The recent publications in the US regarding suspicion of Israeli intelligence activity do not stand on their own. They come at a particularly sensitive timing, in which Washington is trying to advance contacts with Iran and to calm the Lebanese arena, while Israel fears that the emerging arrangements will limit its freedom of action, leave dangerous strategic assets in Iran's hands, or force understandings upon it that do not align with its perception of the threat. Therefore, the main question is not only whether Israel did indeed try to gather information on internal discussions in the US, but why American officials chose to surface the claim precisely now.
According to a report in the New York Times, Israel was largely sidelined from the American contacts with Iran, and learned about them through regional diplomatic sources and also via intelligence gathering, including surveillance of senior American officials. Concurrently, NBC reported that the Pentagon has raised the risk/espionage threat assessment by Israel to the highest level in recent weeks. Israel denied this, and the White House also sought to downplay the significance of things, but the publication itself has already created a political problem.
The timing teaches that this is more than an accidental leak. It is possible that elements in the Pentagon and the intelligence community wish to warn against over-exposure of sensitive information to Israel, especially when there is concern that Jerusalem will act to derail American moves that it does not favor. It is also possible that this signals to elements in the administration: closeness to Trump does not grant Israel unrestricted access to briefing rooms in Washington, and certainly does not grant it veto power over American policy toward Iran.
It is also important to note the potential gap between the White House and the professional defense establishment. Even if the political echelon around Trump wishes to preserve the closeness to Israel and downplay the significance of the publications, the Pentagon and the intelligence community operate according to a different logic: safeguarding the independence of the decision-making process, protecting sensitive information, and restricting the access of foreign actors, even when dealing with a close ally.
In this sense, the publication also serves an internal American purpose. It warns senior officials in the administration, Congress, and the defense establishment against uncontrolled sharing of information with Israelis, and signals that the dispute with Jerusalem is not just over policy but also over trust. As long as Israel is perceived as trying to bypass the official channels, the tendency in Washington will strengthen to tighten procedures, reduce exposure, and manage sensitive contacts in more closed circles. Furthermore, the publication provides ammunition to those seeking to frame Israel not just as a demanding ally, but as an actor operating leverage within Washington to narrow the administration's maneuver space.
The recent publications in the US regarding suspicion of Israeli intelligence activity do not stand on their own. They come at a particularly sensitive timing, in which Washington is trying to advance contacts with Iran and to calm the Lebanese arena, while Israel fears that the emerging arrangements will limit its freedom of action, leave dangerous strategic assets in Iran's hands, or force understandings upon it that do not align with its perception of the threat. Therefore, the main question is not only whether Israel did indeed try to gather information on internal discussions in the US, but why American officials chose to surface the claim precisely now.
According to a report in the New York Times, Israel was largely sidelined from the American contacts with Iran, and learned about them through regional diplomatic sources and also via intelligence gathering, including surveillance of senior American officials. Concurrently, NBC reported that the Pentagon has raised the risk/espionage threat assessment by Israel to the highest level in recent weeks. Israel denied this, and the White House also sought to downplay the significance of things, but the publication itself has already created a political problem.
The timing teaches that this is more than an accidental leak. It is possible that elements in the Pentagon and the intelligence community wish to warn against over-exposure of sensitive information to Israel, especially when there is concern that Jerusalem will act to derail American moves that it does not favor. It is also possible that this signals to elements in the administration: closeness to Trump does not grant Israel unrestricted access to briefing rooms in Washington, and certainly does not grant it veto power over American policy toward Iran.
It is also important to note the potential gap between the White House and the professional defense establishment. Even if the political echelon around Trump wishes to preserve the closeness to Israel and downplay the significance of the publications, the Pentagon and the intelligence community operate according to a different logic: safeguarding the independence of the decision-making process, protecting sensitive information, and restricting the access of foreign actors, even when dealing with a close ally.
In this sense, the publication also serves an internal American purpose. It warns senior officials in the administration, Congress, and the defense establishment against uncontrolled sharing of information with Israelis, and signals that the dispute with Jerusalem is not just over policy but also over trust. As long as Israel is perceived as trying to bypass the official channels, the tendency in Washington will strengthen to tighten procedures, reduce exposure, and manage sensitive contacts in more closed circles. Furthermore, the publication provides ammunition to those seeking to frame Israel not just as a demanding ally, but as an actor operating leverage within Washington to narrow the administration's maneuver space.