Strategic Assessment

Almost exactly six years ago, some of you will recall that I addressed a similar audience in this very same hall at the beginning of my first tour of duty as Ambassador in Israel. I had just come from two years in the White House serving as President Clinton’s Middle East Advisor at the National Security Council, helping to formulate policy towards the Middle East. I took advantage of that occasion six years ago to lay out our strategy for the Middle East. To those of you who were there, I am amazed that you came back to hear me again, but I am grateful that you did. You might recall my argument. It went something like this: We were, at the beginning of the Clinton Administration, at a unique moment in the history of the Middle East. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the defeat of Saddam Hussein, the combination of those two watershed events, had ended decisively the era of super-power competition in the Middle East, a competition which had fueled the Arab-Israeli conflict for every decade since the Second World War, and had at the same time dealt a decisive blow to the Arab military option against Israel and the specter of an Eastern front coalition that would make war on Israel.