Publications

Key Findings:

The Military Echelon

• A majority of the Israeli public, at 78%, expresses high trust in the IDF, showing no significant change compared to the last three months (75%–77%), since peaking at 83% during the war against Iran (Operation Rising Lion) in June 2025. Among the Jewish public, trust in the IDF remains very high at 90% in this survey, compared to 86% previously, while among the Arab public it remains very low at 32%.
• A majority of the public also has high trust in the Air Force—88% among Jews and 34% among Arabs—with no significant change from the August survey. This represents a slight decline from the peak during Operation Rising Lion (83% overall; 93% among Jews; 42% among Arabs in June 2025).
• A majority of the public expresses high trust in the Military Intelligence Directorate—64% overall; 72% among Jews and 30% among Arabs—a significant decline compared to June, during Operation Rising Lion (74% overall; 83% among Jews; 39% among Arabs).
• A majority of the public, at 57%, has high trust in the IDF Spokesperson’s reports, while 24% express moderate trust, and 16% have low trust. The data has remained nearly unchanged over the past three months (56–57%), following the peak of 67.5% recorded during Operation Rising Lion in June 2025.
• There has been a slight increase in trust toward IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, rising from 58% in September to 63% in October. The increase stems mainly from the Jewish public (from 68% to 75%), while trust among the Arab public remains very low and largely unchanged (21%).

The Political Echelon

• Only 27% of Israelis express high trust in the Israeli government (32% among Jews and only 8% among Arabs), compared to 72% whose trust is low. Trust in the government remains unchanged from the previous month but is slightly higher than in July–August when it was 23%. Among coalition voters, 63% express high trust in the government, compared to only 5% among opposition voters.
• Only 33% of the public has high trust in the prime minister (39% among Jews and 7% among Arabs), compared to 66% who express low trust. Here too, there has been no change since Operation Rising Lion in June. Among coalition voters, 76% express high trust in the prime minister, compared to just 6% among opposition voters.

• About three out of four Israelis (74%) support establishing a state commission of inquiry, compared to only 17% who oppose it. Support is broad even among coalition voters (52%), but particularly high among opposition voters (92%).
• A majority of the Israeli public (53%) believes that elections should be moved up following the end of the war, while 39% thinks the war’s conclusion should not affect the election timetable. Support for early elections is very low among coalition voters (16%) and much higher among opposition voters (78%).

• Only 23% of the Israeli public believes that the defense minister’s decision to freeze IDF appointments was made for professional reasons (“to a great or very great extent”), compared to 55% of the public who thinks it was done “to a small or very small extent.” 22% responded “Don’t know.”
• A majority of the public (68%) oppose legislation that would exempt most of the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) public from military service (“strongly oppose” or “somewhat oppose”), compared to 20% who support it (“strongly support” or “somewhat support”) Only 12% responded “Don’t know.”

Key Findings:

• A majority of Israelis (57%) oppose the establishment of a Palestinian state under any circumstances, compared to 30% who support it “under certain conditions,” and 14% who responded, “Don’t know.” Among the Jewish public, 68% oppose a Palestinian state under any circumstances, and only 19% support it. Among the Arab public, 70% support the establishment of a Palestinian state, and only 13% oppose it.

Iran

Key Findings:

• There is high concern about the possibility of another confrontation with Iran in the near future: 62% of the public are very or somewhat concerned, compared to 33% who are not very or not at all concerned.

Israel–United States Relations

Key Findings:

• Half of the Israeli public believes that US President Donald Trump supports Israel only when it serves his own interests. Only 34% thinks Trump is strongly committed to Israel’s security, while 11% views him as an unpredictable leader who is difficult to rely on.

The Resilience of Israeli Society

Key Findings:

• The Israeli public believes that Israel faces many urgent challenges. When asked, “What do you think is Israel’s most urgent task the day after the ceasefire?” 29% answered “Healing and unifying Israeli society.” 10% said “Restoring Israel’s international standing.” 9% answered “Readiness for renewed fighting or other security developments.” 4% said “Preventing the establishment of a Palestinian state.” Another 40% responded “All tasks are equally urgent.”
• Some 39% believes that the resilience of Israeli society has weakened compared to before the war, 33% thinks it has strengthened, and 20% believes it has remained unchanged.
• A majority of the public, at 60%, is very concerned about Israel’s social situation after the war, 25% is moderately concerned, and 11% is slightly or not concerned at all.
• A majority of the public, at 66%, is optimistic about Israeli society’s ability to recover and grow after the crisis (“somewhat optimistic” or “very optimistic”), compared to 28% of the public who feels pessimistic (“somewhat pessimistic” or “very pessimistic”).
• Only 37% of the public reports a high or very high sense of personal security, 43% claims a moderate sense, and 19% reports a low or very low sense of security. This marks an increase in personal security compared to the previous month—before the Gaza ceasefire—when only 29% reported a high or very high sense of personal security.