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The comment by US Secretary of State JohnKerry at a press conference in London on September 9, 2013, whereby thegovernment of Syria could avoid a US punitive strike by placing its stores ofchemical weapons under international control, has led to a political solutionto the Syrian chemical weapons crisis. The idea was adopted almost immediatelyby Russia, which transformed it into a plan to destroy Syria’s chemical weaponsand have Syria join the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Russia called uponSyria to endorse the proposal, and soon thereafter Syrian Foreign Minister WalidMualem, who met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow, announcedthat Syria had accepted the plan. In response to the Syrian announcement, US PresidentBarack Obama declared that the proposal should be examined seriously, and thereforehe was suspending the planned attack.

In a meeting in Geneva on September 14,2013, Secretary Kerry and Foreign Minister Lavrov agreed on a framework forelimination of Syria‘s chemical weapons. The main idea underlying the frameworkis to assure a rapid assumption of control by the international community overthese weapons. The main elements of the framework are: 

a.    Syria must submit a comprehensive listing of its chemical weaponsand installations within one week.

b.   The destruction of the chemical weapons and its verification willbe done according to the stringent procedures of the CWC.

c.    The Syrians must provide the Organization for the Prevention ofChemical Weapons (OPCW) and supporting personnel with an immediate andunfettered right to inspect any and all sites in Syria.

d.   All chemical weapons and equipment will be destroyed in the firsthalf of 2014, withthe possibility of removing weapons for destruction outside of Syria. The twosides also concluded a side agreement on the methodology of the destruction.

e.    The agreement provides for UN administrative and logistical supportto the OPCW for inspections and destruction. In the event of noncompliance, thetwo sides agreed to impose measures under Chapter 7 within the UN SecurityCouncil.  According to Chapter 7 theSecurity Council can authorize use of force.

The Russian proposal that led to thisagreement and its acceptance by the Syrian regime stem from the Russian andSyrian understanding that without it, the chances of a United States attack areconsiderable, and that such an attack would have far reaching consequences. Nowthat Syria has announced that it will join the CWC within 30 days, it seemsthat Syria has no choice but to follow this framework agreement.

On the face of it, there was little reasonfor the two countries to be so disturbed by prospects of a US strike, once the Presidentand the Secretary of State labored to emphasize the limited scope of theplanned action. Rather, the key to understanding the Syrian and Russianperspective is apparently their conspiratorial view of US policy. They areconvinced that the main objective of the United States is regime change inSyria, as was the case first in Iraq and later in Libya. Russia has emphasizedsince the beginning of the Syrian crisis that it will not allow the UnitedStates to repeat the Western ploy, whereby a limited resolution in the UNSecurity Council gave legitimacy for a broad attack that toppled the Qaddafiregime. Russia has substantiated its declarations with actions and successfullyprevented any decision in the Security Council by using its veto power. However,the August 21, 2013 chemical attack in the suburbs of Damascus reshuffled thecards by creating a situation in which there is considerable legitimacy for aUS strike, even without a Security Council resolution. From the perspective ofRussia and Syria, such a strike is only the first step in a broad military moveto topple the regime. Therefore, both countries are highly interested inpreventing an attack, especially considering that from Bashar al-Assad’s pointof view, chemical weapons have become a burden in terms of their influence on hisregime’s ability to survive, although this means that he is relinquishing astrategic deterrent toward Israel. From Russia’s point of view, this is anopportunity to regain its place as a pivotal actor in the region.

This framework agreement represents asignificant victory for President Obama, as his threat to attack has achieved morethan its declared goal. Obama sought to deter Syria from further use ofchemical weapons and thereby bolster the norm of non-use. In practice, he mayachieve Syrian chemical weapons disarmament, which will also strengthen thenorm of non-possession of chemical weapons. Beyond that, concrete steps will betaken soon to neutralize promptly the dangers of Syria’s vast arsenal ofchemical weapons, which could potentially fall into even less responsible handsthan Assad’s brutal regime. From Israel’s point of view, this would be a reliefand a precedent with far reaching consequences for Iran and its nuclear program,because it would strengthen the belief in the need to pressure Iran and scoresimilar achievements. If on the other hand theagreement is not implemented by Syria, Obama’s resolve will be tested again. Anattack would preserve his credibility, and the chances are good that it wouldprevent further use of chemical weapons. Failure to carry out an attack wouldhurt his credibility and erode the ability of the United States to influence actorsin the Middle East, including Iran.

There are considerable difficulties onthe road to implementation of the plan. First, it must be assured that Syria(and its supporters, primarily Russia) negotiated in good faith and does notattempt to gain time and dilute the final objective. So far it appears thatRussia, which devised the proposal and apparently also pressed Syria to acceptit, will continue to support the plan, which is likely to yield Russia politicaland strategic gains.

Second, the situation in Iraq followingthe 1991 Gulf War is instructive regarding actual implementation. As directedby a UN resolution, teams of experts were sent to Iraq to expose, inspect, anddestroy Saddam Hussein’s arsenal of chemical and biological weapons. Theregime, however, made every effort to thwart the work of the inspectors, and consequently,it took them several years to destroy the weapons. The conditions in Syriatoday, with battles raging between Assad’s forces and various rebel groups, aremuch more problematic than in Iraq, and it would likely be very difficult todestroy Syria’s chemical arsenal under such conditions. Furthermore, there is aconsiderable risk that chemical materials and/or weapon systems may fall intothe hands of extremist terrorist organizations. In addition, the Syrianbiological and chemical arsenal includes many research institutes, productionsites, storage sites, and various types of weapon systems. Although a considerablenumber of these sites were previously known to the West, during the civil war therehave been shifts in this arsenal, and today it is not certain that all the sitesare known. Under these circumstances, in order for the inspection anddestruction plan to be implemented effectively, cooperation with the Syriangovernment would be necessary.

From the technical-operationalperspective, there are at least two main alternatives. The first option is totransfer most of the chemical arsenal to a third country such as Russia, whichhas vast experience in handling and destroying chemical weapons. A considerablepart of Syria’s chemical materials is stored in a “binary” fashion, that is, astwo different components that become highly toxic only when mixed. The originalcomponents are not highly toxic, and therefore, it is relatively easy to transportthem; no special safety precautions are needed and destroying them is lessdangerous. However, it will still be necessary to deal also with integratedweapon systems on Syrian soil that are already filled with the final toxicagent, since Assad has apparently armed some of his missiles and rockets, andalso to destroy sites for development, production, and storage.

The second option is similar in principleto the plan for Iraq in the 1990s. Through existing intelligence andcooperation from the Syrians, it will be necessary, with the aid of observersfrom the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)in The Hague, to map, mark, and place human inspectors and/or cameras at allrelevant sites. In the second stage, a plan will be needed to destroy thearsenal on Syrian soil. Here too, there are several possibilities that from atechnical-logistical and safety perspective are not simple, since the demandswill almost certainly be in accordance with strict OPCW standards. (In Iraq inthe 1990s, the OPCW had not yet been established and strict safety conditions werenot imposed.) The first option appears preferable because it will be possibleto circumvent some of the difficulties described and neutralize the inventoriesof chemical weapons in a relatively short time.