Publications

The Palestinian Authority

The immediate objectives of the Palestinian Authority are survival, consolidation of Fatah’s rule, and guarantee of Abbas’s legacy. The PA is currently on the horns of a dilemma – how to progress toward its goals without losing the achievements it has scored since the Oslo Accords. While senior figures threaten from time to time to dismantle the PA and “return the keys” to Israel, in practice it appears that the PA is wary of such a move.

The economic challenge is a central issue. In early 2019, the PA announced that it would stop receiving tax revenues collected by Israel, following the Israeli government’s decision to deduct from the sum the payments transferred to the families of prisoners and terrorists killed in action (“martyrs”). The tax funds from Israel constitute a significant portion of the Palestinian Authority’s total income and part of its GDP. While there are calls in the PA to completely sever its financial connection to Israel, they are not viable given the PA’s dependence on Israel in terms of employment and trade: most of the exports from the PA are intended for Israel, and one tenth of the workforce is employed in Israel. This problematic dependence is compounded by the cut in American and UNRWA funding, and by difficulties in gaining external financial assistance from other sources, particularly the Arab states. In an effort to temper the impending crisis, Israel and the PA formulated a temporary solution to transfer funds that would enable the PA to weather 2019 with relative quiet. Nonetheless, against this financial plight, the PA was forced to cut salaries in half and reduce expenditures. Those employed in the public sector – and constitute the significant employment sector – are the principal casualties, including members of the security apparatuses, which in no small measure are responsible for the current stability in the West Bank. Beyond the economic difficulty, the security apparatuses are confronting a population that is challenging their role as enforcers of law and order, while general public confidence in the PA has reached a low point, in light of performance failures and corruption.

At the same time, coordination between the PA security forces and the IDF continues, in accordance with the PA’s interest in preventing an outbreak of violence and in light of Abbas’s consistent rejection of the path of terrorism. This is despite polls showing increasing support among the Palestinian public for violent struggle.

The Palestinian Authority’s ability to challenge Israel, through economic disengagement and cessation of security coordination or through political struggle in international forums, is limited. Furthermore, the Palestinian issue is gradually losing its centrality and importance in regional and international discourse. Indeed, Israel takes pride in having created overt and covert partnerships with Arab states that formerly glorified the Palestinian struggle. While the PA is still recognized as the official Palestinian representative and as the link connecting the Palestinians to the international community in general and to the Arab world in particular, its influence has ebbed, as the Palestinian issue has been relegated to the sidelines.

Significance and a Look to the Future

Despite Mahmoud Abbas’s unchallenged leadership as head of the PLO, the Palestinian Authority, and the Fatah movement, his age and his health necessitate looking toward the future. Beneath the surface, competition is underway over the leadership on the day after Abbas, which could lead to one of the following scenarios:

* Separation of powers among the three positions (chair of the PLO, president of the PA, and head of Fatah) and the election of a collective leadership (medium-high probability)

* Election of a single leader from Fatah by the Central Committee as an heir to Abbas (medium-high probability)

* Collapse of the Palestinian Authority and the strengthening of tribal-clan foundations and regional leadership in its stead (low probability)

* Rise of a political alternative to the existing leadership. This scenario is extremely unlikely, although there are signs of some of the public looking for a new path

The succession issue, as well as the leadership’s loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the public, has led Abbas and his associates to promote elections in the coming months in two stages, first for the Legislative Council, according to the proportional system, and then for the presidency. Hamas and the other factions have expressed agreement in principle for the idea of elections, but they oppose the election law (amended by Abbas in 2007), which conditions holding elections on recognizing the PLO and the agreements it has signed. It appears that the sides will engage in a “blame game” in order to ascribe responsibility for not holding the elections to the other side. In any case, Hamas will likely continue to try to take over PA institutions and penetrate the ranks of the PLO, and then exploit Abbas’s departure to demand partnership in the Palestinian leadership and deepen its influence in the West Bank. Israel has the ability to minimize damage by obstructing Hamas in the West Bank and even to promote opportunities following Abbas’s departure, as long as it does not “crown” the next leader, but aids in strengthening the leadership that is elected by the Fatah apparatus or in general elections.

Hamas in the Gaza Strip

Hamas is torn between its responsibility for governing the Gaza Strip and its identity as a resistance movement, and in this context faces challenges on three levels. The first is that Hamas itself is divided into groups that disagree on fundamental questions, e.g., support for ties with Egypt versus support for Iran; and support for a limited arrangement with Israel on a ceasefire, versus support for armedresistance. Consequently, the leadership has difficulty ruling and undertaking significant measures. The second level is the difficulty or unwillingness to restrain the other resistance organizations in Gaza forcibly (the “rogue” organizations), which are affected by other interests. The third level is that Hamas is the target of increased popular criticism for incompetent governance. Nonetheless, in 2019, Hamas demonstrated an ability to suppress social protests effectively, and to direct the rage toward Israel.

Since March 2018, the Gaza Strip has been close to a flare-up, even though Israel and Hamas are not interested in escalation. The Hamas leadership in Gaza has presented Israel with an ultimatum of escalation or arrangement; this enabled the limited arrangement with Israel that includes Qatari money coming into Gaza, in exchange for a commitment to reduce the “popular resistance” along the fence. In tandem, Hamas leaders are tightening their military deterrence against Israel – the organization launches rocket fire in response to Israeli military activity and mainly as a tool to pressure Israel in negotiations, in order to ease the civilian situation in Gaza.

Significance and a Look to the Future

There are several alternatives for Israel’s policy toward Hamas and the Gaza Strip:

* Reaching understandings with Hamas through Egyptian mediation and agreeing on an extended ceasefire, in exchange for significantly easing the closure of Gaza

* Creating conditions for intra-Palestinian reconciliation as leverage for restoring the Palestinian Authority’s control over Gaza (an alternative that is not in Israel’s hands)

* Continuing the current policy of conflict management, while adjusting to changes in the situation

* Completely severing Gaza from Israel and the West Bank

* Launching a military campaign to defeat the Hamas and Islamic Jihad military wings

The preferred and most feasible alternative is a long term ceasefire between Israel and Hamas reached with Egyptian mediation, preferably in coordination with the Palestinian Authority – although the likelihood of this is low –which would include significantly easing the closure of Gaza and advancing infrastructure projects. Under current circumstances, it appears that a wide-scale military campaign will not give Israel a decided negotiating advantage or better negotiating conditions than what can already be achieved today, and there is even a danger of the collapse of governmental capacity in the Gaza Strip. In addition, a military move of this sort will not lead to a solution that guarantees against Hamas and Islamic Jihad military buildup.

In this context, Egypt has a central role in stabilizing Gaza, and it has positioned itself as the exclusive mediator between Israel and Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Cairo is trying gently to balance opposing interests: on the one hand, it seeks to bring about an extended arrangement and ceasefire between Israel and Hamas – without being drawn into involvement and responsibility for Gaza – in order to promote stability and security that would contribute to the revival of tourism in Sinai and to economic projects in northern Sinai. On the other hand, it does not see Hamas as part of a permanent solution, and it is interested in the PA’s return to power in Gaza. At the same time, Cairo is working to block the involvement of other political actors in Gaza, especially its Qatari, Turkish, and Iranian rivals.

Main Challenges for Israel

Israel has considerable influence on the Palestinian system. Its actions indicate that in practice, it has chosen to weaken the Palestinian Authority and to raise doubts about its being a “partner” for an agreement, although the PA maintains security coordination with Israel and allows the IDF operational freedom in the West Bank. The approach of the Israeli government over the past decade has been to play for time and thereby postpone the establishment of a Palestinian state as long as possible. With an idea that “time is on Israel‘s side” in the Palestinian arena, the aim of the policy – in the absence of an alternative – is to maintain Hamas as a weakened political entity that both restrains rogue actors and is restrained from a large-scale attack. In practice, Israel’s conflict management policy requires differentiating Gaza from the West Bank, thus working tacitly to prevent the advancement of reconciliation between the PA and Hamas. This strategy of entrenching division between the sub-systems could lead to increased chaos, especially if the situation destabilizes after Abbas’s departure and if the fundamental problems of the Gaza Strip worsen.

This is a difficult time for the Palestinian national idea. On the one hand, the PA continues to adhere to the two-state solution, while on the other hand, among young Palestinians, there are more and more voices calling for setting new priorities that focus on abandoning the principle of two states and instead adopt the idea of a “state of all its citizens” that grants equal civil rights for Palestinians in the State of Israel. These voices could strengthen following the realization of one or more of the following scenarios: if the Palestinian Authority finds itself succumbing to infighting on Abbas’s succession or falls into a severe economic and humanitarian crisis; if Israel pursues annexation measures in the West Bank; or if President Trump’s plan for an Israeli-Palestinian agreement is released and does not relate to a Palestinian state or include recognition of Israeli annexation.

In 2020, Hamas is expected to continue to organize demonstrations against Israel and perpetrate violent incidents along the border in order to reach improved understandings for an arrangement, including removal of the “blockade” and programs for reconstruction and new infrastructure in Gaza, with an emphasis on a maritime port. In exchange, Hamas would agree to an extended and comprehensive ceasefire. In the framework of a broad agreement and in return for the extensive release of prisoners held by Israel, it is possible that it would agree to release the Israeli civilians and the bodies of Israeli soldiers. However, Hamas will not surrender its efforts to develop and maintain the means of struggle at its disposal (from explosive kites and drones to rockets, UAVs, and tunnels) – which aim to deter Israel from military campaigns in Gaza and to pressure it as part of the Egyptian-mediated negotiations for an arrangement. In this context, Hamas’s reluctance to join Islamic Jihad in the escalation with Israel in November 2019 can be seen as reflecting its interest in an agreement.

If Israel and Hamas do not reach and implement understandings on an extended ceasefire, the likelihood of a largescale military conflict in the Gaza Strip will increase – in the form of an undesired escalation that occurs contrary to the interests of both sides (as with Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014). Israel’s objective in a military operation would be to cause serious damage to the Hamas and Islamic Jihad military wings to the point of dismantling them, while leaving Hamas in place as a functioning governing authority and avoiding a scenario whereby one of the rogue Salafi organizations takes over or the IDF is drawn into resuming control over Gaza.

While the IDF is prepared for large-scale military action in Gaza, it is not clear what its exit strategy would be. Although the IDF would seek to withdraw all of its forces immediately after a campaign, the stabilization of the Strip on the day after a campaign remains an open question. In this case, there are two possible scenarios: the first is a clear military achievement for Israel, which would involve heavy losses, followed by the formulation of an arrangement similar in essence to what Hamas is willing to agree on today. The second is the overthrow of Hamas, whether intentional or not, leaving a governance vacuum in Gaza that would lead to chaos that could draw Israel back to the Gaza Strip.

Recommendations for Israeli Policy

The Palestinian problem was and remains on Israel’s doorstep. The consequences of the strategic distress in the Palestinian system do not benefit Israel, and they increase the likelihood of escalation in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. However, the current situation enables Israel to shape a more favorable architecture of relations with the Palestinians, even without a comprehensive agreement, by promoting political, territorial, and demographic separation and an independent and distinct Palestinian entity in the West Bank, along with limited steps on an arrangement in the Gaza Strip that would at least enable postponement of a future conflict. To this end, Israel must act along two channels:

* The first is strengthening the Palestinian Authority as the sole legitimate entity for a future agreement, while bolstering it as a responsible, functioning, and stable authority and fostering economic growth. Israel should set a political objective of achieving transitional arrangements that would shape the separation and outline the conditions for a future reality of two states, based on the INSS Plan, A Strategic Framework for the Israeli-Palestinian Arena.

* The second is seeing Hamas as the entity temporarily responsible for the Gaza Strip and achieving an extended ceasefire with it, in exchange for significantly easing the closure; and in parallel, maintaining the close coordination with Egypt and the UN or the Quartet to advance vital humanitarian projects in Gaza, with the assistance of the international community.

The Trump administration has formulated a different solution than those raised by previous administrations, including a decline in the centrality of the two-state solution and a change in the approach toward the illegality of the settlements. It is not clear whether and when the plan will be made public, but in any case, it will likely be rejected by the Palestinian leadership and Jordan, and met with doubt and reservation by the rest of the Arab states. In contrast, the Israeli government is likely to accept the principles of the plan. The rationale underlying the plan, which holds that the reality on the ground cannot be ignored, serves Israel’s interests both as a guideline for future negotiations and for encouraging Palestinian recognition of the fact that time is not on their side. The Israeli government should use the plan in order to help create a reality of two distinct political entities – not by casting the PA as an opponent of peace, but by incorporating it as a necessary partner in the process of gradual separation in the West Bank.

In addition, in recent years legislative ground is being prepared in Israel for annexation of settlements in the West Bank, joining Prime Minister Netanyahu’s promise to annex the Jordan Valley. Annexation of all or part of the West Bank denotes a change in the fundamental vision of the State of Israel as a Jewish, democratic, secure, and moral state, with recognized borders and international legitimacy. Israeli annexation steps would likely encounter sweeping vehement Palestinian and international opposition. In addition, steps in this direction would likely harm Israel’s relations with Jordan and Egypt, lead to rising violence and terrorism, and bring about the end of the security cooperation with the PA. Therefore, annexation steps should be avoided, even if facilitated by the Trump plan.

Regarding relations with Jordan, Israel is seen in the Kingdom as responsible for the political deadlock and for the Trump plan, which is biased in its favor. Most of the Jordanian public is convinced that the Israeli right wing sees Jordan as an alternative homeland for the Palestinians. Advancement of annexation encourages this notion, hence threatening the future of peaceful relations. Another challenge is maintaining the status quo on the Temple Mount, and Jordan’s potential inability to fulfill its role as custodian of the holy places. Therefore, along with presenting a political vision to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Israeli government should provide economic assistance to Jordan, cultivate the fruits of peace, and strengthen the strategic bilateral dialogue.