Table of Contents:

Summary of the Results

A clear majority of the public (80.5%) believes that there is politicization within the IDF to some extent; more than half of the public (57%) prefers the establishment of a state commission of inquiry over a committee appointed by members of the Knesset; about two-thirds of the public (64%) assess that legislation exempting most of the ultra-Orthodox public from IDF service would harm motivation for combat service; half of the public believes that approval of a bill mandating the death penalty for terrorists would not deter terrorists from carrying out attacks; only one-third of the public (33%) believes that the prime minister’s decision to appoint his military secretary, Maj. Gen. Roman Gofman, as head of the Mossad was made primarily on the basis of security considerations and the national interest; a majority of the public (54%) supports moving to Phase B of the ceasefire agreement in Gaza.

Methodology

The survey was conducted between December 11–14, 2025, under the leadership of the Data Analytics Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Fieldwork was carried out by iPanel and included online interviews with 805 Jewish respondents in Hebrew and 152 Arab respondents in Arabic, constituting a representative sample of Israel’s adult population aged 18 and over. The maximum margin of sampling error for the full sample is ±3.17% at a 95% confidence level.

Click here to download the full survey data | Survey results in Arabic – نتائج الاستطلاع باللغة العربية | Click here to view trends among the Jewish public | Click here to view trends among the Arab public

the complete data

Perception of Threats and Challenges

Less than one-third of the Israeli public (27.5%) assesses the current state of national security as good or very good, while about one-third (31.5%) believes the situation is bad or very bad, and 40% rate it as moderate. On an average scale from 1 (very bad) to 10 (very good), national security received a score of 5.7—no significant change compared to November.

• A sharp gap emerges between Jewish and Arab respondents: among Jews, 31% rate the security situation as good or very good, compared to only 15% among Arabs. Conversely, 45% of Arabs rate the situation as bad or very bad, compared to 28% among Jews. Accordingly, the average score stands at 5.9 among Jews and 4.8 among Arabs.
• A clear political divide is also evident: among coalition voters, 43% assess the security situation as good, compared to only 16% among opposition voters. A similar pattern appears along ideological lines—41% among right-wing voters versus 17% among center-left voters.

Looking ahead five years, cautious optimism is evident. More than one-third of the public (36%) expects Israel’s national security to improve—27% to some extent and 9% to a great extent. By contrast, 21% of the public expects it to deteriorate, 28% foresees no change, and 15% responded “don’t know.” On a scale from 1 (much worse) to 10 (much better), the future of national security received an average score of 5.4, down from 5.7 in November.

• Differences persist between Jews and Arabs: 40% of Jews expect improvement and only 18% anticipate deterioration (average score 5.6), while among Arabs, 31% expect deterioration and only 19% improvement (average score 4.6).
• Political gaps are again pronounced: 52% of coalition voters expect national security to improve versus 27% of opposition voters; 48% on the right versus 28% in the center-left.

Concern over internal social tensions remains extremely high: 83% of respondents report concern—42% are fairly concerned and 41% are very concerned. Only 12% are fairly unconcerned and 3% reported they are not concerned at all.

• This high level of concern is evident across sectors: 85% among Jews and 77% among Arabs. Politically, concern is higher among opposition voters (93%) than coalition voters (78%).

Concern over external security threats is also widespread, although less intense than concern over internal threats. Some 70.5% report concern—52% fairly concerned and 18% very concerned. Another 23% are fairly unconcerned, and only 5% are not concerned at all.

• Among Jews, 74% are concerned about external threats compared to 59% among Arabs.
• Politically, 81% of opposition voters express concern compared to 65% of coalition voters.

Personal security is relatively low and polarized: Only 28% of respondents report high or very high personal security, 48% moderate, and 23% low or very low. On a scale from 1 (very low) to 10 (very high), the average score is 5.9.

• The Jewish–Arab gap is particularly sharp: Among Jews, 33% report high personal security and 17% low (average 6.2), while among Arabs, only 8% report high security and 47% low or very low (average 4.7).
• Politically, 43% of coalition voters report high personal security compared to 19% of opposition voters; conversely, 28% of opposition voters report low security versus 11% of coalition voters.

Trust in Individuals and Institutions

The Military Echelon

A majority of the Israeli public (75%) expresses high trust in the IDF (33% to a great extent and 41% to a fairly great extent), compared to about 24% reporting low trust.

• A pronounced sectoral gap is apparent: Trust among Jews is very high (85%), while among Arabs, only 32% report high trust and 63% report low trust.
• Politically, trust is high among both coalition voters (83%) and opposition voters (79%), but higher on the right (85%) than on the center-left (72%).

A majority of the public expresses high trust in the Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir: 58% report high trust, compared to 31% of the public with low trust; 11% answered “don’t know.” This reflects a slight decline from November, when 63% of the public had high trust.

• Among Jews, 67% express high trust compared to only 23% among Arabs.
• Trust in Zamir is higher among opposition voters (67%) than coalition voters (60%).

Public trust in the IDF’s investigations and lessons learned from the October 7 events continues to rise. Fifty-one percent report high trust (11% very high and 41% high), compared to 42% reporting low trust; 7% answered “don’t know.” This marks a gradual increase since February 2025 and the highest level since the question was first asked in July 2024.

• Among Jews, 56% report high trust compared to only 30% among Arabs.
• Opposition voters express slightly more trust (58%) than coalition voters (51%).

The Political Echelon

Public trust in the government is very low and highly polarized: Only 23% expresses high trust in the government, compared to 76% reporting low trust.

• Among Arabs, trust is particularly low: Only 9% report high trust versus 90% with low trust.
• Political polarization is severe: Fewer than half of coalition voters (49%) express high trust, compared to only 3% among opposition voters. On the right, 43% reports high trust versus 6% in the center-left.

Less than one-third of the public (32%) expresses high trust in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, while 68% report low trust or complete lack of trust.

• Among coalition voters, 66% express high trust versus only 5% among opposition voters. On the right, 59% report high trust compared to 6% in the center-left. Among Arabs, only 6% report high trust, while 91% report low trust.

Trust in Defense Minister Israel Katz is also very low: Only 23% of the public reports high trust versus 70% with low trust—a slight decline from November.

• Among coalition voters, 48% report high trust compared to 6% among opposition voters; 43% on the right versus 7% in the center-left.

Most of the public does not trust the Minister of National Security, Itamar Ben Gvir: Only 26% report high trust compared to 71% reporting low or no trust.

• Among Arabs, trust is nearly nonexistent—1% report high trust versus 97% with low trust.
• Politically, 51% on the right and 58% of coalition voters express high trust, compared to only 5% among opposition and center-left voters.

Trust in Boaz Bismuth, chair of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee and Knesset member, is also low: Only 19% of the public reports high trust versus 67% with low trust; 14% answered “don’t know.”

• Among coalition voters, 41% express a high level of trust in him, compared to only 3% among opposition voters.
• Among the Arab public, only 2% express a high level of trust in him; 86% express a low level of trust, and 13% responded “don’t know.”

Security and Diplomatic Threats and Challenges

The Different Arenas

Iran and Judea and Samaria remain at the top of public concern, while Yemen ranks the lowest. Concern regarding the Syrian arena has increased.

• A majority of the public (67%) is concerned about Iran, similar to concern regarding Judea and Samaria.
• A similar percentage of the public (58%) is concerned about Gaza and Lebanon. Forty-four percent are concerned about Syria, an 8-point increase from November.
• Only 26% are concerned about Yemen.

There is a sharp sectoral gap across most arenas. The level of concern among the Jewish public is significantly higher than the Arab public—Judea and Samaria: 74% among Jews compared to 38% among Arabs; Iran: 72% versus 45%, respectively; Gaza: 61% versus 43%; Lebanon: 62% versus 41%; Syria: a smaller but still evident gap—46% among Jews compared to 36% among Arabs. Yemen is the exception, with similar levels of concern (25%–26%) in both sectors.

By political affiliation, opposition voters are more concerned about Iran and Lebanon, while concern over the security situation in Judea and Samaria is similar across both camps—Iran: 73% of opposition voters are concerned compared to 66% of coalition voters; Lebanon: 64% of opposition voters versus 57% of coalition voters; Judea and Samaria: concern is very similar in both camps (71% of opposition voters compared to 73% of coalition voters).

The Gaza Front

A majority of the public supports moving to Phase B of the Gaza ceasefire: 54% express support versus 36% opposed, while 10% answered “don’t know.”

• Support is lower among Jews (49%) than Arabs (76%).

• Political polarization is sharp: Among coalition voters, 37% support moving to Phase B, compared to 67% among opposition voters. On the right, 36% support this move, compared to 72% support in the center-left camp.

The Northern Front

There is a sharp decline in satisfaction with the enforcement of the ceasefire agreement in the north. Forty-nine percent of the public has a high level of satisfaction with how the agreement is being enforced (39% to a great extent and 10% to a very great extent), compared to 43% of the public who report a low level of satisfaction (35% to a small extent and 8% to a very small extent). Another 8% responded “don’t know.” This marks a sharp decline compared to November, when 62% of the public reported a high level of satisfaction with the ceasefire agreement in the north, and only about one-third (33%) reported a low level of satisfaction.

• The percentage reporting high satisfaction is similar among Arabs (50%) and Jews (48.5%).
• A moderate political gap: 52% of coalition voters express high satisfaction, compared to 47% of opposition voters.

A majority of the Israeli public (58%) believes that the situation in the north requires a return to fighting—primarily limited fighting.

Only 28% of the public believes that the security situation in the north allows residents to feel safe, indicating a decline from 34% who held this view in November.

By contrast, 45% of the public believes the situation requires a return to limited fighting without a ground maneuver, and 13% support a return to intensive fighting that includes a maneuver. Another 14% responded “don’t know.”

• The gap between Jews and Arabs is sharp: Among the Jewish public, only 23% believe the situation allows residents to feel safe, compared to 49% among the Arab public.
• The political gap is also evident: Only 20% of coalition voters believe the situation allows for security, compared to 33% of opposition voters. Among voters on the right, 20% hold this view, compared to 37% in the center-left camp.

Israel’s Foreign Relations

• A majority of the public (56%) perceives China as unfriendly or hostile toward Israel (48% define China as unfriendly and 8% as hostile). By contrast, 25% view China positively (23% define it as a friendly country and 2% as an ally). A relatively high percentage—19%—responded “don’t know.”

  • The sectoral gap is sharp: Among the Jewish public 62% perceive China as unfriendly or hostile, compared to 32% among the Arab public. Conversely, among the Arab public, 53% view China as an ally or a friendly country, compared to only 19% among the Jewish public.

Internal Societal Threats and Challenges

Civil–Military Relations

A majority of the public (80.5%) believes there is politicization in the IDF to some extent (27% to a small extent, 36% to a great extent, and 17.5% to a very great extent). By contrast, only 6% of the public thinks there is no politicization in the IDF at all. Another 14% responded “don’t know.”

• Consensus on this issue traverses the political camps: About 80% of the public on both the right and the center-left agrees that there is politicization in the IDF, “against the background of intervention by external actors seeking to influence the military and cause it to act based on political, rather than professional, considerations.”

A majority of the public (51%) is opposed to rules of engagement that prohibit killing a neutralized terrorist who poses no threat (28% of the respondents do not support this at all and 23% do not really support it). By comparison, 43% of the public supports these rules (24% of respondents somewhat support them and 19% strongly support them). An additional 6% responded “don’t know.”

• The sectoral gap is sharp: A majority of the Jewish public (59%) is opposed to these rules of engagement, compared to a majority of the Arab public (63%) that supports them.
• The political gap is also pronounced: 79% of coalition voters do not support the IDF’s rules of engagement, compared to 32% among opposition voters.

A majority of the Israeli public believes that motivation for combat service would be harmed if an amendment to the law exempting most of the ultra-Orthodox public from IDF service is approved. Sixty-four percent of respondents assess that the amendment would somewhat harm or greatly harm motivation for combat service among the general population, compared to 30% who believe the amendment would not harm or not really harm motivation.

• Eighty-three percent of opposition voters and 76% of those in the center-left camp believe the amendment would harm motivation for combat service, compared to 49% of coalition voters and 55% of those in the right-wing camp.

A majority of the Israeli public (51.5%) is dissatisfied with the IDF’s handling of incidents of nationalist crime by Jews in Judea and Samaria, compared to 33.5% who expressed satisfaction to a great extent or to a very great extent. Another 15% responded “don’t know.”

• By political affiliation, 48% of coalition voters expressed satisfaction to a great extent or to a very great extent, compared to only 25% of opposition voters.
• Only 18% of the Arab public expressed high satisfaction, compared to 37% of the Jewish public.

A majority of the public (52%) opposes the defense minister’s decision to freeze appointments recently made by the IDF chief of staff. Thirty percent of the public does not support this decision at all, and an additional 22% do not really support it. Only 12% somewhat support it and another 9% strongly support the decision. A particularly high percentage—27%—responded “don’t know.”

• Among opposition voters, opposition to this decision is especially strong (75%), while support is low (only 6%). Among coalition voters, the picture is more complex: 38% support the minister’s decision, 32% oppose it, and 30% responded “don’t know.”

Appointment of the Next Mossad Director

A majority of the public believes that the decision to appoint the next Mossad director was motivated primarily by security considerations and the national interest. Only 33% believe that the decision to appoint the prime minister’s military secretary, Maj. Gen. Roman Gofman, as director of the Mossad was driven to a great extent or to a very great extent by security considerations and the good of the state, compared to 52% who believe the opposite (29% to a small extent and 23% not at all). An additional 15% responded “don’t know.”

• Fifty-six percent of the public in the right-wing camp believes the appointment decision was driven by security considerations, compared to only 11% in the center-left camp.

Death Penalty Law

The public is divided over deterrence: the death penalty for terrorists. Fifty percent of the public believes that if a bill mandating the death penalty for terrorists is approved, it would not deter terrorists from carrying out attacks (27% of respondents believe it probably would not deter, and 23% think it definitely would not deter), compared to 46% of the public who believes it would deter (25% of respondents think it probably would deter, and 21% believe it definitely would deter).

• The Jewish public is divided: 50% believe the punishment would deter, compared to 48% who think it would not. Among the Arab public, a majority (58%) believes it would not deter, compared to 31% who believe it would deter.
• Political polarization is sharp: Among coalition voters, 67% believe the punishment would deter terrorists from carrying out attacks, compared to 31% who believe the opposite. Among opposition voters, by contrast, 32% believe it would deter, compared to 65% who believe it would not. On the right, 64% believe it would deter compared to 34% who believe it would not; in the center-left camp, 28% of voters believe it would deter compared to 67% who believe it would not.

State Commission of Inquiry

A majority of the public (57%) supports establishing a state commission of inquiry appointed by the president of the Supreme Court. Twenty-nine percent of the public prefers a commission appointed by members of the Knesset, 4% oppose any commission of inquiry, and 10% responded “don’t know.”

• Political polarization is especially pronounced: Among coalition voters, 25% support establishing a state commission of inquiry, compared to 54% who prefer a commission appointed by the Knesset. Among opposition voters, by contrast, 86% support a state commission of inquiry, and only 9% prefer a commission appointed by the Knesset.
• By political camps, the gap is also sharp: Among voters on the right, 33% support a state commission of inquiry, and 47% prefer a commission appointed by the Knesset. In the center-left camp, 81% support a state commission of inquiry, and only 12% prefer a commission appointed by the Knesset.
• Sectoral gap: Among the Arab public, support for a state commission of inquiry is higher (67%) than among the Jewish public (55%).

The Resilience of Israeli Society

A majority of the public (63%) believes that solidarity in Israeli society exists to a small extent or does not exist at all (50% to a small extent; 12% not at all), compared to 31% who believe it exists to a great extent or to a very great extent (28% to a great extent; 3% to a very great extent). Another 7% responded “don’t know.”

• By political affiliation, among opposition voters, 73% report low or nonexistent solidarity, compared to 53% among coalition voters. By political camps, 71% in the center-left report low solidarity, compared to 55% in the right-wing camp.