The war has brought three lessons into sharp focus for Saudi Arabia. First, while Iran has been harmed, it has not lost its ability to threaten the Gulf states and their energy infrastructure. Second, the Strait of Hormuz remains Tehran's most important point of strategic leverage; even following American military intervention, Washington struggles to ensure it remains fully open and that freedom of navigation is maintained. Third, while the American commitment to Gulf security remains vital, it no longer provides a comprehensive response to the threats faced by the countries of the region.
From this stems the Saudi hedging policy. On one hand, Riyadh continues to promote dialogue with Iran and even seeks to bring the rest of the Gulf states on board, understanding that reducing tension is a paramount security and economic interest. On the other hand, it turns to China — not as a substitute for the United States, but because Beijing is currently the only major power that holds significant leverage over Tehran. China is the primary target market for Iranian oil, its most important economic partner, and the very mediator that brokered the 2023 reconciliation agreement between Riyadh and Tehran. The Saudi Foreign Minister's recent visit to Beijing is an expression of this policy.
From Saudi Arabia's perspective, leveraging Chinese influence over Iran may be one of the few tools available to help restrain Tehran and prevent further disruptions to the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Turning to Beijing does not, as noted, represent a distancing from Washington, but rather a recognition that, in the current regional reality, the United States alone cannot provide the stability the Gulf requires.
In this sense, the outcomes of the war have not weakened Saudi Arabia's hedging policy — they have actually reinforced it. As confidence in Washington's sole ability to shape the regional security order erodes, Riyadh will increase its efforts to diversify risks: maintaining its alliance with the United States, deepening its ties with China, and continuing dialogue with Iran. From Riyadh's point of view, these are not contradictory moves, but rather three pillars of the exact same strategy.
The war has brought three lessons into sharp focus for Saudi Arabia. First, while Iran has been harmed, it has not lost its ability to threaten the Gulf states and their energy infrastructure. Second, the Strait of Hormuz remains Tehran's most important point of strategic leverage; even following American military intervention, Washington struggles to ensure it remains fully open and that freedom of navigation is maintained. Third, while the American commitment to Gulf security remains vital, it no longer provides a comprehensive response to the threats faced by the countries of the region.
From this stems the Saudi hedging policy. On one hand, Riyadh continues to promote dialogue with Iran and even seeks to bring the rest of the Gulf states on board, understanding that reducing tension is a paramount security and economic interest. On the other hand, it turns to China — not as a substitute for the United States, but because Beijing is currently the only major power that holds significant leverage over Tehran. China is the primary target market for Iranian oil, its most important economic partner, and the very mediator that brokered the 2023 reconciliation agreement between Riyadh and Tehran. The Saudi Foreign Minister's recent visit to Beijing is an expression of this policy.
From Saudi Arabia's perspective, leveraging Chinese influence over Iran may be one of the few tools available to help restrain Tehran and prevent further disruptions to the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Turning to Beijing does not, as noted, represent a distancing from Washington, but rather a recognition that, in the current regional reality, the United States alone cannot provide the stability the Gulf requires.
In this sense, the outcomes of the war have not weakened Saudi Arabia's hedging policy — they have actually reinforced it. As confidence in Washington's sole ability to shape the regional security order erodes, Riyadh will increase its efforts to diversify risks: maintaining its alliance with the United States, deepening its ties with China, and continuing dialogue with Iran. From Riyadh's point of view, these are not contradictory moves, but rather three pillars of the exact same strategy.