Russia-Iran Relations: Is There a Change?

The May 17 signing of the agreement to transfer uranium between Iran, Turkey, and Brazil met with sweeping opposition on the part of the Security Council and aroused new international unrest. The day after the signing, the Security Council’s permanent members, including Russia and China – both of which were surprised by the development – signed a proposed resolution to impose sanctions against Iran. Since then, they have been working to curb the Turkish-Brazilian initiative. Iran, which was surprised by the speed and force of the reaction, responded with its normal shrill declarations, particularly towards Russia. Russia, finding itself in this situation for the first time, now faces two challenges: the effort to mollify Iran, and the desire to weaken the Turkish-Brazilian initiative, heralding – from Russia's perspective – an undesirable reversal on the international arena.

Following publication of Russian support for imposing sanctions against Iran, reports of exchanges of verbal blows began. Iran started by excoriating Russia (without mentioning China). Ahmadinejad (May 26) strongly condemned the Russian decision in public, while warning Russia about becoming an enemy of Iran. He added that were he in the Russian president’s place, he would be more careful about “harming a great nation.” The following day (May 27), the Iranian ambassador to Moscow suggested that American manipulations had dragged Russia into trouble, and called on Russia to prevent adoption of the resolution by the Security Council. In the Russian response, which was not long in coming, the Russian spokesmen, Foreign Minister Lavrov and presidential advisor Prikhodko, called the Iranian statement “emotional” and “demagogic.” They stressed that Russia’s policy is solely directed at promoting its own interests and is therefore neither pro-Iranian nor pro-American. They claimed that Russia sees itself as a partner to the international effort to resolve complex situations, among them, Iran.

For his part, President Obama expressed great satisfaction regarding Russia’s joining the call for sanctions. He declared that he views this as a great achievement of the “reset” policy he adopted towards Russia. Indeed, some feel that it was precisely this policy that generated the reversal in Russia’s stance on the Iranian issue. To be sure, the reset policy has involved a host of significant concessions to Russia on various international issues in return for its rallying to the call for sanctions. Now too, Russia was offered some added incentives in return for its agreement, including removing the sanctions against four Russian companies that had worked to develop Iranian nuclear and missile capabilities and the signing of an agreement for civilian nuclear cooperation with Russia. At the same time, the United States also promised China not to act against Chinese companies cooperating with Iran.

It is possible to glean two insights with regard to Russia’s international conduct: on the Iranian level, it seems that the present conflict reflects longstanding tensions between the states. There are some who view the harsh Russian response to the Iranian tongue-lashing as a real change in Russian policy, which began in light of Obama’s reset policy. Some also identify Iran as threatening Russian interests, especially since Russia is not interested in “expanding the nuclear club through the back door.” Recently there was provocative Iranian activity in the Caspian Sea.

On the greater international level, Russia identifies the new Iran-Turkey-Brazil axis as a potential problem for its own position. Russia and China, like the other permanent Security Council members, will not concede their monopoly on supervising unconventional weapons so easily; this would lead to utter chaos. Beyond this, Russia is highly interested in preventing Turkey from assuming Russia's role and becoming the mediator vis-à-vis Iran. Furthermore, Russia is also interested in preventing Turkish-Iranian cooperation on energy transport, which is threatening Russia’s monopoly on supplying Europe with gas.

For its part, Iran apparently worried about a closer Russian-American relationship, took advantage of Turkey’s new ambitions on the international level, and encouraged Ankara to take a more active role with regard Iran. Tehran’s concern stems from the declining option of using Russian-American disagreements to its own advantage. For their part, the United States and Russia have already started to dismantle the package and cancel the obligations of Turkey and Brazil to Iran on the basis of the agreement. The latter will strive to undermine the Security Council sanctions resolution against it by means of procedural delays - an effort that subsequently failed.

The drama described above is gathering momentum at a time of new Russian political activity, conveying calming messages to Iran whereby Russia evinced understanding of Iran’s belligerence as designed primarily for domestic consumption, and reminding Iran that Russia was the one impeding sanctions until now. Even its current support for sanctions is not supposed to damage its relationship with Iran. On May 27, Foreign Minister Lavrov initiated a conversation with the Iranian foreign minister, this time to deliver some new messages: Russia is striving to resolve the situation that was created; it views the Iranian agreement with Turkey and Brazil as based on the original program of the IAEA from last October; it finds in it an appropriate formula, creating preliminary conditions for renewing talks with Iran, and that its implementation could serve as a breakthrough. In other words, we may be witnessing yet another reversal in Russia’s position.

Lavrov also told the media that the agreement was currently under discussion in the 5+1 forum, with the participation of Turkey and Brazil. On this point, he added that although Russia is prepared to view this as a solution, it is not “100 percent certain” of its implementation, because at the end of the day much will depend on Iran’s position and its attitude towards its obligations. In fact, Lavrov expressed doubt regarding the honesty of Iran’s intentions on the nuclear issue. Nonetheless, it is likely that Russia will act to mitigate the repercussions of the affair on its relations with Iran. Russia still has some leverage over Iran that will help it identify an alternative, acceptable to all sides, to the undesirable agreement with Turkey and Brazil, e.g., the completion of the reactor in Bushehr (anticipated this coming August) and the supply of military materiel, particularly the S-300 missile (though this is highly unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future).

Despite Russia’s continued ambivalence on all that concerns Iran, the American reset policy apparently did bring about the hoped-for result, such that the Iranian attempt to upstage key international players with Turkey and Brazil in fact encouraged a closer Russian-American relationship. At the same time, the international arena is set for changes with unexpected ramifications, such that even if the Turks and Brazilians are sidelined, the situation will not soon return to what it was. Iran will continue efforts to complete its nuclear program, though it is still possible that it may agree to some compromise proposal. Russia is eager that the next proposal be put forth cooperatively with Russia, and it is towards this end that it is directing its efforts.