Keywords: Iran, Africa, Israel, Turkey, China, Russia, Gulf states

Introduction

Since the earliest days of the Islamic Revolution, Africa has been an attractive arena for the Iranian regime, which perceived an ideological affinity between Iran and many African states—particularly in light of their resolute opposition to “Western colonialism.” This, together with Tehran’s desire to protect the large Shiite minority across the continent, especially in West Africa, as well as its interest in exploiting Africa’s resources for its own needs, previously led Iran’s leadership to intensify its activities in Africa, particularly during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iran’s former president, Ebrahim Raisi, who made strengthening ties with Africa a top foreign-policy priority of his presidency, likewise worked to deepen Tehran’s relations with numerous countries across the continent.

However, Iran is not the only state seeking to expand its influence in Africa. The Gulf states—foremost among them the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—as well as China, Russia, and Turkey, are also working to deepen their economic, political, and security footholds in the continent and to exploit the vacuum that has emerged there following the retreat of European powers, particularly France, and the limited interest shown by the US administration in Africa.

In order to examine the efforts of Iran, Russia, China, Turkey, and the Gulf states on the continent—and above all to analyze how these efforts affect Israel’s broader interests in Africa, with a view to recommending policy that Israel should adopt to address the negative implications of these trends—the Institute for National Security Studies convened a three-session symposium:

1. The first session—featuring INSS researchers: Former ambassador Arkady Milman, Dr. Yoel Guzansky, Dr. Uri Sela, and Dr. Galia Lindenstrauss—focused on Russia, the Gulf states, China, and Turkey’s efforts to exert influence in Africa.
2. The second session—with the participation of INSS researcher Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz, Ms. Revital Naveh, and Mr. Matan Daniel of Tel Aviv University—analyzed Iran’s activity on the African continent.
3. The third session—featuring Dr. Asher (Assi) Luvtsky of the Israel-Africa Relations Institute—addressed the policies Israel should adopt in order to expand its influence in Africa.

In addition, the roundtable was opened by Dr. Rashid Abdi, Director of Research at the Sahan Research Institute in Kenya, who presented his analysis on the moves of the major powers and Iran in the Horn of Africa.

Major Power Engagement in Africa

The Turkish Dimension

Although early indications of Turkey’s growing interest in Africa could already be observed in the 1980s and 1990s, the turning point came in 2005, when Turkey declared its “Year of Africa.” Since then, Turkey’s relations with African states have flourished across a wide range of domains: diplomacy (Turkey maintains 44 embassies across the African continent); economics (investment in infrastructure projects in various countries and a significant expansion in trade volume); security (Turkey is the fourth-largest defense exporter to Sub-Saharan Africa); as well as soft power and elite-building efforts in Africa (including a network of schools, scholarships for African students, and the popularity of Turkish television dramas).

Somalia has become, to a large extent, the “showcase” of Turkey’s policy toward Africa. In 2011, President Erdoğan visited Somalia, becoming the first foreign leader to do so in 20 years. Thereafter, Turkey chose to provide assistance to the country from within Somali territory, whereas many other states operated from Ethiopia. In 2017, Turkey opened its largest overseas military base in Somalia, and it is estimated to have trained more than one-third of Somalia’s security forces. More recently, Turkish officials have claimed the discovery of significant oil and gas reserves off the coast of Somalia.

To illustrate how Turkey’s involvement in Africa poses several potential challenges to Israel, it’s worth considering a few examples:

1. Turkey’s presence in Somalia affords it a foothold in the Red Sea, and it is also constructing a facility there to test domestically produced missiles. Should issues arise in the future regarding Israeli recognition of Somaliland, this could become a source of tension between the two countries, given Turkey’s support for Mogadishu’s “One Somalia” policy.
2. Turkey’s cooperation with South Africa is significant in the context of the Global South and international criticism of Israel, and Turkey has joined South Africa’s case against Israel at the International Court of Justice in The Hague, accusing Israel of committing genocide in the Gaza Strip.
3. In Niger, Turkey has taken advantage of the weakening French presence to expand its influence and has expressed interest in the country’s uranium resources—ostensibly for Turkey’s civilian nuclear program, though questions have been raised as to possible military purposes as well.
4. Finally, the maritime delimitation agreement signed in 2019 between Turkey and Libya’s Government of National Accord—despite its inconsistency with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and opposition from Egypt and Greece in relevant forums—creates challenges for Israel in advancing Eastern Mediterranean projects, such as the EastMed gas pipeline and the planned undersea electricity cable from Greece to Cyprus and onward to Israel.

The Chinese Dimension

China is involved in the vast majority of African countries across a wide and diverse range of fields—from investments and partnerships in agriculture to cooperation in space programs, satellite launches, and navigation systems (BeiDou). This engagement also encompasses fintech, arms exports (including joint military exercises and peacekeeping missions), involvement in mining and the acquisition of minerals and other resources, as well as infrastructure development (including railways, ports, and construction). China also plays an important role in lending and development assistance to Africa, even if it is not the leading actor in this domain. Overall, China is the most important trading partner for most African states.

China’s cooperation with many African states stems in part from an ideological motivation rooted in opposition to the West (from the Bandung Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement to the contemporary notion of the Global South), as well as from the aspiration to reshape the existing international order—alongside more concrete and tangible interests. China’s cooperation is more deeply institutionalized within Africa’s stronger states, particularly in East and North Africa (such as Egypt, Algeria, Ethiopia, and, of course, South Africa), whereas in weaker states, for example in Central Africa, it tends to be more ad hoc. As a result, in the more fragile parts of the continent China is at times perceived as a neo-imperialist or colonial actor, especially where patterns emerge of exporting raw materials from Africa to China while importing finished goods back into Africa.

In addition, in every major country in which Iran operates, China is also significantly active. Although this is not surprising, it is important to note that there is not always alignment or overlap between Iranian objectives and those of China. For example, in Somalia, Iran provides assistance to global jihadist actors—chief among them al-Shabaab—who seek to undermine the Somali government’s control over the country, whereas China opposes al-Shabaab’s activities due to its interest in strengthening Somalia’s central government. This divergence implies that Israel may have room to attempt to exert influence in such arenas before deciding to act in places such as Somaliland.

The Global South was also mentioned in the discussion. While it is indeed an important organizing concept, it is also, to some extent, a fiction. The numerous internal rivalries within Africa far from conform to such a clearly defined geopolitical category, as with the rivalries among external actors operating in Africa—many of which claim to be, represent, or lead the Global South. This applies as well to assertions regarding China’s role in Africa, which is often described as neo-imperialist or colonialist. This reality creates room for manoeuvre for Israel, provided it is able to exploit it effectively.

The Russian Dimension

Within just a decade (2015–2025), Russia has succeeded in establishing a multidimensional architecture of influence in Africa—a network of relationships, alliances, arms deals, and a semi-official military presence. This presence initially took the form of a semi-private venture managed by the Wagner mercenary group, which advanced Kremlin interests while operating outside Russia’s formal legal and institutional framework. At the time, Moscow was seeking ways to circumvent sanctions, preserve access to Africa’s natural resources, and secure a strategic foothold in areas beyond Western control. Wagner provided an effective solution: mercenaries, ammunition, and influence without overt state responsibility.

Following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin and the disbandment of the Wagner Group, Moscow made a strategic decision to transform its presence in Africa from an unofficial private operation into a state instrument. This shift gave rise to the Africa Corps—a military-security force operating across multiple domains under Russia’s Ministry of Defense and with support from the GRU. Its activities include training military personnel; securing natural-resource facilities (oil, gold, diamonds, and uranium); supplying weapons systems and military equipment; and providing protection for senior leadership, including heads of state. Through this activity, Russia has secured a military and strategic foothold in Libya, Mali, Niger, the Central African Republic, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Chad, and Equatorial Guinea.

Following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Africa became one of the key arenas for the construction of an anti-Western front. Moscow seeks to weaken Western—particularly French and US—presence on the continent and, in light of the sanctions imposed on it, to secure access to natural resources while using the African theatre as a space for military, intelligence, and diplomatic activity. To this end, Russia also conducts influence operations on social media and cognitive and cultural campaigns aimed at shaping pro-Russian public opinion and portraying Russia as an alternative to a “colonialist West.”

As of 2025, the Africa Corps reflects and institutionalizes a structural shift in Russian policy toward Africa—from deniability and informal activity to overt state involvement; from a model based on mercenaries and private business ventures to a force structure endowed with command authority, a dedicated budget, and political legitimacy. In this way, Moscow is constructing permanent geostrategic architecture on the continent. Russia’s presence in Africa thus constitutes not only an expression of regional influence but also an integral component of a broader effort to build a multipolar international system in which Russia is not isolated.

The Gulf States

The intensification of Gulf state engagement in Africa reflects their aspiration to establish centres of power and influence in the global arena, capitalizing on a window of opportunity created by a certain reduction in involvement by the United States and China. Alongside ad hoc cooperation, the intensifying competition among the three Gulf states for influence in Africa has also generated friction—most notably in Sudan and the Horn of Africa—reflecting a broader struggle over the definition of the emerging regional order. From the perspective of African states themselves, this presents a double-edged sword: an opportunity for massive investment and modern infrastructure, but also the risk of economic dependency and external political involvement that may exacerbate existing tensions and generate new ones. For the Gulf states, Africa is gradually becoming a strategic arena—central to their security, economic interests, and global standing—and this dynamic also offers Israel an opening for regional cooperation in addressing the challenges posed by Iran.

Iran’s Engagement in Africa

Iranian activity in Africa has expanded in recent months, particularly the regime’s effort to increase the sale of its weapons systems to numerous countries across the continent and to leverage these sales to deepen Tehran’s security foothold in Africa. This trend is especially pronounced in East Africa, though a growing intensification of Iranian activity can also be identified in the Sahel region.

Thus, in the Horn of Africa and across East Africa, Tehran continues to expand its ties with Sudan and Eritrea and to transfer weapons—particularly UAVs, mortars, and anti-tank missiles—via Eritrea to bolster the capabilities of the Sudanese Armed Forces in the country’s civil war against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This activity reflects a deliberate policy aimed at restoring relations with Sudan and leveraging Iran’s renewed foothold there for a range of strategic purposes. At the same time, Tehran is working intensively to renew its diplomatic relations with Cairo and Djibouti, based on the assessment that deepening Iran’s presence in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa region would tighten the “economic siege” on Israel, facilitate the establishment of channels for transferring weapons to Hamas in the Gaza Strip, and provide the Iranian navy with ports of call in this strategically significant area.

At the same time, Iran seeks to expand its ties with North African states—from Libya through Tunisia to Algeria—thereby gaining not only access to the Mediterranean Sea and the Strait of Gibraltar but, more importantly, increasing military pressure on Morocco, which the Iranian leadership views as a stronghold of Israeli and US activity on the continent. This it pursues through expanded military support for the Polisario Front, which is fighting Moroccan control in Western Sahara.

In parallel with its activism in the Horn of Africa and North Africa, Iran is also seeking to exploit the vacuum created by the weakening of the French presence in the Sahel. Much like China and Russia, Tehran is attempting to secure economic and political footholds in these states. Niger is a case in point, where Iran has multiple interests, including uranium resources that it could procure for use in its nuclear program.

Moreover, Iran is expanding its economic ties with various countries in eastern Africa, including Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, seeking to leverage these relationships both to showcase the resilience of its foreign ties and to circumvent the sanctions imposed on the Iranian regime by deepening economic cooperation with these states.

Finally, it is important to note the high importance Iran attaches to its relations with South Africa, which it regards as a strategic partner across a wide range of domains—political, economic, and security alike. Accordingly, Tehran is working to broaden its ties with Pretoria, inter alia in order to exploit South Africa’s influence on the continent to undermine Israel’s diplomatic efforts, particularly within African multilateral frameworks, which are aimed at strengthening Israel’s political standing in Africa.

In direct relation to Iranian activism, it is also important to underscore Houthi activity on the African continent. The Houthis do not pose a threat solely to the Middle East; their actions in the Horn of Africa—such as their support for al-Shabaab in Somalia alongside their growing activity in Sudan and Eritrea—also constitute an increasing threat to Israeli and Western interests in the region and necessitate a broader assessment of the Houthi challenge.

Policy Recommendations for Israel

The expansion of Iranian activity across Africa jeopardizes key Israeli interests on the continent and heightens the military and economic threat to Israel. Accordingly, Israel must challenge this activity by formulating a strategy aimed at pushing Iran out of Africa. Despite the wide range of security challenges Israel currently faces, it should devote focused attention to Iran’s activities in Africa and seek to enlist additional partners in order to reverse this trend.

Israel must take the African continent seriously. This requires a mental shift on the part of Israeli policymakers and the Israeli public alike. Israel needs to recognize that Africa occupies a central place in Israel’s national security. By way of illustration, it is unacceptable that most Israelis only became aware of Somaliland—one of the most strategic and pro-Israeli locations on the continent—over the past year, and primarily in the context of discussions about “voluntary migration” from Gaza.

Israel should formulate a comprehensive continent-wide strategy, in which the government plays a central role in guiding civilian and economic actors. This requires mapping specific arenas in which Israel has a national interest—first and foremost the Red Sea, but also locations where Israel can procure raw materials essential to its defense industries—particularly in preparation for potential future boycotts or embargoes by Western states.

Israel must operate through coalitions and bring to bear its comparative advantages (security-related and technological). A number of countries friendly to Israel are already active on the continent—among them the United Arab Emirates, India, and, of course, the United States—and Israel should work together with them as a single, coordinated bloc. Africa—especially in the Sahel, but also places such as Mozambique and Central Africa—is a major global hub of terrorism and here Israel can contribute and forge new partnerships; no other country has managed to provide effective assistance, and in the realm of combating terrorism Israel enjoys a significant comparative advantage. Israel also has advanced technological solutions that the continent needs, particularly relating to water. Finally, Israel can serve as a bridge between African states and governments such as the United States, as well as donors and private organizations.

Israel should prioritize the arenas most important to it: First, East Africa, which is the most vital—both because of Iranian involvement and due to its proximity to Yemen; second, areas rich in strategic minerals in Central and West Africa; and third, key states that could cause harm to Israel, such as South Africa. A successful Israeli policy is feasible because many African countries still view Israel positively. In places such as Kenya and Nigeria, Israel enjoys considerable popularity, creating potential for deep, long-term partnerships.

Israel has overlapping interests regarding security and economic cooperation with some Gulf states (the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain) with respect to Africa—above all, countering Iran’s influence and radical Islam. At the same time, Israel should be aware that such cooperation could evoke international criticism, since the Gulf states have previously been criticized for the nature of their involvement in the continent.