The Bombing of the Iranian Embassy in Beirut: Hitting Two Birds with One Stone

Over the past two years the Syrian conflict hasevolved from non-violent political demonstrations into a militarized,sectarian, and prolonged civil war. Furthermore, massive external involvement inthe internal war has turned Syria into a proxy regional war. This is not onlybecause of the major humanitarian crisis triggered by the conflict and theeconomic and political pressure Syria’s neighbors face in seeking toaccommodate the growing influx of refugees, but also because the war in Syriarisks destabilizing the entire Middle East. Indeed, the November 19, 2013attack against the Iranian embassy in Beirut is an example of the ever-growingregional price of the Syrian civil war. Simply put: the myth that externalactors could take an active part in the conflict in Syria while entirelyshielding themselves at home from the costs of their involvement has been shattered.

Lebanon in particular has been affected: theSyrian civil war has drastically worsened the already shaky relations betweenthe political and sectarian forces supporting the anti-Assad opposition – theMarch 14 coalition – and those who, led by Hizbollah, have been supportingAssad. This has also aggravated the relations between the Sunni and Shiitecommunities and led to a state of political paralysis.

Moreover, along with the physical absence of Lebanon’smain political leader, Saad Hariri, the civil war in Syria has fueled a senseof helplessness and resentment within the Sunni community, with an overallstrengthening of the role played by radical salafist preachers and with agrowing number of Lebanese Sunnis actively participating in the Syrian civilwar. In this context, this week’s suicide attack claimed by the Lebanese branchof the Battalion Abdullah Azzam, anal-Qaeda affiliated organization active in the region since 2009 and with anumber of local affiliated branches, should be seen as extremely worrisome.

The suicide bombing represents a new peak inthe trend of growing defiance toward Hizbollah and its local supporters, with salafi-jihadistgroups actively planning and perpetrating attacks against Hizbollah, with thestated intention of both punishing the group for its involvement in the Syriacivil war and deterring it from continuing to support the Assad regimemilitarily. These groups have detonated car bombs and fired rockets against Hizbollah’ssouthern Beirut stronghold, the Dahiya quarter, and the Beqa valley. By attacking Hizbollahcontrolled areas the jihadists have wanted to both physically hit the organization,while dispelling the myth of invulnerability surrounding it.

Attacking the Iranian embassy sends an evenbroader, message: not only is Hizbollah not secure in its country anymore, but the group’s capacity to protect its own alliesis also questionable. The attack allowed the perpetrators both to project powerand to weaken the myth of Hizbollah’s and Iran’s military invincibility.Finally, the embassy bombing represents an evolution and escalation from themodus operandi employed by the salafist groups in the past, not just because ofits reliance on suicide bombers – a clear al-Qaeda trademark – but also becausehitting the Iranian diplomatic premises represents a declaration of war ofsorts directed at both Hizbollah and its powerful patron state, Iran.

In the past Hizbollah’s reaction to attacksagainst its own community has been noticeably restrained, with Hassan Nasrallahrepeatedly calling for calm while avoiding direct violent responses withinLebanon, and even going as far as letting the Lebanese Armed Forces enter theDahiya for the first time. Indeed, Nasrallah’s strategy has been to preservecalm in Lebanon, while continuing to fight alongside Assad in Syria. The Hizbollahleader has repeated on a number of occasions that the group does not want tosee the confrontation between pro- and anti-Assad forces exported into Lebanon.At the same time, however, during his recent public speeches on the occasion ofthe Ashura festival, the Secretary General also reiterated his determination tocontinue to fight and support the Syrian regime until Assad’s victory over theopposition. In addition, although calling for domestic calm, Hizbollah rhetorichas done little to alleviate the situation, with the group adopting anincreasingly more antagonistic and sectarian tone to justify its decision tointervene in Syria, and with Nassrallah warning on multiple occasions againstthe dangers of the Syrian anti-Assad takfiri opposition.

Hizbollah’s mix of defiance and calls fordomestic calm has done nothing to soften the criticism of anti-Assad groups ingeneral, and the salafi camp in particular. Criticism of Hizbollah’sinvolvement in Syria has become especially vitriolic after the group’s directmilitary assistance proved crucial for the regime to secure control of thestrategic western Syria border town of al-Qusayr. Now the salafi-jihadist campin Lebanon has decided to placethe war directly at Hizbollah’s footsteps, also fueled by the perception thatthe group intends to replicate the Qusayr precedentin the impending battle for Qalamoun, which, if won by the regime, wouldrepresent a watershed in the civil war.

The attack against the Iranian embassy is thus aheightened level in a dangerous radicalization process accompanied by a gradualsouring of inter-community relations. In the immediate future, this placesLebanon in an extremely precarious situation, risking not only prolongedinternal paralysis, but also a devastating socio-economic crisis, and anerosion of the country’s fragile social fabric. While a fully-fledged civil waris not in the interest of any of the major political actors in Lebanon,including Hizbollah, still the radicalized al-Qaeda affiliates could push the countryinto a new spiral of internal violence.

In the future, preserving the dual militaryinvolvement in Syria and civilian engagement in Lebanon will prove increasinglydifficult and costly for Hizbollah, as the Beirut suicide bombing effectivelydispelled the myth that groups like Hizbollah and its patron could become majorplayers in an external civil war and still shield themselves from retribution.

The battlefield of the proxy war has beenextended, and even though overall the war will continue to be foughtpredominantly in Syria, it will be impossible to continue denying the regionalspillover of the conflict. With the civil war giving no sign of drawing to aclose, not only will sectarian relations be negatively affected across theregion, but radical groups like those behind the Iranian embassy bombing willcontinue to operate in growing numbers and strength.

Seen from Israel’s point of view, the ongoingtension between Iran, Hizbollah, and the transnational jihadist network doesnot necessarily represent a positive development. As the Iranian embassybombing clearly showed, instability and extremism can be exported, and the riseof a more active, organized, and determined salafi-jihadist camp will, in thelong term, create problems for Israel.
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ReutFriedman, Ilan Shaklarski, and Elior Albachari, interns in the INSS Terrorism andLow Intensity Conflict Program, assisted in preparation of this article.