary to the predictions of many analysts – have to operate under severe time constraints, because its margin of maneuver was not seriously...
The Lebanon War exposed, and not for the first time, severe deficiencies in matters concerned with strategic decision making in Israel, specifically, the conduct of the political echelon and the relationship of the political leadership with the military. Unlike other matters and contrary to popular opinion, the ability to change the situation and correct these flaws is not conditional on any political price or confrontation with the defense establishment. Nor will changing the situation incur an economic or organizational expense. If...
The intensification of the Qassam rocket attacks on the town of Sderot has once again raised the question of defense against this weapon. Interest in this subject is not new. More than a decade ago, when the town of Kiryat Shmona was being bombarded by Katyusha rockets from Lebanon, the Israeli defense establishment began to address this challenge. Its initial response took the form of the tactical laser system “Nautilus.” The system, which was developed as a joint American-Israeli venture, was supposed to destroy rockets...
The Israeli national elections held on March 28 did not yield a clear-cut outcome and one should therefore be cautious in drawing conclusions before all the results, including breakdowns by various criteria, have been properly digested, analyzed and understood. However, it is already possible to venture several observations.
Did the terror offensive of the second Palestinian intifada impact on Israeli national resilience, and if so, to what extent? Did this terror offensive result in changed political views of the Israeli public concerning issues related to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict? Israel’s National Resilience suggests that the years of terror did not unseat the Israeli public’s prior attitudes and accepted patterns of behavior, nor did it puncture the majority consensus regarding the manner of confronting the Palestinians or the...
More than three decades after the Yom Kippur War, Israeli society continues to confront some of the global changes to Israel and its strategic setting highlighted by the war. The essays compiled here dwell on the challenges raised in part by the 1973 war, including security and intelligence challenges; changes to Israel’s strategic environment over the previous three decades; and social dimensions to security challenges.
Has the Israeli intelligence community worked hard enough to realize the pluralism recommended by the Agranat Commission? Has the ability to supply an sharper intelligence assessment – whether military or political – been improved? These questions, particularly acute since the Yom Kippur War, are the subject of Shlomo Gazit’s study, which includes recommendations on how to maximize intelligence assessment in Israel.
