Assessing the Iranian Nuclear Issue

The beginning of the new Jewish year is a good time to take a fresh look at the developing situation regarding the Iranian nuclear project. This project is progressing steadily, albeit at a rather slow rate. This rate is misleading, giving the false impression that there is still ample time to prevent Iran from becoming a de facto nuclear weapons state. From the US previous assessment that Iran still has a long way to go, it now says that it could take at least a year until Iran achieves a nuclear capability, if it makes “a dash” for it. “A year is a very long period of time” a senior US official was quoted as saying. However, in the present scheme of things, when the application of sanctions seems to be the only plan of action, a year is a short time. The time constant of sanctions and diplomatic activities is quite long, compared to a year.

Before delving into the Iran issue, it should be clear what a “nuclear capability” is: the state of affairs when a country can produce a nuclear weapon within a reasonably short time, e.g., three months. In the case of Iran, for example, this would occur if it accumulates a sufficient amount of 20 percent enriched uranium for the further enrichment to the 90 percent grade for the production of one nuclear bomb, or if there is a sufficient number of uranium enrichment cascades allocated within a short time for the production of 90 percent enriched uranium from its stocks of 3.5 percent enriched uranium. Recently, Iran’s president offered to stop the enrichment to 20 percent, in exchange for reactor fuel. This is blackmail, since he would not receive this fuel (which in any case is not essential since he can buy the medical isotopes on the free market, as do most countries in the world), in any other way. He also probably realized that he took the 20 percent leap too early, and must backtrack in order to buy more time.

What then does the future foretell at this time? There are several points to consider. First, the nuclear project is perhaps the one issue in Iran that enjoys a near-national consensus. It is also a matter of national pride. It is doubtful whether any Iranian government would dare drop the project, unless it were a completely different, secular, and democratic regime, but this scenario is too far in the future and uncertain at that. The sanctions have no chance of becoming fierce enough to force the present regime to reverse its course. Only a major concession on the part of the international community, such as continuing enrichment in Iran under close international supervision and assistance in the production of the Bushehr fuel rods could ostensibly persuade Iran to mend its ways. This, however, is fraught with danger, as Iran would retain its capacity for breaking out and producing nuclear weapons.

Second, the issue of red lines crops up from time to time. However, red lines have a meaning only when there is a plan detailing what to do if they are crossed; they are effective only when they and their consequences are known to the other side and act as successful deterrents. The two possible remaining red lines are the breakout scenario and an underground nuclear explosion in Iran. Both scenarios are feasible, and Iran at this time has little to fear in the way of retaliation. The world reaction to Iran’s crossing a red line will probably not be too far off what happened in the India and Pakistan cases.

Unfortunately, the Obama administration is probably not up to this issue. It does not appear to have red lines or plans to deal with them. The containment option, as a solution to the crossing of a red line, is a hollow option, given the attitude of the US and the regional situation. The impact of a nuclear Iran on the Gulf states and on the US position in the international scene will be considerable and of a lasting duration. The damaged US image will take a very long time to repair.

At this time it seems that the only way to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons is through a persistent stand-off attack by the US, targeting the nuclear installations and its allied industries. Many argue that Israel on its own can probably not levela decisive blow to the Iranian nuclear project. The most the US can do without becoming involved in a full scale military operation (including land operations) is to keep the nuclear project in check, not letting Iran use its capabilities and potential to revive the nuclear project. This would need a sustained lengthy US naval and air effort, until Iran realizes that it is not worthwhile to further pursue its efforts. Israel has virtually no role to play in this game. It will, however, almost certainly suffer again as it did in the 1991 Gulf War when it was struck by Iraqi missiles as a retaliatory measure.

Will Israel act if the US does not? This is a difficult question. The US should be relieved if Israel does so, as it would then be able to blame Israel for any repercussions from Iran and the Islamic world and further distance itself from Israel. It will take a lot of will power on the part of Israeli leaders to refrain from taking military actions. In all, an Israeli military action is the least desirable route of action. On the other hand, can the Israeli government afford not to take action? It will take a lot of convincing for the Israeli public to justify non-action, especially if one of the above red lines is crossed.

It is a somber outlook. Since August 2002, when the Iranian uranium-enrichment project came to light, very little effect was achieved by the numerous efforts of “engagement,” sanctions, and threats. The Iranian project forged ahead, almost without external hindrance, and the situation today is almost irreversible. All the platitudes of an “unacceptable” Iranian nuclear capability are superfluous today. A nuclear Iran will become a reality unless something drastic is done, at this eleventh hour.