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Given the immediate Hezbollah threat from Lebanon on the operational level, the IDF took action to protect Israel without spiraling into war, while bracing for escalation should Hezbollah insist on and succeed in striking at Israel. This may explain the restrained force in Lebanon in contrast to the lethal force in Syria, the calming messages that were relayed to Lebanon, and the opting for a low media profile – including the lack of photographed documentation, at least thus far, from Mt. Dov. As of now, the IDF has performed its mission well, and it would appear that after the explosion in Beirut there is a greatly reduced likelihood of additional terrorist attacks by Hezbollah along the Lebanese border at this time. Nonetheless, the challenge that the organization presents remains.

On the strategic level, the tension in the north was part of the ongoing dialogue between Hezbollah and Israel regarding rules of the game and deterrence. Over the last decade, the situation vis-a-vis Lebanon has stabilized against the backdrop of mutual deterrence and a shared desire to avoid ruinous war. Given Israel's repeated strikes in Syria against Iranian and Hezbollah entrenchment, the organization is trying to spread its deterrence umbrella from Lebanon over Syria. But the devastating explosion in Beirut, which inflamed the existing dire economic straits that were already the country's most severe, and were exacerbated by the coronavirus crisis, has underscored the rift between the interests of the broad Lebanese public and the interests of Hezbollah and its military activity, which endanger Lebanon, make it hard to cope with its plight, and enlist international economic aid.

The moments of the explosion in Beirut from different angles (Sky News Arabia)

انفجار #بيروت.. ظهور المزيد من فيديوهات الكارثة على مواقع التواصل | #شاهد_سكاي pic.twitter.com/v8VomjnqJK

— سكاي نيوز عربية (@skynewsarabia) August 9, 2020

On the diplomatic level, the security tension affords a rare opportunity with excellent timing – straight into the scheduled Security Council discussions on renewing the mandate of the United National Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which expires at the end of August 2020. In recent months, the Lebanese government and Hezbollah, with the backing of Russia and China and their power to exercise a veto, have advocated vigorously – through operations, the media, and diplomacy – for the existing mandate to be renewed as is, unchanged. In a May 5 session of the Security Council, the US ambassador outlined the fundamental violations of Resolution 1701 by Hezbollah's overt military activity in the south. “For all intents and purposes, [Hezbollah] dictates to UNIFIL where and when it can patrol. Instead of working with the UN and the Security Council to address these manifest problems, the Government of Lebanon is preventing the Mission from fulfilling its mandate by denying it access to sites inside its area of operations. The time has come to either pursue serious change to empower UNIFIL, or to realign UNIFIL’s staffing and resources with tasks it can actually accomplish” – in other words, to bolster UNIFIL as befits its mission or downsize it as befits its operations. In late May there was another assault on a UNIFIL patrol in the village of Blida, and Lebanese media made clear that this was a message from Hezbollah to the Security Council and to the countries contributing troops to UNIFIL, lest they dare change the current situation. In early June, a report on UNIFIL effectiveness by the UN secretary-general recommended concentrating forces along the Blue Line, thinning them out in the deeper areas, and converting UNIFIL into a light and protected patrol force with improved monitoring capabilities. Hezbollah media deemed this a recommendation to turn UNFIL into an espionage mechanism for Israel against the "resistance." A draft of the secretary-general's report on the situation in Lebanon, which will serve as the basis for the debate and has yet to be disseminated, was described in Lebanese media as rather convenient – or in other words, not particularly challenging to Lebanon or supporters of the status quo.

The operational tension and the Hezbollah attack at Mt. Dov lend Israel an opportunity to demonstrate the holes in the Lebanese security situation: a readily available Hezbollah military capacity in south Lebanon along the Blue Line, which it can unleash at a time of its choice without UNFIL being able to locate or prevent it; a slew of 1701 violations by Hezbollah against the Lebanese government’s “commitment” to the resolution that is not matched by action (weaponry in the south, ceasefire violations, denial of UNIFIL access, and assaults on its patrols, incursions across the Blue Line while Lebanon refuses to demarcate it on Mt. Dov); and, on the other hand, UNIFIL's vital capability to serve as an efficient liaison for relaying messages and avoiding miscalculated escalation between the sides. Israel would do well to present the Security Council members without delay its findings and documentation regarding the foiled attack at Mt. Dov, as fresh and decisive evidence regarding the actual situation. As the security tension persists, Israel can document and expose Hezbollah violations, as well as the Lebanese army's collusion and UNIFIL's inability to reach sites in time where Hezbollah poses an immediate military threat.

The Beirut blast instantly changed the context, shifting the focus of attention from the southern front to the stricken capital. While the fierce crisis may provide the international community with improved negotiating leverage vis-à-vis a Lebanon that needs aid more than ever, it also inflames worries about Lebanon collapsing into chaos, and thus many actors prefer at this time to attend to short-term stability rather than security risks that do not seem imminent. Clearly the fallen Lebanese cabinet is not a viable address for demands at this time, but rather, is seen as the victim of a disaster that calls for assistance and governance and political reforms. In the situation that has emerged, security challenges are regarded as of secondary urgency.

In the current circumstances, Israel, with the help of its friends on the Council – chiefly the United States, as well as France, Britain, and India - should try to advance changes in the security regime that was set up at the end of the Second Lebanon War and since then has eroded significantly. After the Beirut blast, it appears that improvements to UNIFIL and UN work have a greater chance of success than what is entailed in demands of the Lebanese government. Changes are needed on four levels:

Security Council Oversight: Given the systematic procrastination by Lebanon and Hezbollah, the most important requirement right now is stipulation of an enhanced frequency of Security Council discussions and greater oversight of the evolving situation in Lebanon. Instead of an annual session that ends with a resolution to renew the UNIFIL mandate, along with two periodic resolution-free sessions, the mandate should be renewed for a half-year only (as with UNDOF, the UN force on the Golan Heights). This would allow for a deeper discussion of the correlation between the force's capabilities and size and actual operations, as well as of actual progress regarding the core clauses of Resolution 1701 – led by the ban on non-governmental military assets south of the Litani. An additional session in February is preferable to convening only in August – a date set when the war ended in 2006, and which also happens to coincide with the vacations of most UN delegations and foreign ministries.

UNIFIL Structure and Capabilities: Israel should support the recommendation by the UN secretary-general that UNIFIL be bolstered as a light, mobile force with improved monitoring capabilities, as well as that its presence be increased along the Blue Line and thinned out in the interior. In the future, there should also be a reduction of UNIFIL’s force of some 10-20 percent (from its approximately 10,500 personnel currently) and budget (today some $480 million), and with permitted troop numbers lowered from 15,000 to 8,000-10,000. This would serve to diminish the incongruity between force capabilities and operations, as well as the risk to international forces in the event of an escalation, and would also make clear to the Lebanese government that a policy change is in order. A budget cut would likewise reduce the economic yield to Hezbollah from UNIFIL activities in Lebanon, especially in the south of the country.

UNIFIL Operations: In the absence of a change to the UNIFIL mandate, what is needed is to enable it to function independent of the Lebanese army, whose activity in the south has already been diluted due to the growing burden of the crisis. UNIFIL should have free, unrestricted access anywhere in southern Lebanon, with an emphasis on areas abutting the Blue Line and including the so called "private properties" that are expanding significantly over time. It would also be right to expand the UNIFIL liaison mechanism, which has repeatedly proven its usefulness in de-escalation.

Transparency and Reporting: One of the challenges to focused Security Council policy discussion on Lebanon is the deliberate occlusion in the UN reports, which provide a basis for these sessions, of the reality on the ground. Efforts should be made to improve factual documentation of the actual situation, using precise and detailed geographic and photographic reporting on UNIFIL activity, with location trackers, body- and car-cams, camera drones, and a geographic operational database. UNIFIL patrols by foot, car, and helicopter will be documented separately. An information center should be set up at UN headquarters with database access, able to produce reports for Council members on request. Immediate UNIFIL reporting to the Council on any incident is required, including the exact coordinates of an incident and any denial of access of movement, as well as a detailed monthly operational report by the UNIFIL commander to the Security Council.

As with every year, it can be expected that US efforts within the Security Council to improve the situation will encounter opposition by advocates of the status quo – including veto threats by permanent members. In the current circumstances, Israel would do well to support a change in the situation, including through an American threat to veto a renewal of the mandate if necessary amendments, such as a half-year extension only, are not incorporated. Given concern that this might bring about a UNIFIL departure from Lebanon, consider that all stakeholders are interested in UNIFIL's continued existence (including Nasrallah, despite his claims that he does not care at all whether UNIFIL remains, leaves, grows, or shrinks), though they are divided as to its character and mission. Hezbollah wants a force that is restrained and cowed that does not endanger its continued illicit activity and is useful for the economy of southern Lebanon; Israel and the United States are interested in an effective monitoring force capable of preventing escalation; Lebanon is interested in the veneer of UNIFIL's political legitimacy, as well as its economic benefits; France and Italy are interested in the diplomatic advantages and the ability to deploy military forces in the eastern Mediterranean at a low risk.

Thus even if a resolution on renewing the UNIFIL mandate is vetoed, this will presumably not lead to its dissolution, but rather, to renewed negotiations over the modalities of its mandate. It would also be possible to advance the desired improvements in stages – for example, partly in August and partly in February, assuming the mandate is renewed for a half-year only. What is most important is to correct the current course, which is sloping gently toward escalation in the name of stability under the cover of an illusory status quo. Now is also the time to launch diplomatic initiatives, to advance steps under international auspices, such as renewed Blue Line demarcation, agreement on a maritime border and gas exploration, and improved security arrangements in exchange for economic aid. The tension in the north, the blast in Beirut, and the crisis in Lebanon are an opportunity to correct the current dangerous course.