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Home Publications INSS Insight Warming Relations between Turkey and Syria: A Tactical Move?

Warming Relations between Turkey and Syria: A Tactical Move?

After more than a decade of hostility, Turkish control over areas in northern Syria, and belligerent rhetoric from Assad and Erdogan, recent months have seen a new diplomatic discourse, and a Turkish call to advance normalization between the two states. However, there are some signs that this same “new spirit” is little more a Turkish elections tactic that Erdogan will disregard if he is reelected. If so, what are the chances we will see a Turkish ambassador in Damascus any time soon?

INSS Insight No. 1689, February 8, 2023

עברית
Carmit Valensi
Gallia Lindenstrauss

The relations between Syria and Turkey have gone through several changes over the past year. Just a few months ago, the President of Turkey threatened to launch a new military operation in Syria, with the aim of completing a 30 kilometer-deep security zone to settle one million Syrian refugees living in Turkish territory. However, in late December there were increasing reports that Turkey and Syria had begun talks with the aim of reaching a formal settlement, whereby Ankara would recognize the Assad regime and renew diplomatic, military, and economic relations with it. In return, the regime would work to eliminate the Kurdish-dominated autonomy in the north of its territory and refuse to recognize it in any future negotiated deal. This article examines the respective interests of the two sides and the prospects for a Syrian-Turkish rapprochement, and presents interim scenarios pending any agreement.


Since May 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has threatened to launch yet another military operation in northern Syria. In November 2022 Turkish forces began aerial bombardments in northern Syria, after a terror attack in Istanbul that Turkish authorities attributed to the Syrian branch of the Kurdish underground – although the latter denied responsibility for the attack. On January 14, 2023, Erdogan’s senior advisor Ibrahim Kalin stated that a ground operation in Syria could begin at any time. Yet at the same time, over the past year Ankara has also made conciliatory statements that did not rule out negotiations. Indeed, on December 28, the Turkish and Syrian defense ministers held a meeting in Moscow, with Russian mediation; the UAE later joined the efforts to promote a settlement. The move generated a wave of protest in northern Syria – a region populated by opponents of the regime – against normalization. In this context, several reports have noted a reversal in Assad’s image, from an ostracized figure to legitimate president.

At the same time, many indications underscore that there is still a long way to go toward a resolution between Ankara and Damascus. One seemingly technical reflection of the distance that remains is the halted process that was supposed to build trust and basic agreements between the sides. The transition from meetings of the defense ministers to meetings of the foreign ministers has not moved ahead as planned. The next stage after meetings of the foreign ministers was meant to be a historic summit between Assad and Erdogan, after over 12 years when they did not meet. But the meeting of the foreign ministers has not yet occurred; the postponement was attributed to scheduling constraints.

Assad himself, in his first statement on the matter on January 12, sought to cool expectations, stating: “For these meetings to be productive, they should be founded on co-ordination and advanced planning between Syria and Russia,” and that the aim of talks should be “ending the occupation and support for terrorism.” Syrian foreign minister Faisal Mekdad reinforced Assad’s statement and said that “a meeting between Assad and the Turkish leadership depends on removing the reasons for the dispute…We cannot talk about resuming normal ties with Turkey without removing the occupation.”

Two competing explanations might explain these developments and the intention of holding high-level meetings in the future:

First, a sincere effort toward Turkish-Syrian reconciliation: If the developments are substantive and diplomatic contacts come to fruition in a formal settlement, this turn of events is no less than dramatic. For Turkey, which has dealt with security threats from Syrian territory for over a decade and which bears the burden of hosting over four million Syrian refugees, it is not clear that an additional military operation would achieve the desired results. Russia, which is mediating in an attempt to achieve a resolution, is interested in improving its regional and global status as an answer to the harsh international criticism against it for its military conduct in Ukraine. A Syrian-Turkish rapprochement would strengthen Russian assets in the region and likewise point to American shortcomings. Furthermore, in recent years Russia and the UAE have worked to strengthen Assad’s status in the Arab world and sought to encourage other regional states to normalize relations. Russia is also interested in stabilizing Syria and strengthening the Assad regime in order to reduce its dependence on Moscow and to recoup at least some of its expenses from the past few years by taking advantage of natural resources in Syria and by integration in economic agreements regarding the country’s reconstruction. The UAE would like to strengthen Assad, presuming that involvement by regional states in Syria will balance Iranian influence there, with the eventual hope of removing Tehran’s presence entirely.

A second and more likely explanation is that this is a political ploy by Erdogan ahead of upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections, which were moved up and are now scheduled for May 14. Erdogan must prove to his voter base that he is taking steps to deal with two challenges – the Kurdish issue and the refugee issue. The series of meetings, those that have already taken place and those that are planned between senior Syrian and Turkish officials, are thus important for their visibility, even if they do not translate into a formal resolution and full normalization. A public opinion survey from December 2022 found that 59 percent of the Turkish public supports a meeting between Erdogan and Assad. Opposition parties in Turkey also promised to engage in a dialogue of this kind, were they to gain power. Assad for his part stated that he is not interested in offering Erdogan hollow political gestures, and has refused to meet him on several occasions so long as Turkish forces are stationed in his country. His reason for agreeing in principle to begin dialogue now is primarily Russian pressure, although this alone was not enough. When that was not sufficient, the Emirati foreign minister flew to Damascus to persuade Assad, and may also have promised him some compensation for advancing the process.

The concern that this is a Turkish ruse gains credence, as neither side has suggested concrete concessions, as least not publicly. The Turks have not declared that they are willing to withdraw from Syrian territory, and Assad has not stated that he intends to dismantle the Kurdish-dominated autonomy in northeastern Syria. The discourse is currently on the level of slogans: from the Syrian point of view, Assad is not interested in a compromise that would leave Turkish forces on his land, and he would certainly have reservations about one million refugees returning to Syria – most of whom are poor, and many of whom are also regime opponents – which would increase the burden on a country already facing a severe financial crisis. Even if there is some return of refugees, an escalation in the rebel-controlled Idlib province could cause a significant new wave of refugees into Turkey. In addition, massive action against Kurdish forces would be complicated economically and militarily, so long as US forces are deployed in the area (it is estimated that some 800 US troops are stationed on Syrian soil). Iran also seeks to maintain its influence and involvement, in an effort reflected in a series of meetings between the Iranian foreign minister and his Syrian, Russian, and Turkish counterparts, and in the planned visit by President Ebrahim Raisi to Syria and Turkey. In late January it was decided that Iran will serve as an additional mediator, alongside Russia, in the negotiations between Syria and Turkey. These diplomatic moves are underway notwithstanding the displeasure of the US administration. On January 12, State Department Spokesperson Ned Price stated that Washington does not support normalization with the Assad regime, without referring to any specific country. During his visit in Egypt on January 29, Secretary of State Antony Blinken repeated that the US opposed any recognition of Assad until he cooperates with the political process formulated by the UN Security Council.

Accordingly, the prospects of a comprehensive peace deal that would include full Turkish withdrawal from Syrian territory are slim. At the same time, there are several more likely interim scenarios for a settlement between the sides:

  1. Accepting Turkish demands for a security zone along the Syrian-Turkish border and deployment of Syrian forces there, or the joint presence of Turkish, Syrian, and Russian forces along the border, in order to reduce freedom of movement of Kurdish forces and distance them from the Turkish border.
  2. Increased presence of – and control by – the Syrian regime in Manbij and Tal Rifaat in north-central Syria.

The opening of a dialogue process between Turkey and Syria thus appears to be a tactical move. This breakthrough was achieved in part due to pressure from Russia and the UAE, but many obstacles to a full Syrian-Turkish resolution remain. One of the tests that the dialogue process will undergo is its continuation after the elections in Turkey in the spring, when Erdogan’s motivation – assuming that he is reelected – to make concessions to Assad will be low. However, the devastating earthquakes that struck southern Turkey and northern Syria on February 6, and their unfolding consequences, require cooperation between Turkey and Syria, and may also prove to be a route for greater contact between Ankara and the Assad regime.

Northern Syria is a relatively less important region for Israeli interests, but it is clear that normalization between the Assad regime and Turkey would have far-reaching consequences for the decentralized state model established in Syria in recent years. It would certainly bring Assad closer to fulfilling his aim of regaining control over the entire country – a development that would be highly significant for Assad’s status in Syria and the entire region.

The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.
Publication Series INSS Insight
TopicsSyriaTurkey
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