An unusual wave of protests against Israeli military activity was recorded on Friday, October 24, in locations across Syria, from Daraa and Quneitra to Damascus, Homs, Idlib, and Hasakah. Beyond the anti-Israel rhetoric, two key features stand out: the expansion of the protests beyond areas of direct friction with the IDF, and the emphasis on national unity and Syrian sovereignty.
Nearly two years have passed since the IDF entered southern Syria following the fall of the Assad regime. Until now, aside from isolated incidents, there have been no sustained violent friction or popular protests on the scale and across the geographical spread now emerging.
Israel has legitimate security concerns: the new regime in Damascus is struggling to establish full control, while hostile actors, including ISIS, Iran, and its proxies, continue to seek opportunities to establish a foothold. But Israel’s military presence, and especially its increasing ground operations, comes at a cumulative cost: raids on villages, arrests, disruption to daily life and livelihoods, and, more recently, deadly shootings. These deepen frustration and hostility toward Israel. The latest incident, in which Muath Salama al-Baeer, a young man with Down syndrome from the village of Jamla, was killed, underscores the sensitivity of the situation. According to the IDF, the force identified a threat, and the incident is under review.
The strategic risk is that Israel could, by its own actions, create the very threat it seeks to prevent. Ongoing local friction could become a focal point for broad national resistance, increase public pressure on the al-Sharaa regime to adopt a more hostile stance, and give extremist elements an opportunity to rally support in the name of resistance to Israel.
The use of military force, however vital it may be in some cases, cannot serve as a substitute for a long-term policy. Israel must establish greater clarity regarding its objectives in southern Syria, distinguish between tangible security threats and the civilian population, and minimize disruption to daily life as much as possible. Above all, it must maintain and advance channels of dialogue and serious negotiations with the new administration in Damascus, like it or not. A security arrangement, even a limited and gradual one, with monitoring mechanisms, U.S. guarantees, and freedom of action against concrete threats, may serve Israeli interests better than unlimited reliance on military force.
An unusual wave of protests against Israeli military activity was recorded on Friday, October 24, in locations across Syria, from Daraa and Quneitra to Damascus, Homs, Idlib, and Hasakah. Beyond the anti-Israel rhetoric, two key features stand out: the expansion of the protests beyond areas of direct friction with the IDF, and the emphasis on national unity and Syrian sovereignty.
Nearly two years have passed since the IDF entered southern Syria following the fall of the Assad regime. Until now, aside from isolated incidents, there have been no sustained violent friction or popular protests on the scale and across the geographical spread now emerging.
Israel has legitimate security concerns: the new regime in Damascus is struggling to establish full control, while hostile actors, including ISIS, Iran, and its proxies, continue to seek opportunities to establish a foothold. But Israel’s military presence, and especially its increasing ground operations, comes at a cumulative cost: raids on villages, arrests, disruption to daily life and livelihoods, and, more recently, deadly shootings. These deepen frustration and hostility toward Israel. The latest incident, in which Muath Salama al-Baeer, a young man with Down syndrome from the village of Jamla, was killed, underscores the sensitivity of the situation. According to the IDF, the force identified a threat, and the incident is under review.
The strategic risk is that Israel could, by its own actions, create the very threat it seeks to prevent. Ongoing local friction could become a focal point for broad national resistance, increase public pressure on the al-Sharaa regime to adopt a more hostile stance, and give extremist elements an opportunity to rally support in the name of resistance to Israel.
The use of military force, however vital it may be in some cases, cannot serve as a substitute for a long-term policy. Israel must establish greater clarity regarding its objectives in southern Syria, distinguish between tangible security threats and the civilian population, and minimize disruption to daily life as much as possible. Above all, it must maintain and advance channels of dialogue and serious negotiations with the new administration in Damascus, like it or not. A security arrangement, even a limited and gradual one, with monitoring mechanisms, U.S. guarantees, and freedom of action against concrete threats, may serve Israeli interests better than unlimited reliance on military force.