Strategic Assessment

Following three decades of economic reconstruction, when in late 1978 a “reform and opening up” policy was adopted by the Chinese Communist Party, China spared no efforts in developing relations with Middle East states and establishing a prominent economic presence in the region. With the growing significance of the Middle East for China, especially given the country’s spiraling energy needs, China’s approach to the Middle East is prudent and pragmatic. This paper argues that China’s Middle East policy since the Arab Spring can be cast as “selective engagement” with specific states and areas, driven by three dimensions. The first dimension is China’s need for a stable Middle East, in order to secure the requisite energy supply for its economic development. The second dimension is China’s concern that the Arab Spring could influence, if not undermine, the legitimacy of its own government. The third dimension is China’s fear of the expansion of terrorism and Islamic extremism, which may provoke the Muslim minority inside China, especially in the Xinjiang Uyghur region. However, China’s “selective engagement” policy in the Middle East may be challenged by the emerging Sunni-Shiite rivalries and the Chinese leadership’s future ambitions.