Since the outbreak of "Roaring Lion," Egypt has cultivated a quadrilateral dialogue and coordination mechanism with Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia aimed at increasing the four nations' influence in shaping the regional order. Assessments among figures close to the Cairo government suggested this quartet would serve as a cornerstone for establishing a permanent joint framework. Thus, it came as a surprise when Egypt remained outside the "Mecca Joint Defense Agreement," signed on August 7 by its three partners, even though the Turkish Foreign Minister noted that the door for Egypt to join in the future remains open, subject to settling technical matters.
Official Cairo has not explained why it was absent from the agreement, but Egyptian commentators have raised a series of speculations: Concerns that such a defense alliance would fuel regional conflicts and arms races; a desire to maintain maximum freedom of maneuver in foreign policy and independence in employing military force, while avoiding being dragged into foreign conflicts with actors like Iran, the Houthis, or Iraqi militias; fear of damaging its neutral status as a regional mediator; and concerns that drawing closer to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan would come at the expense of its strategic relations with Greece, Cyprus, the UAE, and India, and provoke negative reactions from the United States and Israel.
Another factor influencing Egypt's position appears to be the apparent legal contradiction between the Mecca Agreement—which stipulates that an armed attack on one member shall be considered an attack on all—and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. This refers primarily to Article 6, which addresses the status of the peace treaty in relation to other agreements signed by the two states.
In fact, this sensitive clause was a point of contention between Cairo and Jerusalem as early as the discussions on the draft of the peace treaty in October 1978. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat felt that a clause giving the peace treaty with Israel priority over other treaties would humiliate Egypt in the Arab world. On the other hand, Prime Minister Menachem Begin believed that waiving such a clause would be interpreted as a recognition of Egypt's right to violate the peace treaty. Ultimately, the clause was drafted to create "constructive ambiguity": On the one hand, it stated that the treaty "does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting" the parties' obligations to third parties; on the other hand, it established that "in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the parties under the present treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this treaty shall be binding and implemented."
The Bottom Line
Egypt's decision not to join the Mecca Agreement is not necessarily the final word, nor does it halt the trend of growing ties between Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Cairo's caution about joining a military alliance that could undermine its relations with Jerusalem underscores the value of mutually preserving the framework of peace. Particularly in times of tension and mistrust, both sides’ adherence to the spirit of the treaty and the implementation of its clauses are key to strengthening regional stability and security.
Since the outbreak of "Roaring Lion," Egypt has cultivated a quadrilateral dialogue and coordination mechanism with Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia aimed at increasing the four nations' influence in shaping the regional order. Assessments among figures close to the Cairo government suggested this quartet would serve as a cornerstone for establishing a permanent joint framework. Thus, it came as a surprise when Egypt remained outside the "Mecca Joint Defense Agreement," signed on August 7 by its three partners, even though the Turkish Foreign Minister noted that the door for Egypt to join in the future remains open, subject to settling technical matters.
Official Cairo has not explained why it was absent from the agreement, but Egyptian commentators have raised a series of speculations: Concerns that such a defense alliance would fuel regional conflicts and arms races; a desire to maintain maximum freedom of maneuver in foreign policy and independence in employing military force, while avoiding being dragged into foreign conflicts with actors like Iran, the Houthis, or Iraqi militias; fear of damaging its neutral status as a regional mediator; and concerns that drawing closer to Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan would come at the expense of its strategic relations with Greece, Cyprus, the UAE, and India, and provoke negative reactions from the United States and Israel.
Another factor influencing Egypt's position appears to be the apparent legal contradiction between the Mecca Agreement—which stipulates that an armed attack on one member shall be considered an attack on all—and the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. This refers primarily to Article 6, which addresses the status of the peace treaty in relation to other agreements signed by the two states.
In fact, this sensitive clause was a point of contention between Cairo and Jerusalem as early as the discussions on the draft of the peace treaty in October 1978. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat felt that a clause giving the peace treaty with Israel priority over other treaties would humiliate Egypt in the Arab world. On the other hand, Prime Minister Menachem Begin believed that waiving such a clause would be interpreted as a recognition of Egypt's right to violate the peace treaty. Ultimately, the clause was drafted to create "constructive ambiguity": On the one hand, it stated that the treaty "does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting" the parties' obligations to third parties; on the other hand, it established that "in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the parties under the present treaty and any of their other obligations, the obligations under this treaty shall be binding and implemented."
The Bottom Line
Egypt's decision not to join the Mecca Agreement is not necessarily the final word, nor does it halt the trend of growing ties between Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Cairo's caution about joining a military alliance that could undermine its relations with Jerusalem underscores the value of mutually preserving the framework of peace. Particularly in times of tension and mistrust, both sides’ adherence to the spirit of the treaty and the implementation of its clauses are key to strengthening regional stability and security.