Strategic Assessment

This
edited volume seeks to help Israeli readers understand the historic attempt of
the Oslo process to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and to analyze
the reasons for its failure. The editors, and Prof. Shimon Shamir in his
preface, insist on the importance of this effort, so that if and when the
parties return to serious negotiations, they will be able to learn lessons from
the failure and achieve a more successful result. Based on this analysis, the
book also presents concrete proposals for what most of its authors regard as a
desirable solution.

Shamir
does a good job in the preface of summarizing the ideas of the entire book. In
an afterward, Joel Singer, the legal advisor to the Israel delegation at the
Oslo talks, describes the arrangements for the Palestinian Authority self-administration
in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in the framework of the Oslo process. The
other 32 articles in the book, some of which were written specifically for the
book and some of which were previously published, are grouped under eight
headings: "The Attempts to Settle the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict"; "The
Policy and Leadership Failure at Oslo"; "Responses in Israel to the
Oslo Accords"; "Legal Aspects"; "Processes in the Negotiations
for a Permanent Settlement"; "The Negotiations for a Permanent Agreement
from the Perspective of the Negotiation Leaders"; "Has the Oslo
Vision Reached its End?" and "A Look to the Future."

A large
majority of the essays in the book repeat the familiar mantras of the Zionist
left from various perspectives (the articles are written well, though buttressed
by sources from the same ideological camp). They attribute the Oslo failure to
a list of (sometimes contradictory) factors. The leading explanation is the
lack of a strategic decision on both sides to agree to divide the land,
followed by the way the negotiations were conducted (most of the criticism is
directed to the principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is
agreed," which prevented real progress on the ground); the lack of prior agreement
on the framework for a permanent settlement (an agreed political horizon),
which in turn motivated the parties to establish facts on the ground; the lack
of an agreed ethical code and legal basis for discussing and handling
complaints by the parties; and on the other hand, the attempt to force the
parties, especially the Palestinians, to reach agreement on a framework for a
permanent settlement before the conditions were ripe for acceptance of the
concessions that this will require.

Both
parties are accused of not taking sufficient steps to implement the agreement
and bolster peaceful values among their respective publics. Israel, especially
during the period of Prime Ministers Barak and Netanyahu, is castigated for
continuing construction in Judea and Samaria in full force, and for refusing to
carry out the third withdrawal in order to avoid carrying out the agreement,
thereby undermining Palestinian trust in the process. The Palestinians are
accused of failing in their war against terrorism, and of encouraging terrorist
attacks, especially during the second intifada, thereby undermining Israeli
trust in them and in the process itself. An attempt is made in some of the
articles supportive of Oslo to attribute Palestinian terrorism to the massacre
in the Tomb of the Patriarchs; it is asserted that there were no terrorist
attacks before the massacre. The facts, however, are completely different.
Between the signing of the agreement on September 13, 1993 and the massacre on
February 25, 1994, the Palestinians committed 23 deadly attacks in which 29 Israelis
were murdered.

The
articles also attempt to highlight the advantages of the Oslo process and the
situation it created. The Oslo process is portrayed in this context as a
historic effort to establish Israel's borders on the basis of the 1967 lines (Rabin,
of course, opposed this, but it appears that this is how the Israeli team at
Oslo understood the process). It is argued that Oslo led to acceptance of the
principle of a peaceful solution of the conflict; political backing to the
principle of a Palestinian state alongside Israel; mutual recognition (an
expression of the failure to understand the Palestinian position); the alleged positive
effects on relations with Jordan and Egypt, and with other countries; and the
improvement, as the writers see it, in the security situation until and after the
second intifada resulting from security cooperation with the Palestinians (this
argument is also highly problematic).

What is
true in this context is that the interim situation of the Oslo process, which
was not designed to last indefinitely, became the reality for the parties. An
entire generation has known no other reality. There is no doubt, as stated by
the authors of several of the articles, that the arrangements established in
the Oslo Accords were not designed to serve as a basis for a prolonged interim
situation that is in effect a permanent state of affairs. This created lacunae
and major contradictions that led to conflicts and frustration, with the threat
of further conflicts.

The book
also contains a small number of articles that express different opinions (by Efraim
Karsh, Alan Baker, Tal Becker, and Shmuel Even). These articles highlight the
lack of political wisdom in the Oslo process, which saved the PLO and Arafat
from decline and oblivion following their support for Iraq in the 1991 Gulf
War, and sought to achieve a settlement with an enemy that had not changed its
basic attitude (as Karsh put it, peace is made with enemies who have seen the
light). The sole article to express a more complete view of the depth of the
problem, and which does not absolve the Palestinians of the need to truly change,
is the one written by Amal Jamal. His article, however, contains many abstruse terms
, which make it difficult to read. In my opinion, his is the most interesting
article, and the one that comes closest to understanding the roots of the
conflict.

All in
all, the book reflects the problems that researchers and politicians dealing
with relations with the Palestinians in general, and the Oslo Accords in
particular, face in trying to contend with these issues. It appears to be very
difficult, indeed, almost impossible, for anyone engaging in this effort to
separate scholarly insights from political views. The analysis therefore often
appears to be based not only on facts, but also on hopes and aspirations, and
on mistaken beliefs, interpretations, and mantras.

None of
the writers who were involved in the process accept any responsibility for the
failure. None of the them say, "I was wrong," or "We made a
major mistake in understanding the views of the Palestinian side and the extent
of its commitment to a narrative that denies the very existence of the Jewish
people and its right to a state in the Land of Israel, and that, even after the
Accords, regards the struggle against Zionism as a right and duty of every
Palestinian, including the use of terrorism and violence, if necessary."
Most of the writers believe that everyone is at fault, above all the Israeli
leadership. While the Israeli group that created the process and the agreements
indeed made mistakes, the basic assumption that there is a Palestinian partner
for a permanent settlement is not questioned, while the statement by Prime
Minister Barak after the Camp David summit that there is no partner is severely
criticized.

Even
though all of the writers agree that the Oslo process failed, the book does not
attempt to probe seriously why it failed, or what should be done now, and
instead presents to its readers the familiar themes of the Israeli Zionist left.
The impression from the book is that its authors believe that anyone who thinks
differently represents either a dangerous religious-end-of-days-messianic trend
liable to bring disaster on rational political Zionism, or is entrenched in an
outmoded concept of security that perpetuates a dangerous status quo, which
will almost certainly lead to disaster.

According
to most of the writers, the way to escape these dire straits is for Zionism to
abjure any claim to the territories over which Israel gained control in 1967 (nowhere
in the book does the term "Judea and Samaria" appear; only the
"West Bank" - even
though UN Resolution 181 refers to these areas as Judea and Samaria, and even
though these areas are the core of the Jewish people's heritage in the Land of
Israel). From the book's perspective, Area C is not a disputed area, as Israel
contends; it is territory promised to the Palestinians at Oslo, which is to be
the basis of the Palestinian state. In essence, the authors believe that the
failure of Oslo is that it did not establish such a state, because founding
this state quickly is the most important national goal of Israel and the
Palestinians, and the problem is that the leadership on both sides,
particularly the Israeli leadership, has not acted according to this principle.

The
Palestinians and the current Palestinian Authority (PA) are portrayed as a viable
partner for a settlement, and are consequently depicted as a Western-like
society with which any agreement will be fulfilled as written. Palestinian
terrorism is mentioned occasionally, usually while belittling its importance
and without any thorough analysis of its motives and origins. It is almost
always presented as a method of action that the Palestinians had to adopt
because Israel did not fulfill its agreements. The ongoing incitement by the
Palestinians and their habit of paying salaries to terrorists is mentioned only
once. The book generally depicts the Palestinians as people whose sole desire
is a state within the 1967 borders (not lines, as they actually were) with East
Jerusalem as its capital (the question of Jerusalem and the Holy Basin is also
discussed very little in the book), with agreed territorial exchanges and a
solution for the problem of the refugees based on the right of return.

The demand
for return of the refugees is cast as a difficult problem, and the writers ask
the Palestinians not to insist on it, but several of them express understanding
for this demand, and one author even regards it as the equivalent of Israel's
demand that the Palestinians recognize Israel as the nation state of the Jewish
people. He argues that the two sides should simultaneously concede these
demands in order to make it possible to reach a settlement in which the other
Palestinian demands will be fully granted in a manner that will solve the 1967
problems, while postponing the 1948 problems for the future. The view of most
of the writers in the book is that the apparent alternative among those who do
not agree with them is one state, probably a binational state, that will be
either an apartheid state or not a Jewish state (there are some - As'ad Ghanem
and Dan Bavly – who recommend this), and will jeopardize the rational Zionist
vision. They adhere to these views even though the actual likelihood of this happening
is negligible, and only a few people imagine Israeli control of the territories
currently under Palestinian control (the Gaza Strip and Areas A and B under PA
control).

The
feasible option of continuing the status quo with gradual improvements is portrayed
in the book as extremely dangerous, but is not seriously analyzed (except for Yair
Hirschfeld, who realizes its importance, but immediately recommends adopting the
proposals of the other articles). They take this position even though this
option more or less reflects Rabin's vision for a permanent settlement, and
even though it enables Israel to reduce to a very large extent its involvement in
the control over the Palestinians. It provides the Palestinians with self-rule
and a higher quality of life than that enjoyed by their Arab neighbors, while
postponing the discussion of their demands and expectations that are
unacceptable to Israel, based on de facto Palestinian acceptance of concessions
that they are incapable and unwilling to make de jure. The need for such an
analysis is clear, because it appears that the two sides are unable to agree on
any other option. Despite the argument that this situation cannot persist for
long, it has already existed for nearly 25 years, notwithstanding the threats
made intermittently by various groups and a number of unilateral efforts to
make a substantial change in it. It is, in fact, the only way to utilize the
time to prepare people and generate readiness for a future settlement.

The book
suffers from additional lapses. First, it almost completely ignores the essence
of the Oslo process as a trial period. Within a short time, it became obvious
that the Palestinians were incapable of meeting the terms of the trial period,
and did not want to do so (the Hamas takeover in the Gaza Strip was conclusive
evidence of the Palestinian failure in this test). This was the reason why
Israel refrained from surrendering additional territories to PA control and had
to change its security policy in the field (the security separation fence,
roadblocks, armed incursions into Area A, arrests, and more). Disregard of the
dismal results of the test leads many of the writers to recommend returning to
it under even more dangerous conditions, and forming a Palestinian state
without the Palestinians making the slightest change in their actions. It is implausibly
assumed that a more substantial response to their demands will induce a transformation
that will enable them to run an orderly country that will not become a failed
state or one controlled by extremist groups, and which will live in harmony
with Israel.

In many
cases, the writers give the impression that had Rabin not been assassinated, he
would have led the process toward a settlement that in their opinion he
intended, i.e., a two-state solution. There is no factual basis whatsoever for
this hypothesis. In the October 1995 Knesset debate about the Oslo II Accord,
Rabin explained that in his concept of the permanent settlement, the
Palestinian entity would be less than a state, a united Jerusalem would be the
capital of Israel, and the Jordan Valley, in the broadest sense of the term,
would be Israel's eastern security border. Note that the Oslo Accords contained
no commitment to establish a Palestinian state, let alone one along the 1967 lines.
The article by Alan Baker, who was a legal advisor on the negotiation team, does
a good job of illustrating this point. Rabin remained very suspicious of the
Palestinians and Arafat, and his view of future relations with the Palestinians
reflected constant hesitation. In actuality, at first Rabin did not consider
the narrative of the Palestinian view in depth (he later tried to correct this
mistake), erred by not involving professional staff (military, intelligence,
and legal personnel) in the process from the beginning, and committed a
political error by proceeding with the agreement without broad political
support.

In the
book it is argued that Israel erred by making security demands a condition for
a permanent settlement, because security-military thinking is shortsighted. It
is contended that the demand for defensible borders is excessive, and that the
border should be based on the 1967 borders/lines. The writers dismiss the argument
that defensible borders are required in order to make it difficult for what
happened in the Gaza Strip after the disengagement from recurring in Judea and
Samaria. They ignore the necessity of preventing the penetration of Iran and
radical groups into areas of crucial importance to Israel – the center of the
Land of Israel – given the instability in the region and the growing influence
of these elements. The writers who do mention this problem, especially Omer
Tzanani, believe that the settlement itself will convince the Palestinians to
provide security, because the more their requests are granted, the more they
will have to lose. Were the settlement to be accompanied by Palestinian
recognition of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people, there would
have been some kind of logic in this way of thinking, but the prevailing view
in the book is that this demand should be conceded. It is therefore difficult
to understand exactly on what the writers rely.

The issue
of recognition of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people, a theme
pervading the book, is addressed directly in two of the articles (by Tal Becker
and Matti Steinberg). Steinberg notes that already in 1977, Begin stated that
Israel was not seeking such recognition of its right to exist. Steinberg
therefore regards the demand for recognition as problematic. In practice,
during Netanyahu's term as prime minister (Steinberg presents a comprehensive
and mainly accurate review of the evolution of the Israeli demand in this
context), Israel did not demand that the Palestinians recognize the right of
the Jewish people to its own nation state in the Land of Israel, but merely
recognition of the fact that Israel is the nation state of the Jewish people. Contrary
to what is stated in a number of places in the book (Steinberg is correct on
this point), Israel made this demand a condition for a settlement, not a
condition for beginning negotiations. The Obama administration recognized the
justice of this demand (President Obama's speech at the Jerusalem Binyanei
Haumah Convention Center in March 2013). For his part, Secretary of State John
Kerry made it clear that the second principle of his peace plan is to ensure
the fulfillment of the vision of Resolution 181, whereby there will be two
states, one Jewish and the other Arab, with mutual recognition between them,
and with equal rights for all their citizens. In my opinion, the formula
proposed by Kerry is inadequate from Israel's perspective (according to
Steinberg, it is designed to bypass the Israeli demand, and I am inclined to
agree with this interpretation), but it was completely unacceptable to the
Palestinians, and they therefore rejected the entire plan. Abu Mazen did not
answer Obama directly, but he made it clear in his speech in Ramallah upon his
return from Washington that the Palestinians were adhering to the promise and
the covenant, and that there would be no concession on the deposit –
Palestinian codes that signify a commitment to achieving sovereignty in all of Palestine
and a refusal to recognize Israel as the Jewish nation state. Steinberg and
other writers state that Israel did not make this demand of Egypt and Jordan,
and regard this as evidence of the negative intentions behind the presentation
of the demand. They ignore the enormous difference between the cases; Egypt and
Jordan have no demands regarding Israel's territory. The entire Palestinian
narrative, however, negates Israel's existence as the nation state of the
Jewish people, and affirms the commitment to Palestinian sovereignty in the
entire territory of Palestine. Without recognition of Israel as the nation
state of the Jewish people, therefore, a stable and permanent peace between the
two sides cannot be achieved.

The book
boasts an impressive list of contributors, and includes several of the people
who were involved in the process and played key roles in it (Pundak and
Hirshfeld, for example), but it is quite one-sided. In the absence of any
explanation of how the writers were selected, it is unclear why the book
contains no articles written by residents in the Jewish communities in Judea
and Samaria, those who led the negotiations with the Palestinians on behalf of
the Likud governments (Yitzhak Molcho, for example), prominent Likud members
and officeholders in the Likud governments (Yaakov Amidror, for example), or on
the other hand, people who are clearly left wing, such as leaders of the
organizations campaigning for an immediate end to Israeli rule in Judea and
Samaria (although their opinions are mentioned in the book). In particular, the
absence of those who changed their opinion over the years, such as Moshe
"Bogie" Ya'alon and Yuval Steineitz, stands out. Instead, the book
contains three articles by Omer Tzanani that more or less repeat the same
message.

The book occasionally contains information that is definitely of
interest (most of it not new), and provides an excellent opportunity to
understand the thinking on the Zionist left, which regards disengagement from
the Palestinians, an end to Israeli control of Judea and Samaria, and establishment
of a Palestinian state as quickly as possible - while
postponing the discussion of 1948 problems until the future - as essential measures for ensuring
the ability of Zionism to realize its destiny.