In a recent interview with the Al-Mashhad channel, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa once again rejected the idea of opening a military front against Hezbollah in Lebanon, as proposed in President Trump’s controversial initiative. Al-Sharaa’s reluctance stems from a combination of domestic and regional considerations.
Domestically, the Syrian army remains in the process of reconstruction and rebuilding; its capabilities are limited, and it faces significant security and political challenges. A confrontation with Hezbollah could drag Syria into the Lebanese quagmire, divert resources from the internal front, and potentially undermine regime stability.
Moreover, such a move could be perceived by the Syrian public as serving Israeli interests — an image al-Sharaa is keen to avoid. At the regional level, most actors have expressed reservations regarding Syrian involvement in Lebanon. Al-Sharaa, who is investing considerable effort in restoring Syria’s international standing, is unwilling to jeopardize his diplomatic gains. Even within Lebanon, there is little appetite for renewed Syrian intervention, given the painful legacy of Syria’s presence in the country between 1976 and 2005. Turkey, Damascus’s key ally, is also concerned about the potential destabilization of Syria and the implications for its own influence there.
In Israel as well, despite the shared interest in weakening Hezbollah, there appears to be growing opposition to Syrian involvement in Lebanon. The Israeli establishment remains wary of al-Sharaa’s character and intentions, given his jihadist past and in light of the trauma of October 7. Such a move raises concerns about the spread of Sunni extremism into Lebanon, possibly as part of a broader Syrian ambition to revive the vision of “Greater Syria” (al-Sham), encompassing Lebanon. From the perspective of some Israeli actors, it is preferable to contend with the familiar Shiite adversary than to face a new jihadist threat.
Although a rational assessment suggests a low likelihood that al-Sharaa will initiate an offensive move in Lebanon, the Middle East remains a dynamic environment. According to a report in the Lebanese newspaper Al-Modon, Damascus has left the door slightly open to responding to the American proposal, while setting stringent conditions for any potential involvement against Hezbollah. These include an Israeli withdrawal from Syrian and Lebanese territory, alongside a commitment not to interfere in internal affairs. It was also reported that Damascus demanded military assistance and funding for operational activity, as well as American air support — indicating that all options remain open.
For the time being, however, al-Sharaa appears to prefer avoiding the Lebanese adventure.
In a recent interview with the Al-Mashhad channel, Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa once again rejected the idea of opening a military front against Hezbollah in Lebanon, as proposed in President Trump’s controversial initiative. Al-Sharaa’s reluctance stems from a combination of domestic and regional considerations.
Domestically, the Syrian army remains in the process of reconstruction and rebuilding; its capabilities are limited, and it faces significant security and political challenges. A confrontation with Hezbollah could drag Syria into the Lebanese quagmire, divert resources from the internal front, and potentially undermine regime stability.
Moreover, such a move could be perceived by the Syrian public as serving Israeli interests — an image al-Sharaa is keen to avoid. At the regional level, most actors have expressed reservations regarding Syrian involvement in Lebanon. Al-Sharaa, who is investing considerable effort in restoring Syria’s international standing, is unwilling to jeopardize his diplomatic gains. Even within Lebanon, there is little appetite for renewed Syrian intervention, given the painful legacy of Syria’s presence in the country between 1976 and 2005. Turkey, Damascus’s key ally, is also concerned about the potential destabilization of Syria and the implications for its own influence there.
In Israel as well, despite the shared interest in weakening Hezbollah, there appears to be growing opposition to Syrian involvement in Lebanon. The Israeli establishment remains wary of al-Sharaa’s character and intentions, given his jihadist past and in light of the trauma of October 7. Such a move raises concerns about the spread of Sunni extremism into Lebanon, possibly as part of a broader Syrian ambition to revive the vision of “Greater Syria” (al-Sham), encompassing Lebanon. From the perspective of some Israeli actors, it is preferable to contend with the familiar Shiite adversary than to face a new jihadist threat.
Although a rational assessment suggests a low likelihood that al-Sharaa will initiate an offensive move in Lebanon, the Middle East remains a dynamic environment. According to a report in the Lebanese newspaper Al-Modon, Damascus has left the door slightly open to responding to the American proposal, while setting stringent conditions for any potential involvement against Hezbollah. These include an Israeli withdrawal from Syrian and Lebanese territory, alongside a commitment not to interfere in internal affairs. It was also reported that Damascus demanded military assistance and funding for operational activity, as well as American air support — indicating that all options remain open.
For the time being, however, al-Sharaa appears to prefer avoiding the Lebanese adventure.