The IAEA-Iran Partnership

On August 27, 2007, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published an Information Circular (INCIRC 711) that included the text of the “Understandings of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the IAEA on the Modalities of Resolution of the Outstanding Issues.” Towards the end of that document, the following text can be found: "The Agency's delegation is of the view that the agreement on the above issues shall further promote the efficiency of the implementation of safeguards in Iran and its ability to conclude the exclusive peaceful nature [sic] of Iran's nuclear activities." Resolution of the outstanding issues would take at least up to the end of 2007.  Thus, by focusing on the resolution of old and almost irrelevant questions, the IAEA managed to divert attention from the main issue of Iran’s continuing uranium enrichment activities.  The Iranians, of course, were overjoyed with the agreement, declaring that the "Iranian File" is about to be closed.

The IAEA dared write this text in spite of the fact that Iran has reneged on its promise to abide by the Additional Protocol (AP).  The IAEA agreed to conduct its activities "in accordance with Iran's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement."  Thus, the IAEA has reverted to its old and inefficient "Comprehensive Safeguards" mode that failed conspicuously in Iraq and is a sure prescription for failure in Iran.  The Comprehensive Safeguards failed in Iraq because they lacked one major capability: to search for concealed facilities, materials and activities.  How could the IAEA let this happen?

Following the 1991discovery by the IAEA Action Team in Iraq of an extensive plan to produce nuclear weapons, a program named “93+2”was launched to review the existing safeguards mode and propose a better system.  The outcome of that work was the proposal for the AP that included, among other things, a provision for environmental sampling -- a "nuclear forensic" method for uncovering these illicit activities.  Had this method been in place in Iraq, Iraq’s secret uranium enrichment and plutonium separation activities would surely have been uncovered.  The AP, however, implied one very questionable promise: that it could provide assurances as to the absence of nuclear materials and activities.  Such negative assurances cannot be provided, especially not in a country the size of Iran with its record of cheating, lying and concealing.

Following the discovery of undeclared activities in Iran, Iran was forced to sign the AP in late 2003 and promised to abide by it, even prior to the necessary parliamentary ratification.  But Iran has reneged on that promise.  Thus the IAEA is handicapped, with no means of discovering any parallel, undeclared activities should they exist.

What, then, is the IAEA's rationale in coming up with the incredible statement that the agreement with Iran can provide the IAEA with the ability "to conclude the exclusive peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities"?  What happened to the insistence on taking samples? Does the IAEA deem the AP no longer necessary?  Did the IAEA come up with an efficient way to conduct its activities without reliance on extensive field work?  The answer to all these questions is simple: the IAEA gave in to Iran on all important issues.  In fact, the IAEA has become Iran’s silent partner.

The most serious issue confronting the international community is Iran's determination to enrich uranium.  In July 2006, the Security Council adopted a resolution demanding "…that Iran shall suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development…" and then imposed sanctions on Iran for failing to do as was demanded of it.  Disregarding this and further resolutions, Iran continued with its enrichment development.  The issue is of extreme importance because once Iran has mastered the technique and successfully operated 3000 uranium enrichment gas centrifuges, it will be able to enrich uranium to military-grade levels (around 90%) and quantities within one year.  This fact was a prominent concern in the SC decision to demand the suspension of Iran's enrichment operations. In spite of this fact, the IAEA's Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, chose to voice his own opinion, elsewhere, that it was too late to stop Iran and that some enrichment activities should be permitted to take place.  His omission of any mention of the demand for suspension in the latest agreement with Iran speaks even more loudly than do his words.

ElBaradei’s periodic report to the IAEA Board of Governors and the SC, promulgated three days after the above-mentioned INFCIRC, did nothing to alleviate any uneasiness that was caused by the previous text.  A major part of this report was again devoted to the "outstanding issues".  In the part dealing with activity at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, it was reported that some 2000 machines were operating simultaneously and were being fed with UF₆, enriching uranium to 4.8%.  Additional machines were being installed and run in.  This alarming fact did not persuade the IAEA that a very dangerous situation has developed, whereby Iran could, if it so decided, use the machines it is now operating to enrich a significant quantity of uranium to military levels within a year and a half.  In the short penultimate paragraph of its report, the IAEA mentioned that Iran has not suspended its enrichment-related activities, contrary to the decisions of the SC.  The IAEA again called on Iran to facilitate safeguards by providing full access to documentation and individuals (but not to sites), and to institute transparency measures, including those provided for in the AP.

Iran was quick to deny the allegation implied in the IAEA report that it was behind schedule in the construction of its centrifuges and stated very strongly that it was not going to accede to the demand of the SC to stop its enrichment activities.

Instead of going straight to the issues of outmost importance, the IAEA continued on its route of non-confrontation, diverting attention by focusing on minor issues and buying time for Iran, thus making Iran's attainment of a military nuclear capability an almost foregone conclusion.  If a non-military solution to the Iran nuclear crisis is to be found, it is imperative that the IAEA concentrate only on essentials, stop aiding Iran in both subtle and overt ways, and sound the alarm about progress in development of Iranian nuclear capabilities.