In recent weeks, Jordan has faced the launch of approximately 100 missiles and UAVs at military bases hosting U.S. forces and at civilian targets in the port city of Aqaba — some launched directly from Iran and others by militias in Iraq. Most of the attacks were intercepted — approximately 85 percent — but several deadly strikes were recorded, resulting in the deaths of three U.S. soldiers. Egypt, too, sustained an unprecedented drone attack last week at the port of Damietta, which struck a floating storage and regasification unit supporting liquefied natural gas import infrastructure and gas supply. No actor claimed responsibility for the attack, but the prevailing assessment is that Iran or its proxies were behind it.
Both countries have so far preferred to contain the incidents. Jordan warned that it would strike militias in Iraq if they attacked it again, but refrained from issuing similar direct threats against Iran and limited itself to condemnations. Its position reflects a range of considerations: the desire to prevent an escalation that would turn the kingdom into an even more central arena of confrontation between Iran, the United States, and Israel; concern over economic damage, heightened by the attack on Aqaba — Jordan’s only outlet to the sea, a major tourist center, and a critical commercial hub; and a desire to avoid playing into the hands of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and domestic opposition elements seeking to portray the royal palace as a collaborator with Washington.
Egypt likewise refrained from directly accusing or threatening Iran. Even before the attack in Damietta, Cairo had been involved in mediation between the United States and Iran, based on the view that reaching diplomatic understandings with Tehran would be less costly and more effective for Egypt and the region than the continuation and escalation of the military confrontation. The attack further underscored Cairo’s vulnerability and the potential damage it could suffer should the conflict expand into its territory. Natural gas is used to generate more than 75 percent of Egypt’s electricity, and the destruction of gas infrastructure could therefore lead to power outages during a period of peak demand and damage the country’s reputation as a reliable and stable regional hub for energy trade.
The attacks may be interpreted as an Iranian attempt to drive a wedge between Jordan and Egypt, on the one hand, and the United States and Israel, on the other. In Jordan’s case, they may signal that the security and political costs of hosting U.S. forces outweigh the benefits of the alliance with Washington. In Egypt’s case, they may signal that its extensive gas ties with U.S. and Israeli companies — which depend on liquefaction and regasification facilities at its ports — could turn it into a target if hostilities resume. These warning messages appear to have registered in Amman and Cairo and, for the time being, have only reinforced their belief that restraint and diplomacy are preferable to escalation and confrontation as a means of protecting their domestic stability and the complex web of interests they maintain vis-à-vis Washington, Jerusalem, and Tehran.
In recent weeks, Jordan has faced the launch of approximately 100 missiles and UAVs at military bases hosting U.S. forces and at civilian targets in the port city of Aqaba — some launched directly from Iran and others by militias in Iraq. Most of the attacks were intercepted — approximately 85 percent — but several deadly strikes were recorded, resulting in the deaths of three U.S. soldiers. Egypt, too, sustained an unprecedented drone attack last week at the port of Damietta, which struck a floating storage and regasification unit supporting liquefied natural gas import infrastructure and gas supply. No actor claimed responsibility for the attack, but the prevailing assessment is that Iran or its proxies were behind it.
Both countries have so far preferred to contain the incidents. Jordan warned that it would strike militias in Iraq if they attacked it again, but refrained from issuing similar direct threats against Iran and limited itself to condemnations. Its position reflects a range of considerations: the desire to prevent an escalation that would turn the kingdom into an even more central arena of confrontation between Iran, the United States, and Israel; concern over economic damage, heightened by the attack on Aqaba — Jordan’s only outlet to the sea, a major tourist center, and a critical commercial hub; and a desire to avoid playing into the hands of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and domestic opposition elements seeking to portray the royal palace as a collaborator with Washington.
Egypt likewise refrained from directly accusing or threatening Iran. Even before the attack in Damietta, Cairo had been involved in mediation between the United States and Iran, based on the view that reaching diplomatic understandings with Tehran would be less costly and more effective for Egypt and the region than the continuation and escalation of the military confrontation. The attack further underscored Cairo’s vulnerability and the potential damage it could suffer should the conflict expand into its territory. Natural gas is used to generate more than 75 percent of Egypt’s electricity, and the destruction of gas infrastructure could therefore lead to power outages during a period of peak demand and damage the country’s reputation as a reliable and stable regional hub for energy trade.
The attacks may be interpreted as an Iranian attempt to drive a wedge between Jordan and Egypt, on the one hand, and the United States and Israel, on the other. In Jordan’s case, they may signal that the security and political costs of hosting U.S. forces outweigh the benefits of the alliance with Washington. In Egypt’s case, they may signal that its extensive gas ties with U.S. and Israeli companies — which depend on liquefaction and regasification facilities at its ports — could turn it into a target if hostilities resume. These warning messages appear to have registered in Amman and Cairo and, for the time being, have only reinforced their belief that restraint and diplomacy are preferable to escalation and confrontation as a means of protecting their domestic stability and the complex web of interests they maintain vis-à-vis Washington, Jerusalem, and Tehran.