This week the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) disclosed a number of influence efforts on social media by Iranian elements impersonating Israelis in order to influence the Israeli discourse, gather intelligence, and use Israeli citizens in a deceptive manner in order to deepen social and political divisions.
This event corresponds well with the Iranian strategy, as manifested in recent years, intended to harm the State of Israel and Israeli society “below the threshold of escalation.” Iran assumes that the use of cyberspace and social media allows it room for denial of these actions, since the characteristics of this space, led by anonymity, make it possible to differentiate between Iran and the moves it takes against Israel, thereby significantly reducing the likelihood of an Israeli response to these actions.
These efforts have intensified during the war in Gaza, taking advantage of the shock Israeli society has weathered since October 7. Some of the influence networks uncovered by the Shin Bet were established immediately after the Hamas attack, on October 8, or in the following weeks, while those that operated before the outbreak of the war moved to focus on issues related to the war, such as the struggle for the return of the hostages or the promotion of calls to “return to Gush Katif.”
In addition to the objectives of these operations, as described in the Shin Bet announcement, such as seeking to gather intelligence (for example, by through surveys), influencing the internal discourse, and harassing political parties or the families of the hostages, there is also Iranian incitement against Israeli Arab citizens, including the publication of personal details and pictures of the citizens with target symbols on their faces. The network encouraged incidents of violence in various hospitals in Israel while spreading false information about the presence of “Hamas terrorists” in those hospitals. The purpose was to deepen the Jewish-Arab divide and even generate actual physical friction and violence at a critical time when senior officials in Israel warned against a potential Guardian of the Walls II.
Exposing the Iranian influence efforts on social media, as the Shin Bet did this week, shows that the organization sees them as a significant threat. The detailed media exposure emphasizes that a key channel in dealing with the phenomenon is strengthening public awareness and the public's digital literacy.
This week the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) disclosed a number of influence efforts on social media by Iranian elements impersonating Israelis in order to influence the Israeli discourse, gather intelligence, and use Israeli citizens in a deceptive manner in order to deepen social and political divisions.
This event corresponds well with the Iranian strategy, as manifested in recent years, intended to harm the State of Israel and Israeli society “below the threshold of escalation.” Iran assumes that the use of cyberspace and social media allows it room for denial of these actions, since the characteristics of this space, led by anonymity, make it possible to differentiate between Iran and the moves it takes against Israel, thereby significantly reducing the likelihood of an Israeli response to these actions.
These efforts have intensified during the war in Gaza, taking advantage of the shock Israeli society has weathered since October 7. Some of the influence networks uncovered by the Shin Bet were established immediately after the Hamas attack, on October 8, or in the following weeks, while those that operated before the outbreak of the war moved to focus on issues related to the war, such as the struggle for the return of the hostages or the promotion of calls to “return to Gush Katif.”
In addition to the objectives of these operations, as described in the Shin Bet announcement, such as seeking to gather intelligence (for example, by through surveys), influencing the internal discourse, and harassing political parties or the families of the hostages, there is also Iranian incitement against Israeli Arab citizens, including the publication of personal details and pictures of the citizens with target symbols on their faces. The network encouraged incidents of violence in various hospitals in Israel while spreading false information about the presence of “Hamas terrorists” in those hospitals. The purpose was to deepen the Jewish-Arab divide and even generate actual physical friction and violence at a critical time when senior officials in Israel warned against a potential Guardian of the Walls II.
Exposing the Iranian influence efforts on social media, as the Shin Bet did this week, shows that the organization sees them as a significant threat. The detailed media exposure emphasizes that a key channel in dealing with the phenomenon is strengthening public awareness and the public's digital literacy.