Ori Sela

Despite the prevailing perception that China retreated from the Middle East in 2025 amid the renewed strengthening of the United States in the region and the absence of significant Chinese involvement in the Israel-Iran war, the reality is more complex. A multi-dimensional analysis of trade, investment, technology, as well as security and diplomatic ties, shows that not only has China not retreated from the Middle East, but it has continued to consolidate and deepen its economic foothold there, maintaining a consistent pattern of conduct: avoiding security commitments while expanding economic influence. The round of confrontation between Israel, the United States, and Iran in early 2026 highlights this trend: China remains a marginal actor in the military arena, yet acts cautiously to leverage the crisis in order to accumulate long-term influence. The central question that remains open is whether and how China will be involved in Iran’s post-war reconstruction—particularly in the rehabilitation of its military capabilities and defense industry. This issue is not merely theoretical. It requires Israel to act in the international sphere alongside regional partners that have also been targeted by Iran, and influence China to refrain from such involvement, particularly with regard to rebuilding Iran’s military capabilities. Furthermore, Israel must prepare for the intensification of great power competition in the Middle East, potentially in a different and more acute form than that seen over the past decade.

What opportunities and risks did Beijing see during the 12-day war between Israel and Iran—and what gains and losses did it draw at its conclusion?

Unusual military maneuvers, extreme statements, and a new president in Taipei: Tensions between Taiwan and China have escalated over the past year. What can recent events tell us about what lies ahead with Trump in the White House?

Has China’s policy truly suffered a blow with Israel’s damage to the “Axis of Resistance” and the rebels’ success in toppling Assad’s regime in Syria?

Conclusions from the main international event in the fields of aviation and space, which serves as clear evidence of China’s aspiration to lead in the areas of defense, space, and industry in the 21st century

Taiwan—with the complicated and charged relationships surrounding it—is considered one of the most prominent areas of contention in the global arena. As the competition or rivalry between the two main global superpowers, the United States and China, escalates in the Asian or Indo-Pacific region, the tension surrounding the Taiwan issue heightens, the rhetoric intensifies, and the parties’ actions create a new status quo that at any moment threatens to give way to actual warfare. This article examines the development of the trilateral China-Taiwan-US relationship since the Democratic Progressive Party’s return to power in Taiwan in 2016, the ways this relationship has deteriorated during this period, and the possible reasons for this. The article focuses on the processes that took place from the visit of Speaker of the US House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi’s to Taiwan in August 2022 until a new president took office in Taiwan in May 2024—President Lai, also from the DPP. These processes are referred to as the Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis, which is ongoing.