The declaration of intent reached between the United States and Iran, which is expected to be signed this coming Friday in Geneva, is primarily an American attempt to halt a war that Trump was no longer interested in. The administration presents the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, the cessation of hostilities, and an Iranian commitment not to act toward achieving a nuclear weapon as a significant achievement. Meanwhile, the Iranians boast about securing the release of their frozen funds, the continuation of oil exports, and make it clear that passage through the Strait of Hormuz will not return to its previous state —meaning a levy of some kind will be collected.
This is not a new nuclear agreement, and most of the core issues remain open: the fate of the enriched uranium, the continuation of uranium enrichment, and the scope of inspection alongside the lifting of sanctions. Even the 60-day window for negotiations to reach a nuclear agreement does not guarantee a breakthrough. It is more likely to turn into a mechanism for delay, drawing out time and leading to lengthy discussions without a resolution. Iran will try to preserve the concessions it has already received, avoid making additional concessions, and water down the American demands. Trump, who has already declared success, will find it difficult, and will likely be unwilling, to return to war, as it would risk the political achievement he seeks to present.
On the issue of Iran's proxies — primarily Hezbollah and the Houthis—there is no detailed layout, beyond stating that the cessation of hostilities will apply to all arenas. On the Lebanese issue, which is critical for Israel, there are differing reports from Washington and Jerusalem. This has created an opening for ongoing friction with the Trump administration, where Israel is suspected of trying to undermine the chances of ending the war.
At the current point in time, Israel's status is complex, and negative on certain issues. The campaign proved Israel's military power, with an emphasis on intelligence and technology, as well as the depth of operational cooperation with the United States. However, in the absence of a decisive military outcome, gaps between Israel and the United States were exposed during the concluding phase, and the exclusion of Israel from the discussions between Washington and Tehran was heavily underscored. Israel hoped to translate its military achievements into a long-term strategic change vis-à-vis Iran and Hezbollah; Trump sought to end the war, open the Strait of Hormuz, lower the economic pressure on the global system, and present a swift political achievement.
Iran, despite the significant damage it sustained during 40 days of fighting, emerges from the campaign with the upper hand. It managed to stand against the powerful militaries of the United States, and Israel and conducted negotiations while stubbornly securing its primary interests: the siege on it is lifted; its nuclear program was not dismantled; the uranium issue was deferred; it is expected to receive economic concessions (frozen funds and oil exports); and the leverage of closing the Strait of Hormuz, which proved itself to be an effective tool of pressure on the global economy and on Washington, will remain largely in its hands. The regime did not collapse, and it feels even stronger vis-à-vis the Iranian public.
None of this diminishes the damages that require rehabilitation, the economic problems that have worsened and for which the Iranian regime has no readily available solution, the hostility of large segments of the public toward the regime, or the power struggles that are likely to develop in the future among various political actors.
Israel emerges from the campaign with partial military achievements and a more constrained diplomatic space. Vis-à-vis Iran, its freedom of action is expected to be significantly curtailed; in Lebanon, some degree of operational space of action may be preserved, but any substantial strike against Hezbollah’s reconstruction will be assessed through the lens of whether it endangers the agreement with Iran, and Israel may have missed an opportunity to strengthen the Lebanese government by reaching understandings with it.
The declaration of intent reached between the United States and Iran, which is expected to be signed this coming Friday in Geneva, is primarily an American attempt to halt a war that Trump was no longer interested in. The administration presents the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, the cessation of hostilities, and an Iranian commitment not to act toward achieving a nuclear weapon as a significant achievement. Meanwhile, the Iranians boast about securing the release of their frozen funds, the continuation of oil exports, and make it clear that passage through the Strait of Hormuz will not return to its previous state —meaning a levy of some kind will be collected.
This is not a new nuclear agreement, and most of the core issues remain open: the fate of the enriched uranium, the continuation of uranium enrichment, and the scope of inspection alongside the lifting of sanctions. Even the 60-day window for negotiations to reach a nuclear agreement does not guarantee a breakthrough. It is more likely to turn into a mechanism for delay, drawing out time and leading to lengthy discussions without a resolution. Iran will try to preserve the concessions it has already received, avoid making additional concessions, and water down the American demands. Trump, who has already declared success, will find it difficult, and will likely be unwilling, to return to war, as it would risk the political achievement he seeks to present.
On the issue of Iran's proxies — primarily Hezbollah and the Houthis—there is no detailed layout, beyond stating that the cessation of hostilities will apply to all arenas. On the Lebanese issue, which is critical for Israel, there are differing reports from Washington and Jerusalem. This has created an opening for ongoing friction with the Trump administration, where Israel is suspected of trying to undermine the chances of ending the war.
At the current point in time, Israel's status is complex, and negative on certain issues. The campaign proved Israel's military power, with an emphasis on intelligence and technology, as well as the depth of operational cooperation with the United States. However, in the absence of a decisive military outcome, gaps between Israel and the United States were exposed during the concluding phase, and the exclusion of Israel from the discussions between Washington and Tehran was heavily underscored. Israel hoped to translate its military achievements into a long-term strategic change vis-à-vis Iran and Hezbollah; Trump sought to end the war, open the Strait of Hormuz, lower the economic pressure on the global system, and present a swift political achievement.
Iran, despite the significant damage it sustained during 40 days of fighting, emerges from the campaign with the upper hand. It managed to stand against the powerful militaries of the United States, and Israel and conducted negotiations while stubbornly securing its primary interests: the siege on it is lifted; its nuclear program was not dismantled; the uranium issue was deferred; it is expected to receive economic concessions (frozen funds and oil exports); and the leverage of closing the Strait of Hormuz, which proved itself to be an effective tool of pressure on the global economy and on Washington, will remain largely in its hands. The regime did not collapse, and it feels even stronger vis-à-vis the Iranian public.
None of this diminishes the damages that require rehabilitation, the economic problems that have worsened and for which the Iranian regime has no readily available solution, the hostility of large segments of the public toward the regime, or the power struggles that are likely to develop in the future among various political actors.
Israel emerges from the campaign with partial military achievements and a more constrained diplomatic space. Vis-à-vis Iran, its freedom of action is expected to be significantly curtailed; in Lebanon, some degree of operational space of action may be preserved, but any substantial strike against Hezbollah’s reconstruction will be assessed through the lens of whether it endangers the agreement with Iran, and Israel may have missed an opportunity to strengthen the Lebanese government by reaching understandings with it.