Even after the historic and impressive US strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, Hezbollah has remained outside the circle of the war. This is despite earlier indications that the organization might reconsider its policy following the American entry into the conflict. For example, the organization’s Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, stated just a few days earlier that Hezbollah is not neutral in this conflict, supports Iran, and will stand by its side—although he refrained from issuing an explicit threat that Hezbollah would join the fighting.
Hezbollah’s first official response to the strike was issued on the evening of June 22. The delay likely reflects hesitation and confusion among the group’s leadership, as well as a need to consult with the Iranians. Ultimately, Hezbollah’s response was limited to a harsh condemnation that included strong accusations against the United States, alongside full support for Iran, which, according to the statement, has the right to defend itself and the capability to confront Israeli and American aggression. Lebanese sources were even quoted in the Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, claiming that it is Israel that is trying to drag Lebanon into war, while Hezbollah remains firm in its decision to avoid involvement.
The following constraints underlie Hezbollah’s decision to abstain from participating in the war:
· Hezbollah’s current difficult situation: The organization is still recovering from its defeat in the war with Israel and wishes to focus first on rebuilding its capabilities and status. Any action against Israel or the United States would lead to further loss of assets and additional harm to Lebanon and its citizens.
· The IDF’s relentless military activity: The Israeli military campaign against Hezbollah, occurring simultaneously with the war against Iran, significantly hampers the organization’s ability to act—even if it were willing to take the risk. In recent days alone, several Hezbollah operatives were killed, and Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon was targeted. The IDF has also reportedly increased its presence along the border.
· Pressure from Lebanon’s new leadership: Unlike Hezbollah, Lebanon’s leadership was quick to respond to the US strike. President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam emphasized—after a joint consultation—that Lebanon’s supreme interest is to avoid any involvement in the war. President Aoun even recalled that Lebanon has already paid a heavy price for the wars of others and cannot bear the cost of another conflict.
· External pressure from international actors: The Lebanese leadership also faces strong pressure—not only internally but from the international community, led by the United States—to prevent Hezbollah from intervening and to accelerate efforts to disarm Hezbollah and the armed Palestinian groups in Lebanon operating in coordination with it. This issue was raised during discussions in Lebanon with US Special Envoy, Thomas Barrack.
In conclusion, should the war with Iran end in the near term, the chances increase that Hezbollah will remain outside the fighting and choose to focus on rebuilding its capabilities in preparation for a future campaign against Israel. If the war drags on and becomes more complicated, one cannot rule out the possibility of Hezbollah becoming involved—even if only symbolically and in a limited fashion—in coordination with Iran and in support of its interests.
Even after the historic and impressive US strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities, Hezbollah has remained outside the circle of the war. This is despite earlier indications that the organization might reconsider its policy following the American entry into the conflict. For example, the organization’s Secretary-General, Naim Qassem, stated just a few days earlier that Hezbollah is not neutral in this conflict, supports Iran, and will stand by its side—although he refrained from issuing an explicit threat that Hezbollah would join the fighting.
Hezbollah’s first official response to the strike was issued on the evening of June 22. The delay likely reflects hesitation and confusion among the group’s leadership, as well as a need to consult with the Iranians. Ultimately, Hezbollah’s response was limited to a harsh condemnation that included strong accusations against the United States, alongside full support for Iran, which, according to the statement, has the right to defend itself and the capability to confront Israeli and American aggression. Lebanese sources were even quoted in the Saudi newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat, claiming that it is Israel that is trying to drag Lebanon into war, while Hezbollah remains firm in its decision to avoid involvement.
The following constraints underlie Hezbollah’s decision to abstain from participating in the war:
· Hezbollah’s current difficult situation: The organization is still recovering from its defeat in the war with Israel and wishes to focus first on rebuilding its capabilities and status. Any action against Israel or the United States would lead to further loss of assets and additional harm to Lebanon and its citizens.
· The IDF’s relentless military activity: The Israeli military campaign against Hezbollah, occurring simultaneously with the war against Iran, significantly hampers the organization’s ability to act—even if it were willing to take the risk. In recent days alone, several Hezbollah operatives were killed, and Hezbollah infrastructure in southern Lebanon was targeted. The IDF has also reportedly increased its presence along the border.
· Pressure from Lebanon’s new leadership: Unlike Hezbollah, Lebanon’s leadership was quick to respond to the US strike. President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam emphasized—after a joint consultation—that Lebanon’s supreme interest is to avoid any involvement in the war. President Aoun even recalled that Lebanon has already paid a heavy price for the wars of others and cannot bear the cost of another conflict.
· External pressure from international actors: The Lebanese leadership also faces strong pressure—not only internally but from the international community, led by the United States—to prevent Hezbollah from intervening and to accelerate efforts to disarm Hezbollah and the armed Palestinian groups in Lebanon operating in coordination with it. This issue was raised during discussions in Lebanon with US Special Envoy, Thomas Barrack.
In conclusion, should the war with Iran end in the near term, the chances increase that Hezbollah will remain outside the fighting and choose to focus on rebuilding its capabilities in preparation for a future campaign against Israel. If the war drags on and becomes more complicated, one cannot rule out the possibility of Hezbollah becoming involved—even if only symbolically and in a limited fashion—in coordination with Iran and in support of its interests.