The IAEA February Reports on Iran and Syria

On February 19, 2009, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) director general (DG) delivered to the constituent membership two periodic reports, on Iran's nuclear program and on the progress in assessing Syria's activities at the bombed site of al-Kibar, prior to September 2007. They both merit comments on their findings.

Iran

The outstanding finding of the report on Iran is that it has so far produced around one ton of enriched uranium hexafluoride to the level of around 3.5 percent – Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). By achieving this, Iran moved a step closer to the capability of further enriching the LEU to High Enriched Uranium (HEU) and producing some 25 kilograms of HEU, sufficient for one nuclear explosive device according to IAEA definitions.

Interestingly, according to the IAEA inspectors in Iran, the number of the gas-centrifuge machines enriching uranium, around 4000, has not increased since the previous IAEA report of November 2008. However, the inspectors reported that some additional 1500 machines have been installed and are ready to receive the feed material but have not yet done so. Optimists have seen this as a sign that the Iranians may have done this "as a conciliatory gesture in advance of any diplomatic overtures by the Obama administration."

However, this is little cause for celebration, since the currently operating centrifuges can produce another ton of LEU in less than one year, even when no machines are added to the present setup. Furthermore, the additional 1500 centrifuges might be on standby status for the rapid enrichment of the available LEU into HEU. If the setup is ready, they could produce 25 kilograms of HEU in considerably less than a year. This is certainly cause for concern.

A discussion arose recently concerning the availability of uranium in Iran. Interestingly, the Iranians took up the bait to try and disprove the assessment that it is uranium-starved. One official stated that Iran is able to export uranium, but at the same time said that they have 5000-7000 tons of uranium in ore that still has to be mined. The present rate of production is less than one hundred tons a year. No doubt this is a huge reserve when considering that every uranium-based nuclear explosive device needs about eight tons of natural uranium as raw material. It can also be assumed that the IR-40 natural uranium reactor under construction will consume a few dozen tons a year. However, a nuclear power reactor of the Bushehr type consumes between 160-220 tons of natural uranium annually. The overall reserves are not great, and the rate of mining is certainly insufficient for these needs. The question then arises as to where Iran will get its supply of uranium for its future grandiose plans for additional nuclear power reactors. On the other hand, one senses that there is no real need in Iran for additional reserves, if the program is only nuclear weapons production oriented. This is what the Iranians, of course, are trying to refute.

Finally, the recurrent mantra that if Iran cooperated fully the IAEA would be able "to provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran" is to be deplored. An absence cannot be verified, and the IAEA is therein misleading Iran and the world.

Syria

In its report on the inspections of the al-Kibar site, the IAEA continues to refute Syrian claims that the site bombed in 2007 was a military site and not a reactor site. The IAEA reported that additional uranium particles that had undergone chemical processing were found in the samples taken at the site, and that these were "of a type not included in Syria's declared inventory of nuclear material." In addition, the report refers to the Syrian claim that the origin of the uranium particles was in the "missiles that Israel used to bomb the site." The IAEA report counters that "there is a low probability that the uranium was introduced by the use of missiles as the isotopic and chemical composition and the morphology of the particles are all inconsistent with what would be expected from the use of uranium based munitions." Although not officially confirmed, Reuters reported that graphite particles were also found at the site, adding another layer of confirmation to the solid base of evidence against Syria.

However, the IAEA still evades the inevitable conclusions. Strangely enough, it makes requests that Syria would never be able to fulfill since they would be self-incriminating. These requests include: "additional information and supporting documentation about the past use and nature of the building at the [al-Kibar] site, and information about the procurement activities." Since the Syrians are aware that the IAEA has played into their hands, they would never provide the requested information. Thus, the IAEA will be able to repeat unendingly that it needs more information, and the Syrians will be left free to receive IAEA Technical Cooperation support of hundreds of thousands of dollars.

In addition, the IAEA urged "Israel and other states that may possess relevant information to make the information available to the Agency, including satellite imagery, and to agree to the Agency’s sharing of such information with Syria." However, the IAEA already has all the necessary information to enable it to reach the conclusion that the al-Kibar site indeed held a nuclear reactor. Most, if not all, information is in the public domain. An example is a 1500 page e-document that has all the satellite photography one needs for an assessment.[1] Most of these are commercial properties and can be purchased from their owners.

The IAEA should stop shirking its responsibility and instead state clearly the obvious conclusion, which puts the burden of refuting on Syria. It is doubtful whether the present DG will do it.

[1] A Sourcebook on the Israeli Strike in Syria, 6 September 2007, Version of 2009-02-13, Appendix B:

Imagery and Related Materials; http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/syria.pdf