After Round One with Rouhani: Staying Focused on the Dynamics of Nuclear Bargaining

While overthe past weeks expectations of a deal with Iran have been running high in many quarters,the first round of nuclear negotiations following the election of Hassan Rouhanihas ended with no concrete progress save the promise of another meeting early nextmonth where the Iranian proposal will undergo further scrutiny.

Therewere certainly some new features that characterized these talks: they wereconducted in English, the Iranian proposal was presented in a PowerPoint presentationand reportedly included a serious and detailed proposal, the Iranians overall demonstrateda much more positive and direct attitude in the talks, and negotiations ended witha joint Iran-P5+1 statement noting that the Iranian proposal will be examinedcarefully.

Nevertheless,as far as concrete substance is concerned, Gary Samore, former White Housecoordinator for Arms Control and WMD, is quoted as saying that the Iranianshave not offered the kind of concessions the US is looking for. In his view,“the Iranian proposal appears to be pretty much boiled over soup,” and is anoffer that is not fundamentally different from what was proposed whenAhmadinejad was president.

Inassessing prospects for success down the road in this difficult negotiation, oneaspect seems clear: for the international community to attain the deal it wants,it must not lose sight of the basic setup of the bargaining situation. Contraryto media portrayals of the past few months, these negotiations should not beregarded as a give and take between two parties that are working to realize ashared goal. This crisis was created by Iran when it began to cheat on itscommitment to remain non-nuclear according to the terms of the NPT. For years Iranhas been working on a military nuclear program, and the international communityhas been trying to stop it. Resolving the crisis is about one thing only: Iran withdrawingfrom its military ambitions in the nuclear realm.

For overa decade the international community has striven to fix a problematic situationcreated by Iran. The international community has sought a negotiated dealwhereby Iran relinquishes its military nuclear ambitions, but Iran would liketo continue on its own to a military nuclear capability while paying a minimumprice. Negotiations have played no role in Iran’s basic game plan and over theyears were regarded more as a nuisance (sometimes hurdle) to be overcome on theroad to the ultimate goal. When Iran has come to the negotiations table, it hasbeen in order to demonstrate a semblance of cooperation, for the purpose of wardingoff the prospect of harsher steps being imposed by the international community inresponse to its ongoing nuclear defiance. Being engaged in negotiations – whichmust be distinguished from negotiating in order to reach a deal – has sometimesproven useful to Iran as a means of not only avoiding international pressureand punishment, but gaining time to push its program forward.

Thedifference now is that Iran has a more concrete reason to bargain with the West.Iran is suffering from the impact of biting sanctions that were put in placeover the course of 2012 inresponse to its indifference to international demands, so it currently seeksnegotiations in order to have these sanctions lifted. This has resulted in negotiationsappearing more like a give and take situation – the P5+1 demand that Iran make nuclearconcessions, and Iran in turn demands that the P5+1 reciprocate by liftingsanctions. The fact that Iran brought sanctions upon itself through its nucleardefiance is pushed to the sidelines, and in the meantime, the Iranians demandrespect, reciprocity, and recognition of their right to a civilian nuclear program.

But whilea prospective deal might ostensibly draw on this new setup, there is in fact noindication that the basic dynamic has changed. The international community isstill trying to compel Iran to abandon its military ambitions, and as of yet Iranhas shown no indication of wanting to do so. If biting sanctions are lifted forless than a final deal, the international community will go back to square one,with no cards to play in the negotiations or means to coerce Iran to reversecourse. Structurally, even though Iran suffers from economic sanctions, in thenegotiations process it has always had the upper hand because it is notdependent on a negotiated deal, and can therefore abuse negotiations as it continuesto enhance and diversify its nuclear program.

Untilit becomes clear that Iran may be willing to reverse course in the nuclearrealm, its offers of nuclear concessions should be regarded as bargaining chips– purposely created by Iran along the way, in case it should face a situation muchlike it faces today, when the pressure becomes too much to bear. But these bargainingchips do not endanger Iran’s ability to move toward nuclear weapons at a timeof its choosing. The 20 percent enrichment issue is an excellent example of anissue that Iran created, and in which regard Iran can now afford to be flexible.However, the international community had demands of Iran before the 20 percentenrichment issue was put on the table; therefore taking it off the table cannotnow be regarded as a solution.

It isdifficult to remain firm and determined when your adversary is smiling. But ifthe smile is genuine, Iran should be able to readily address the problematicaspects of its nuclear program that support the assessment that Iran strivesfor a military nuclear capability. Continuing to resist that, while focusingall attention on sanctions relief, is what fuels the sense that the changedatmospherics are not indicative of a changed Iranian nuclear stance.

Finally,an interesting twist in the overall dynamic of confronting Iran is Rouhani’srecent move to introduce the prospect for a new and changed bilateralrelationship with the United States. On the one hand, this has raised thestakes of the nuclear negotiation for the United States, because if the Obamaadministration remains steadfast as far as sanctions relief, it now riskslosing more than a nuclear deal – namely, the enticing prospect of a changedrelationship with Iran. On the other hand, the implications of this move byIran may have significant consequences for other players in this dynamic aswell, most importantly Russia. Russia’s surprisingly cool reception of theGeneva talks – which stands in stark contrast to the voices of optimism coming fromWestern capitals – raises the possibility that Russia is not happy with theprospect of thawed bilateral relations that could very well mean a parallelloss of Russian influence in Iran. Russia may be signaling to Iran that itcould be the spoiler for Iran’s desire for a quick nuclear deal that would bringsanctions relief if Iran indeed moves closer to the United States.