Strategic Assessment

Introduction—The Question of Ideology

The Russia-Ukraine war, which began in February 2022 as the largest conflict in Europe since World War II, has reignited academic debate on whether the Putin regime possesses a coherent ideology. Scholars have broadly agreed that the Soviet Communist regime adhered to a clear ideological framework that shaped its vision of a future society. In the post-Soviet era, however, and particularly under Putin’s rule, ideological foundations are far less clear. While some scholars argue that the war demonstrates Putin’s ambition to restore Russia’s imperial stature and reestablish it as a global competitor to the West, others reject that ideological framing and instead see the war as the cynical tool of the Russian elite to consolidate power and maintain legitimacy.[1]

From a methodological standpoint, a discussion of ideology in this context raises complexities and challenges. A major pitfall is the reproduction of the binary framework that dominated Western scholarship on the Soviet Union in the second half of the twentieth century—particularly evident in the frequent pairing of categories such as repression and resistance, state and society, official culture and counterculture, totalitarian language and opposition language, the public “I” and the private “I,” truth and falsehood, and morality and corruption (Yurchak, 2006, pp. 4-5). Despite the profound transformations precipitated by the dissolution of the Soviet Union, contemporary research on post-Soviet Russia remains tethered to this historiographical paradigm, maintaining a focus on the leader’s cult of the personality and his decisions. What emerges is two-dimensional: a monolithic and unchanging regime set against the homogeneous society under its rule. This approach leaves little room for understanding social and cultural processes as part of a more nuanced system—one that is shaped by many complexities, including the balance of power among social classes, political and military circumstances, and the various ways these factors are interpreted by various groups within the population.

To avoid this pitfall, this article approaches ideology as a set of cultural and social norms within a given historical context.[2] Instead of assessing the extent to which Putin’s regime is driven by ideology, we conceptualize the ideological dimension as a process of cultural construction. More specifically, how has the Putin regime instilled behavioral and cultural norms in the context of the war in Ukraine? The innovation here is to highlight the inseparability of Putinism’s international and internal agendas; we claim that Russia’s foreign policy cannot be understood without a cultural analysis of its domestic policy. Our test case is the way that the regime has glorified the family, an institution that has become central to public discourse in Russia and that sociologists view as much more than a network of kinship relations; the family upholds and reinforces a society’s values (Casey, 1989, pp. 1-14). We explore several key questions: What defines the family? How does the institution of the family serve internal and external political agendas? And in what ways is the Putin regime utilizing the concept to promote its ends?

The article consists of three sections. The first outlines Russia’s search for an ideological path after the collapse of the Soviet Union and in light of a conceptual detachment from the West under Putin. The second examines the institution of the family in Russia, with attention to the boundaries that define it and its increasing importance, to the point that it has become a matter of national security. The final section explores how the model of the ideal family is being instilled among Russian citizens and shows how this model is being implemented in Russia and the occupied territories of Ukraine.

The Search for an Ideological Path under Yeltsin and Putin

Historically, Russia’s position between Europe and Asia has raised complex questions about its identity. Does Russia belong to the West or the East? Can it be considered European in terms of its ideology and cultural principles? The answers have varied with the unique circumstances of each era. The question of Russia’s distinct path (Sonderweg)—its essence and character—resurfaces especially during social, cultural, and political crises. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s and the subsequent surge of nationalism in Eastern Europe, Russian leaders found themselves, once again, at this crossroads.[3]

The Communist vision that had guided Russian politics and strategy gave way to the search for a new identity. With Boris Yeltsin’s rise to power in 1991, that new identity took the form of moving closer to the West by adopting free-market economic principles. Entrepreneurship and private ownership were fostered, and state assets were privatized. This period saw the sale of state-owned oil and gas companies, such as Yukos and Sibneft, alongside other major factories, enterprises, and industries that had been under state ownership for decades. These assets were offered at bargain prices to politically connected individuals who promised to support Yeltsin, a practice that effectively turned Russia’s government into an oligarchy (Judt, 2009, pp. 806–813). It is important to note that some members of this emerging business and political elite sought political change, positioning themselves as philanthropists and civic leaders with a new social vision for Russia.[4] At the same time, the country underwent a process of democratization and developed political and cultural openness to the West. Positionisng itself as a Western and European state within the diplomatic landscape, Russia was integrated into the G8 and became a member of the Council of Europe. Russian cities began to reshape themselves in line with Western urban aesthetics.

A major shift began with the transfer of power to Vladimir Putin in March 2000. Putin expected the new group of oligarchs to submit to his authority and relinquish their assets. He wanted a centralized regime based on a closed political system, with absolute control over information and financial capital, and little tolerance for opposition. Putin also introduced, but gradually, a set of ideological principles that can now be seen as milestones in his domestic and foreign policy. Over time, these principles have positioned Russia as an alternative to the West. This ideological shift was not immediately apparent. Shortly after his election, Putin assured Bill Clinton, “It is clear to the whole world that I am a person you can work with…. I think we have a good basis for U.S.-Russian relations, which was established by you and the first Russian president, Yeltsin, and we have all the foundations to further develop our relations” (White House, 2000, p. 2). In retrospect, it seems that Putin’s initial efforts to strengthen ties with the West, and particularly with the United States, had little to do with any intention to align Russia with Western values or governance models. Instead, Putin appears to have been motivated by the desire to consolidate his rule in Russia and gain the trust of Western countries.

A turning point in Russia’s separation from the West was Putin’s speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007. Putin outlined an explicitly isolationist stance, emphasizing the uniqueness of Russian nationalism and Russia’s difference from Western countries, particularly the United States. Another key moment came in April 2014, with the publication of “Political Fundamentals of State Cultural Policy” by the Russian Ministry of Culture. The document asserted Russia’s distinctiveness from Europe and upheld the country’s right to return to its traditions and culture as a deliberate alternative to Western-style liberalism (Ukaz Prezidenta RF N 808, 2014). The turn away from the West gained momentum in the months after the Euromaidan, the spontaneous protests in 2013 over the Ukrainian government’s abrupt decision not to sign an Association Agreement with the European Union. The Ukrainian government’s attempts to suppress the protests were unsuccessful, and ultimately the pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, was ousted. Russia responded with the invasion of eastern Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea (Shveda & Park, 2016), events that triggered international condemnation. Europe and America imposed sanctions against Russia, including an arms embargo, a ban on military cooperation, restrictions on transactions with Russian banks, and visa bans on individuals associated with the military offensive. Russia shifted ever more rapidly toward isolationism.

Nonetheless, Putin demanded international recognition of Russia’s national rights, and he presented that demand as a rectification of the past: his country was finally breaking free of the restrictions that other countries had imposed on it for centuries. “There is a limit to everything. And with Ukraine, our Western partners have crossed the line, acting crudely, irresponsibly, and unprofessionally,” Putin declared in March 2014 (President of Russia, 2014). But when the war against Ukraine began in February 2022, deepening Russia’s isolation diplomatically, scientifically, economically, and culturally, the regime felt a greater urgency to define an identity in direct opposition to the West. Putin no longer sought Western recognition, as he had in his 2014 speech; after the invasion, his statements reflect a growing alienation. On the eve of the war, Putin remarked, in reference to the American people, “Although they think that we are the same as they are, we are different people. We have a different genetic, cultural, and moral code” (BBC News, 2021). The rupture that Putin had previously framed as a political crisis assumed an essentialist, value-laden character.

This forging of Russia’s identity in recent years has significant implications both domestically and internationally. The ideological foundation of Putin’s regime can be summarized as follows: Russia has strength and superiority as a stable world power (statism) that constitutes a civilization in and of itself (state civilization), and therefore Russia possesses a unique way of life that is distinct from the West (Snegovaya & McGlynn, 2025). By habitually referring to Russia as a civilization rather than a nation-state, Putin endows the country with historical depth and longevity. This attitude legitimizes military action in Ukraine and reinforces a stance of cultural and moral superiority over the West.[5]

This process has also involved a new security doctrine. In the 1990s, Russia conceived of its security in terms of military defense against military and paramilitary threats (zashchishchennost’). Now, however, the conceptualization is broader; as described in 2020 by Vladimir Nazarov and Dmitry Afinogenov, members of Russia’s Security Council, the doctrine is “security through development.” Social issues have become part of the mission (Nazarov & Afinogenov, 2020, pp. 9-19; Cooper, 2022). As a result, cultural and historical matters, including the question of Russian identity, constitute matters of national security, not just topics for intellectual and moral debate (Snegovaya & McGlynn, 2025, p. 7). Traditional values—including the institution of the Russian family—can now legitimize military action.

Domestically, the Putin regime’s anti-Western stance has produced a conservative agenda. Fostered by nationalist politics and the glorification of Russia’s unique history and values, this agenda is presented by government and state officials as a return to the country’s authentic path—a path that had been abandoned because of cosmopolitan and Western influences. The regime understands itself to be waging war not only against Ukraine, but also against the external influences that prevent Russia from assuming its true character. But it is important to note the inaccuracy in this portrayal. In its cultural war, Russia is not unveiling its true identity but constructing a new one in response to immediate political needs. After all, notions of old and new are to a large extent ideological constructs. While the discourse of a return to Russia’s authentic values grants the regime a political legitimacy it may otherwise lack, that discourse is selective. The regime embraces the parts of the past that serve its political interests but casts aside the more problematic elements of history and memory.

The Growing Political Significance of the Family Institution under the Putin Regime

With the collapse of the Communist regime, the totalitarian political system disintegrated, along with its unique social contract with the citizens. The system was based on the use of force and violence, but under the social contract, most people were shielded for most of the time if they respected cultural boundaries and helped to maintain those boundaries within their immediate surroundings. This requirement demanded vigilance and careful attention to the regime’s signals and ideological fluctuations; as Hannah Arendt argues in The Origins of Totalitarianism, such boundaries are not monolithic but dynamic and constantly shifting. (Arendt, 1976, p. 76; Gessen, 2017, p. 99). One major shift was the emergence of private life as a matter of political significance during the second half of the Soviet regime, as Stalin’s police empire collapsed. This shift was driven by the belief that every personal choice carried far-reaching social and political implications (Field, 2007). The regime increasingly sought to define what constituted a proper private life, including life within the family. From the 1950s onward, the institution of the family also became a significant component in the construction of communism: the private family formed the basis of the “great proletarian family,” a workers’ alliance envisioned as the foundation of a utopian society. This period redefined the boundaries and functions of the family, as well as its proper relationship to kinship and community structures (Itkin, 2025).

The dogmatic ideal of the family, along with the need to conform to it as part of the social contract, waned with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Surveys conducted in the 1980s showed that Soviet citizens had grown weary of communist ideology, objecting particularly to the notion of the family as a central pillar of the communist collective. Citizens had instead come to view the family as a refuge from the regime’s demands. In the final years of Soviet rule, the family became an agent of privatization and individualization (Shlapentokh, 1991). In the 1990s, even though Soviet-era attitudes about private life remained largely intact at the state level, the rapid political transition, along with new economic needs and principles, gave rise to more liberal family policies. For example, despite the Soviet Union’s prohibition against homosexuality, a queer cinema festival was held in the two central locations of Leningrad and Moscow in early 1991, constituting the first significant event of Russia’s LGBTQ movement (Gessen, 2017, pp. 101-102). Homosexuality was officially decriminalized in 1993.

That process of democratization and liberalization came to an end with Putin’s rise to power. His regime has promoted the traditional family, which it defines by two key features: heterosexual marriage and a large number of children. That model has become a central focus of propaganda, with politicians, clergymen, journalists, writers, publicists, and other figures emphasizing the family’s vital role in education and the inculcation of Russian values. Putin, who actively molds the current ideological discourse, frequently expresses his view of the family as the foundation of state and society; the family both reflects and shapes contemporary Russian society and its values. He appeals to history to support the model that he promotes: “Let us remember that in Russian families, our grandmothers and great-grandmothers had seven or eight children, or even more. Let us preserve and revive this tradition. Having many children, a large family, should become the norm and a way of life for everyone in Russia” (Gereykhanova, 2023a). Not coincidentally, Putin’s rhetoric on the family bears a religious tone; he has exalted the family, for example, as “a spiritual phenomenon, the basis of human morality” (Gereykhanova, 2023b). Since Kirill’s election as Patriarch of Moscow in 2009 and the beginning of Putin’s third term in 2012, relations between the Russian Orthodox Church and the regime have grown increasingly close. The church has endorsed Putin’s conservative and isolationist ideology (Soroka, 2022), and Putin has supported the church’s advocacy for conservative family values with his promotion of the traditional family.

But the promotion of large families is more than a question of traditional values; the campaign is also a concerted attempt to address Russia’s urgent need for more citizens. A prolonged decline in the country’s birthrate has persisted for several decades, leading to the depopulation of entire regions, including northern Russia, eastern Siberia, and the Russian Far East. Government efforts to reverse this trend have largely failed, despite occasional successes, and Russia has become the world’s third country, after China and Japan, to experience negative natural population growth. The year 2023 marked a demographic low point, with the number of births matching that of 1999, and projections for 2024 indicated a continuation of the downward trend (Lebedeva, 2024). The crisis is exacerbated by the war in Ukraine, which has led to battlefield casualties as well as increased emigration, and the long-term consequences will persist for decades.[6] The regime is particularly concerned about two threats to national security: a reduction in the country’s capacity to sustain a large and powerful military and a weakening of the national economy.

As part of the regime’s pro-natalist policy, demography is emerging as a key factor in the Kremlin’s assessment of local governments. Starting in 2025, a governor’s failure to meet demographic targets may serve as grounds for dismissal or the denial of promotion. An interesting point is the difference that is anticipated between the approaches of wealthier and poorer regions. To encourage higher birth rates, wealthier regions are expected to rely on financial incentives, such as direct grants to mothers, while poorer regions are expected to intensify propaganda that promotes childbirth (Verstka, 2024).

In keeping with these efforts, Putin’s regime has introduced legal changes that discourage abortion. Since the 2010s, advertising for abortion procedures has been banned, and doctors have had the right to refuse abortions on the grounds that the procedure conflicts with their religious beliefs. Political opposition to abortion has become stronger in the past few years. In the summer of 2022, Russian Minister of Health Mikhail Murashko called for the stricter enforcement of regulations governing the sale of abortion-inducing drugs, and in 2023, the Ministry of Health publicized a set of recommended responses for doctors, with the intention of persuading patients to carry their pregnancies to term (Minzdrav Rossiyskoi Federatsii, 2023). Additional measures have included the closure of private clinics that perform abortions and the imposition of fines on individuals and organizations that encourage women to terminate their pregnancies. In November 2023, Putin himself referred to abortion as an urgent issue for the regime.

These restrictions on clinics, doctors, and pregnant women reflect a governmental stance against a woman’s right to make her own decisions about her body and family—a stance that neatly aligns with the ideology of traditional values, which promotes the notion that childbirth is a woman’s primary role. Not surprisingly, Putin emphasized this role in his address to Russian women on International Women’s Day, March 8, 2024: “You, dear women, are capable of changing the world… above all, through the greatest gift that nature has given you—giving birth to children. Motherhood is the destiny of women” (Telekanal ROSSIIA 1, 2024). In hearty agreement is the Russian Orthodox Church, which vehemently opposes abortion and sees traditional gender roles as a reflection of God’s will. In a sign of this growing alignment between the church and the regime, newly pregnant women at health clinics in 16 regions of Russia have begun to receive letters from the Patriarch, blessing their pregnancies and discouraging them from seeking abortions (RIA Novosti, 2024).

In recent months, the government has also been working to outlaw organizations that promote childlessness, which are seen to promote a Western lifestyle. “Propaganda encouraging people to be child-free is a dangerous social phenomenon. The Americans are the ones behind it. Our country is vast, and their ideology is dangerous,” stated Vyacheslav Volodin, chairman of the Duma, Russia’s lower house of parliament, in late September 2024 (Gosudarstvennaya Duma, 2024). Once enacted, the proposed law against such propaganda is expected to impose non-compliance fines of 400,000 rubles on individuals and five million rubles on organizations. In a push for such organizations to be classified as extremist, some government officials want to model the law on one that bans LGBTQ propaganda (see below). In addition, proposals have called for a revival of Soviet-era policies, such as the imposition of fines on childless families or the prohibition against building one-room apartments in major cities, the sort of dwelling that would encourage single living. It is fascinating to note that against the background of all this activity, demographers and researchers claim that such organizations promoting a child-free lifestyle in Russia are extremely rare and have little to no social significance (Moscow Times, 2024b).

Another phenomenon the government is targeting is Russia’s relatively high divorce rate, which the Russian Federal Service for State Statistics (Rosstat) has recently found to coincide with a slight decline in marriage rates. Of every 1,000 people, 7.2 married in 2022, compared with 6.5 in 2023; over those two years, the divorce rate remained unchanged, at 4.7 per 1,000 people. With these figures, Russia ranks among the countries with the highest divorce rates worldwide (Rosstat, 2024). As part of its emphasis on family, the regime is introducing measures to discourage divorce. A law passed by the Duma in December 2024 requires individuals seeking a divorce to attend multiple sessions for psychological counseling (Agadzhanov, 2024), and beginning in 2025, the tax on divorce proceedings is rising from 650 to 5,000 rubles per person (Moscow Times, 2024a).

Putin is also targeting homosexuality and transsexuality. His regime has always encouraged homophobia, but the attitude became official policy in 2013, when a law was passed to ban the dissemination of information about homosexuality. Additional legislation followed. Same-sex couples are barred from adopting children, no children may be adopted at all from countries that allow homosexual relations, LGBTQ activists are openly persecuted, and gender transitioning is banned. Particularly notable is the justification for a law passed in November 2023, which officially classified the LGBTQ community as an extremist entity: the LGBTQ community, the legislation claimed, is part of a global Western movement that aims to undermine Russia’s unique identity, especially by attacking the institution of the family. Effectively, LGBTQ individuals have been legally defined as a threat to the state. Conversely, the heteronormative family was enshrined in the Russian constitution through an amendment ratified in 2020: “The role of the state is to protect the family, motherhood, fatherhood, and childhood; to defend the institution of marriage as a union between a man and a woman” (Article 114V).

One of the prime motivations for all these efforts appears in a July 2021 directive, Russia’s National Security Strategy, which stated that the Russian family is a fundamental pillar of national security, and therefore the protection of the family must be a national priority. This is quite a change from the previous directive, which was issued in December 2015 and mentions the family only briefly. In the directive of 2021, the family has become a moral and spiritual bulwark against existential threats not only to Russia but to all of humanity. According to the document, “The changes taking place in the modern world affect not only interstate relations but also universal human values… Humanity is faced with the threat of losing its spiritual and moral way. Basic moral norms, the institution of marriage, and family values are being increasingly undermined” (Ukaz Prezidenta RF, 2021, Sections 85-87). Russia reinforces its broader ideological stance against the West by identifying it as the source of these allegedly dangerous values.

Since February 2022, Russia has leveraged this security narrative as a moral and political justification for the invasion of Ukraine. In Russian political discourse, Ukraine is a state that has surrendered to the West and fallen under its destructive influence (Soroka, 2022, p. 14). Shortly after the invasion, Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church described the war as a necessary step to protect the Russian-speaking population in eastern Ukraine from the moral decay stemming from Ukraine’s “Western-controlled” government. Similarly, Governor Alexander Beglov of St. Petersburg underscored the significance of traditional values in the war effort: “Soldiers who saw bathrooms in schools [in Donetsk and Luhansk] with three rooms instead of two—male, female, and non-binary—need no explanation as to which values we are fighting for.” Among those values, Beglov singled out the need to protect children from what he described as the imposition of an unnatural sexual identity (Radio Svoboda, 2024). These views are widely shared by government and community figures. The campaign to protect Russia’s traditional values translates into anti-Western propaganda, according to which the war in Ukraine is a broader struggle against the culturally decadent hegemony of America and the West (President of Russia, 2022).

In this ideological war, Russia does not claim to stand entirely on its own. At the same time that it promotes a multipolar world order, Russia emphasizes its alignment with a group of nations that advocate conservative values (Druyan Feldman and Mil-Man, 2023b). Extreme nationalists such as Aleksandr Dugin have long advanced the idea of a moral, anti-liberal bloc, and mainstream government officials have recently begun to express similar sentiments. “Most countries in the world,” asserted Dmitry Medvedev—former president and prime minister, and currently Putin’s deputy in the Security Council and the military-industrial committee—“have remained loyal to traditional spiritual and moral values and to the norms of universal morality” (Edinaia Rossiia, 2024). Along the same lines, in August 2024, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova claimed that a wave of European citizens was relocating to Russia for the purpose of “saving their children from gender reassignment (pereinachivanie) and protecting their families” (Tsargrad, 2024). As Zakharova explained it, this relocation reflects the opposition of many Europeans to the liberal ideology of the West, as well as their longing for a place where traditional family values are preserved.

Measures for Promoting the Ideal Family Model

The government advances its vision of the ideal family in various ways. These include holidays and observances, along with propaganda efforts in schools and institutions of higher education. An official Year of the Family was declared in 2024, with directives to all relevant governmental bodies to allocate resources for the preservation of the family unit, as well as the establishment of a special committee under Deputy Prime Minister Tatyana Golikova to promote the year’s objectives. Among the measures implemented was the introduction of “family management” as a new subject in Russian schools as of September 1, 2024. Textbooks and instructional materials are being developed for this course, which focuses on the moral foundations and social significance of family life. As part of the curriculum, students meet with “exemplary” couples who share their experiences and with medical personnel who discourage voluntary childlessness (Kommersant, 2024). Not surprisingly, the topics of sex education and family planning are excluded.

Cinema and state-controlled television also promote the ideal family. The television series Big Family, whose twelve episodes were produced with government support and broadcast in 2024, sports the slogan “A large family is a superpower.” The film Mother’s Letter, which premiered in October 2024 with funding from the Orthodox Spas channel, focuses on two women who are struggling with the question of whether to have an abortion. Ultimately, against all odds, both choose to continue their pregnancies. The film includes medical footage of abortions as well as interviews with women who had considered the procedure but decided against it. Notably, the struggle these women experience is framed as a choice between the preservation of life on the one hand and personal convenience on the other—the latter portrayed as an expression of selfishness. The slant is already obvious in the way that representatives of Spas characterize their product. The film, they say, aims to answer two central questions: “How can we prevent the murder of babies?” and “Why is parenthood a source of happiness rather than a burden?” Boris Korchevnikov, CEO of Spas, draws a link to the war in Ukraine: the film involves an equivalent “internal war” over the souls of young people. If abortions had not been performed and if people had embraced traditional values, Korchevnikov argues, the physical war on the battlefield would never have broken out (Batanogov, 2024).

Putin has also reinstated a tradition that dates from 1944, when the Soviet Union was contending with the heavy human losses of World War II. This is the conferral of the “Heroic Mother” medal to women who have raised ten children, whether biological or adopted. The award is both ceremonial and financial: Putin personally confers the medal, and awardees receive a one-time payment of one million rubles. The general population also has access to financial benefits that are meant to encourage large families, but demographers contend that these incentives are insufficient to increase fertility rates (Zubik, 2024).

The idealization of the Russian family has had a particularly dark side in Russian-occupied territories. Since February 2022, evidence has accumulated that Ukrainian children are being abducted and transferred to the Russian Federation for re-education and adoption by Russian families (President of Ukraine, 2022). As of June 2024, reports indicate that nearly 200,000 children have been affected, forcibly removed from institutions such as orphanages and hospitals as well as from areas of active combat. These children undergo a process of Russification aimed at erasing their Ukrainian identity; their ties with their biological families are severed, and they are placed for adoption by Russian families whom the authorities deem suitable (Fronek et al., 2024).[7] Comments about the West’s moral corruption of children, such as those cited above by St. Petersburg Governor Alexander Beglov and Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova, suggest that these abductions have an ideological dimension. Beyond its punitive nature, its contribution to the Russification of Ukrainian society, and its mitigation of Russia’s demographic crisis, the forced transfer of Ukrainian children into ideal Russian families is seen to be a moral act—a rescue of innocents from the moral decay that stems from the West’s liberal policies on sexuality and gender.

Summary

In recent years, the Russian ideal of the family has undergone a process of cultural shaping and become a cornerstone of the country’s identity. The Russia-Ukraine war has served as a catalyst in this development.

The new family ideal is structured around two core elements: a large number of children and a heterosexual marriage. A pronatalist campaign has involved extensive propaganda, economic incentives, and increasing restrictions on divorce and abortion. Traditional gender roles, which position women primarily as child-bearers and caregivers, are glorified as both natural and morally correct, and the LGBTQ community has been condemned and marginalized.

The targeting of women who do not conform to the model, and, even more so, the characterization of the LGBTQ community as politically disloyal, demonstrate that Putin’s family ideal has become a tool for repressive domestic policies. The same ideological war is being waged through Russia’s abduction of Ukrainian children. The transfer of approximately 200,000 children to Russian territory, often to so-called ideal Russian families, seems to be more than a question of Russia’s demographic needs or interest in punishing or Russifying the Ukrainian population. The brutal policy is apparently understood, in addition, as a way to protect children from moral degradation.

Putin’s conception of the family has become a key part of the ideological framework that his regime uses to justify its war against Ukraine. Russia considers itself to be fighting in the name of the traditional values that define its own identity and that the countries of the West undermine. Under Putin, the family institution has assumed a significant role in both domestic and foreign policy.

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[1] For example, see Graham, 2023; Guriev & Treisman, 2023; Snigyr, 2024; Suslov, 2024; Snegovaya & McGlynn, 2025.

[2] In this article, we follow the anthropological view of culture as a comprehensive system of norms, values, ways of life, practices, and perceptions.

[3] For a historical discussion on Russia’s distinct path, see, for example, Cherepanova, 2010.

[4] For the example of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, see Gessen, 2012, pp. 264–268.

[5] For the term “state civilization,” see, for example, Jacques, 2012, pp. 209-215.

[6] Recent estimates by the UK Ministry of Defense from October to December 2024 report that 1,400 Russian soldiers are killed or wounded daily (https://tinyurl.com/23paax5r). For a discussion of Russia’s demographic challenges, see, for example, Druyan Feldman and Mil-Man (2023a).

[7] Older children, who are less likely to be adopted, are reportedly being sent to military academies, where they undergo indoctrination to prepare them for service in the Russian army. The individual overseeing the adoption of Ukrainian children is believed to be Maria Lvova-Belova, the Russian Presidential Commissioner for Children's Rights. In 2023, an international arrest warrant was issued against her for her role in the abduction of Ukrainian children, an act that is considered a war crime. Lvova-Belova herself is the mother of nine children, four of whom are adopted; among those four is a child from Mariupol, a Ukrainian city seized by Russia during the war. Her personal example is meant to embody the new Russian family ideal and to advance Putin’s anti-Western ideological agenda.