Saudi Arabia is experiencing one of its most severe security low points in years. To the east, the ongoing war with Iran and the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz are impairing its ability to export oil; to the south, the Houthis are targeting strategic facilities in the kingdom and threatening the alternative export route via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait; in Yemen, fears are mounting over the renewal of a full-scale war; and to the north, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq are joining the circle of threat. Riyadh is thus contending with threats from almost every direction, simultaneously undermining its security and its primary source of power—energy exports. Saudi oil exports dropped to a low this month of just 3 million barrels per day.
Saudi Arabia’s response is to diversify its pillars of support. Riyadh is attempting to strengthen ties with the United States, deepening its alliance with Pakistan, forming the "Mecca Alliance" together with Pakistan and Turkey, and advancing regional security frameworks to safeguard freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
Yet no single framework provides a comprehensive solution. The United States remains Saudi Arabia’s central pillar; Pakistan adds military and deterrent depth; Turkey contributes military and industrial capabilities; and regional frameworks provide additional cooperation. Despite its mutual defense clause, the Mecca Alliance has yet to demonstrate how it would function in wartime, particularly given that its members do not share a common threat perception.
This proliferation of alliances reflects not only power, but above all distress. As Saudi Arabia’s sense of threat intensifies, Riyadh is not choosing a single ally but assembling a range of partial partnerships to avoid dependence on any one actor.
Israel, too, could become part of this network—not as a substitute for the United States or as part of a new defense alliance, but as another partial partner. Israel has much to offer in intelligence, early warning, defense against missiles and UAVs, and confronting Iran and the Houthis. However, given the political cost of openly engaging with Israel, particularly in light of the Palestinian issue, such cooperation is likely to remain selective and discreet for now. Herein lies the paradox: Saudi Arabia’s security distress may increase its need for Israel, but not necessarily the urgency of normalizing relations with it.
For Israel, the right policy is not to use Saudi Arabia’s distress as leverage to pressure Riyadh into normalization, but to demonstrate its value as a security partner. Israel should offer practical cooperation through discreet channels. The more it is perceived in Riyadh as providing a vital additional layer of security without demanding exclusivity or immediate public acknowledgment, the more likely it is to gradually lay the groundwork for a broader partnership and, ultimately, normalization.
Saudi Arabia is experiencing one of its most severe security low points in years. To the east, the ongoing war with Iran and the disruption in the Strait of Hormuz are impairing its ability to export oil; to the south, the Houthis are targeting strategic facilities in the kingdom and threatening the alternative export route via the Bab el-Mandeb Strait; in Yemen, fears are mounting over the renewal of a full-scale war; and to the north, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq are joining the circle of threat. Riyadh is thus contending with threats from almost every direction, simultaneously undermining its security and its primary source of power—energy exports. Saudi oil exports dropped to a low this month of just 3 million barrels per day.
Saudi Arabia’s response is to diversify its pillars of support. Riyadh is attempting to strengthen ties with the United States, deepening its alliance with Pakistan, forming the "Mecca Alliance" together with Pakistan and Turkey, and advancing regional security frameworks to safeguard freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.
Yet no single framework provides a comprehensive solution. The United States remains Saudi Arabia’s central pillar; Pakistan adds military and deterrent depth; Turkey contributes military and industrial capabilities; and regional frameworks provide additional cooperation. Despite its mutual defense clause, the Mecca Alliance has yet to demonstrate how it would function in wartime, particularly given that its members do not share a common threat perception.
This proliferation of alliances reflects not only power, but above all distress. As Saudi Arabia’s sense of threat intensifies, Riyadh is not choosing a single ally but assembling a range of partial partnerships to avoid dependence on any one actor.
Israel, too, could become part of this network—not as a substitute for the United States or as part of a new defense alliance, but as another partial partner. Israel has much to offer in intelligence, early warning, defense against missiles and UAVs, and confronting Iran and the Houthis. However, given the political cost of openly engaging with Israel, particularly in light of the Palestinian issue, such cooperation is likely to remain selective and discreet for now. Herein lies the paradox: Saudi Arabia’s security distress may increase its need for Israel, but not necessarily the urgency of normalizing relations with it.
For Israel, the right policy is not to use Saudi Arabia’s distress as leverage to pressure Riyadh into normalization, but to demonstrate its value as a security partner. Israel should offer practical cooperation through discreet channels. The more it is perceived in Riyadh as providing a vital additional layer of security without demanding exclusivity or immediate public acknowledgment, the more likely it is to gradually lay the groundwork for a broader partnership and, ultimately, normalization.