Publications

President Trump’s 20-point plan for ending the war in the Gaza Strip and its reconstruction rests on three main components: the establishment of a technocratic government, the creation of an international stabilization force (ISF), and the formation of a Board of Peace. While the technocratic government is intended to be exclusively Palestinian, both the ISF and the Board of Peace are meant to be multinational, even if President Trump himself chairs the board. The ISF is to be assembled and coordinated by a dedicated US command, which has already been established. At the same time, it is necessary to understand the implications of establishing a multinational force and operating it as a peacekeeping and peace enforcement mission in light of international experience and the relevant literature. It is essential to recognize the problems and challenges involved in deploying such task forces, to learn from the extensive—often negative—experience accumulated in this field, and to ensure that the right thing is done right in the mission’s substance, its relevance, and its implementation—from force generation and training through its deployment and operations.

The Challenges Involved in the Deployment of Peacekeeping Forces

Peacekeeping operations are a broad generic concept encompassing a wide spectrum of missions. These range from traditional peacekeeping, which monitors and supervises peace agreements or ceasefires without authority to intervene; through peace enforcement, in which the mission is authorized to use force to uphold agreements; to stabilization and state-building operations, which are characterized by a broad mandate and extensive involvement in the area of operations and engagement with the local population.

What peacekeeping operations share, in this broad and inclusive sense, is that they take place in a conflict zone, even in the context of a formal agreement. The mission becomes more complex in active conflicts and environments characterized by high levels of violence and the presence of active spoilers—particularly when they are armed. Across the various missions, peacekeeping environments are saturated with multiple actors operating within a civilian population. In practice, this means a mix of local and external actors with differing interests and, above all, distinct cultural backgrounds. As a result, every peacekeeping arena generates cultural challenges alongside operational ones.

The cultural challenge in deploying a peacekeeping force can be characterized at three levels. The first concerns the force itself. When personnel come from different countries, the mission inherently becomes an intercultural encounter, even among soldiers, since they come from different militaries with distinct organizational cultures—even when operating within national contingents. Because such forces typically combine multinational military units with civilian actors from different countries, the internal cultural challenge is twofold: there are differences between soldiers and military units from different states, and the interaction between the military and the civilian spheres, with the associated frictions and tensions.

The second level of the cultural challenge relates to the interaction between the peacekeeping force, which is military in nature, and civilian actors operating on the ground—international organizations, humanitarian agencies, human rights groups, and the media. Humanitarian aid is characterized by inter-organizational politics, driven by tensions and rivalries among organizations over resources, areas of activity, and media visibility (as analyzed in depth by Linda Polman in The Crisis Caravan). Since the mission’s success depends in part on effective cooperation with these civilian actors, it requires a deep understanding of these dynamics, along with cognitive flexibility, creativity, and the ability to navigate among them to maximize cooperation.

The third level of the cultural challenge is probably the most complex and addresses the cultural gaps between the force and the civilian population. In peacekeeping missions—particularly stabilization and peace enforcement operations, and even more so in state-building missions combined with assistance to the local population and the reconstruction process—success depends on cooperation with the local population, which in turn requires a deep understanding of local culture. Such understanding must emerge from an ongoing learning process grounded in cultural intelligence and cultural awareness, which guide the collection and interpretation of culturally relevant information (see, for example, Chapter 9 in the Transformation in the World of War and Peace Support Operations, edited by Kobi Michael, David Kellen, and Eyal Ben-Ari, 2009).

Beyond these cultural challenges, peacekeeping missions also face operational challenges related to the execution of the mission in environments with hostile and violent civilian populations—and, in the case of the Gaza Strip, also almost entirely devastated and subject to severe humanitarian conditions. Military activity in such a setting requires policing alongside military operations—referred to in the literature as “military policing” (see the special issue on “Military Policing in Israel” of Israel Studies Review, 2020). Integrating military and policing functions requires specialized skills; however, in the vast majority of cases, peacekeeping forces lack the requisite training and experience.

Beyond the operational and professional capabilities required of any peacekeeping force, a clear mandate for its deployment is essential. The mandate must define the mission and the authorities required to carry it out, the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and the Rules of Engagement (ROE). In many cases, peacekeeping mandates are defined by the UN Security Council, which has historically been reluctant to adopt Chapter VII mandates of the UN Charter that confer enforcement authority, out of concern that violent confrontations in the area of operations could result in casualties among the force personnel. Chapter VII, however, authorizes the use of force not only in self-defense but also to accomplish the mission, particularly in cases of enforcement, security stabilization, and state-building. A “thin” mandate—one that does not permit the use of force—greatly constrains the peacekeeping force and is often a recipe for failure.

International experience shows that peacekeeping forces have often been assembled modularly—by combining military units from different countries under a command structure determined by the Security Council—rapidly and without adequate training or preparation. Most peacekeeping missions have relied on troops from developing countries, who are rotated frequently and often lack sufficient experience in, and familiarity with, the area of operations.

The ISF in Light of International Peacekeeping Experience

President Trump has announced his intention to begin deploying the ISF as early as the beginning of 2026 and to appoint an American general to command it. On December 17, 2025, US Central Command (CENTCOM) convened representatives from 45 countries in Doha, Qatar, to accelerate the establishment of the ISF for the Gaza Strip and adhere to President Trump’s timetable. The president has emphasized the enthusiasm and support of many countries for his plan and their willingness to contribute troops, and he appears to view broad participation as a significant achievement, both as a source of legitimacy and as a contribution to mission success. However, experience suggests that a peacekeeping mission—especially one intended for a dense, heavily populated, hostile, violent, and devastated environment such as the Gaza Strip—will struggle if it is composed of a heterogeneous mix of units from many countries, deployed before a specific mandate has been defined, and required to operate in a context in which Hamas remains both a governing and military entity in populated areas (approximately half of the territory of the Strip). Under these conditions, the mission is destined to fail, even if commanded by a capable American general.

The unique, complex, and highly problematic characteristics of the Gaza Strip—particularly the presence of Hamas as a military and governing actor that refuses to disarm—require a far slower and more meticulous preparation process. In this sense, “haste is the enemy.” Since it is clear that any peacekeeping force will not assume responsibility for disarming Hamas or demilitarizing the Gaza Strip, and given that Hamas’s leadership has no intention of cooperating with disarmament, the US administration, eager to begin implementing the president’s plan, is likely to limit the force’s operations in advance to areas where Hamas is not present. Israel, for its part, will justifiably condition the initiation of the force’s deployment on the disarmament of Hamas and the other armed factions. Accordingly, without legitimacy for proactive military action to dismantle Hamas in the western part of the Strip, Israel will not consider it feasible to begin deploying the force in the eastern part of the Strip, in areas under IDF control. Moreover, it is doubtful whether the force can be established at all, given the pronounced reservations of most states—aside from Turkey—about joining it under these conditions, and in light of the agreed requirement in UN Security Council Resolution 2803 to disarm Hamas and demilitarize the Strip.

Beyond this, and assuming understandings are reached regarding the gradual implementation of the plan and the force’s deployment, the force will be built in a careful and orderly manner, drawing upon the existing body of experience regarding the formation and deployment of peacekeeping forces.

Recommendations for Establishing and Operating the Peacekeeping Force

Before assembling the force, it is necessary to determine and carefully draft the mandate. Because the force will operate in an environment in which hostile, armed actors are present and active—and will also be required to perform policing tasks that may necessitate the use of force—the mandate should confer enforcement authorities in the spirit of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, even if it does not explicitly invoke Chapter VII, given likely reservations. Although the general concept is for the force to mentor the Palestinian police—without Hamas—and assist it in enforcing law and order, including disarming armed actors, it is reasonable to assume that, at least initially, the Palestinian police will not be able to do so on its own. Hence, the task force will be required to actively intervene, including the use of force.

Beyond this, a specific mandate should be drafted that addresses the broadest possible range of required stabilization tasks and clearly defines metrics for success. Past experience suggests that the performance of the UN Department of Peace Operations, which is responsible for the command and management of peacekeeping missions, has been uneven at best. Accordingly, it would be preferable to place responsibility in the hands of the United States, with the UN providing backing through a Security Council resolution. If responsibility for operating the peacekeeping force were to rest with the UN, conflicting interests among the Security Council members would likely make it difficult to formulate a meaningful mandate, resulting in an ambiguous, even hollow, mandate. It is therefore preferable to enable the US administration to lead the definition of the peacekeeping force’s mandate.

Once the mandate is set, the force-building process should begin. Given the complex challenges involved in deploying task forces of this kind, it is advisable to significantly limit the number of participating countries and militaries. In light of the inherent constraints requiring the active participation of Arab militaries and militaries from Muslim-majority states, the peacekeeping force should be built in a modular manner that enables the allocation of organic forces that are as homogeneous as possible forces to carry out missions in defined geographic sectors.

After decisions are made regarding the force’s composition and size, preparations must be made to train the force prior to its arrival in the field and the start of its operations. An important part of this training should focus on developing familiarity with the terrain, the population, and the actors operating within it, as well as training forces for military policing operations. The learning process should not end with pre-deployment training; rather, it must be methodical and sustained over time. The force will therefore require a dedicated intelligence function capable of addressing the cultural dimensions involved in mission execution.

To ensure effectiveness, it is important to integrate military units and experts from capable Western states such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy. Conversely, Turkey and Qatar should be excluded from participating in the force due to their clear ties to Hamas and their support for the organization. Their inclusion could generate internal tensions, disrupt the mission, and make it difficult for Israel to cooperate with the force. At the same time, the force should not be built on the basis of dozens of countries and sub-units. Rather, the number of participating states and units should be kept to a minimum, and the peacekeeping force should be organized according to areas of operation and specific mission types, relying on force compositions that are as homogeneous as possible.

Supreme importance should be attached to coordination between the force and the IDF and Israel’s security establishment, particularly with respect to the intelligence infrastructure that Israel can and should provide, as well as the necessary operational coordination. Accordingly, preparations should be made to establish an effective coordination mechanism and to formulate clear procedures between the sides, with an emphasis on intelligence cooperation and on preserving Israel’s freedom of action and operational space.

One of the most important missions of the force will be to mentor and accompany the Palestinian police as they deploy throughout the Gaza Strip and to assist the technocratic committee in the areas of law enforcement and maintaining order. This includes ensuring public order, internal security, and creating the conditions for cooperation with the civilian population as necessary conditions for effective functioning and for building legitimacy.

Carrying out this complex mission requires training for the peacekeeping force that is grounded in a deep understanding of the Palestinian political system and the socio-cultural foundations, particularly the structure of social power, the role of clans, and the role of religion, as well as the economic and infrastructural realities of the Gaza Strip. This is not a natural mission for military forces and will require the force to develop capabilities aimed at gaining the population’s trust and confidence—in Rupert Smith’s words, “to win the hearts and minds” of the local population (see his The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World).

Conclusion

President Trump’s determination to accelerate the establishment of a stabilization force for the Gaza Strip and to begin its deployment as early as the beginning of 2026, together with the importance he assigns to broad international legitimacy expressed through the active participation of dozens of states and military units, stands in tension—and even in contradiction—with the conditions necessary for the force’s success. An additional tension exists between the time required to properly build and train the force and the accelerated rebuilding of Hamas’s capabilities, which could reach a point of no return. The mission assigned to the force falls into a category more complex than classic peacekeeping, incorporating elements of enforcement, stabilization, and state-building. This is a complex mission in its own right, rendered even more challenging by the initial conditions prevailing in the Gaza Strip.

International experience with the deployment of such task forces underscores the necessity of drafting a detailed and carefully formulated mandate, grounded in Chapter VII or similar to of the UN Charter, which authorizes the use of force for mission execution and includes clear “dos and don’ts,” particularly with regard to force structure, training, and operational employment. Premature deployment of the force, the bypassing or shortening of essential training processes, or excessive participation by multiple actors would likely result in functional cacophony and mission failure. Such failure could lead to renewed fighting in the Gaza Strip and a further deterioration of the humanitarian situation, undermine prospects for improving conditions in Gaza, and inevitably spill over into the broader Palestinian arena. It would also affect regional stability, reduce the likelihood of expanding the Abraham Accords and shaping a new regional architecture, and harm vital US interests.

Alongside the importance of an orderly process of building and training the stabilization force prior to its deployment, the need to generate momentum that disrupts Hamas’s force-building process cannot be ignored. Accordingly, some compromise may be required with respect to the optimal timeframe for preparing the task force. It may therefore be appropriate to shorten this timeframe to begin deploying the force as part of a partial and gradual implementation of the plan in the southern Gaza Strip, in areas under IDF control, while preparing in advance for the continued training of the force during its operational activity. In light of the complexity of the challenge, Israel cannot remain a bystander. It has an important role to play in defining the mandate for the force’s deployment and in the processes of training and operating it on the ground.