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In Israel, the prevailing assumption is that relations with the United States will continue as they have in the past. This mindset stands in contrast to the famous assertion by 19th-century British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, who said that Britain had no eternal enemies or friends, only eternal interests—interests that shift as circumstances change. Israeli leaders and much of the public, by contrast, tend to believe that no geopolitical or domestic political upheaval can alter the fundamental nature of ties between Israel and the United States. Thus, Israel can continue to challenge the United States and even harm its interests in the Middle East without the American administration deviating from its fundamental support. For many years, this assessment appeared justified.

However, will Israel be able to achieve its objectives in the future if doing so entails possible harm to the US administration’s strategic preferences—without damaging the foundation of bilateral relations?

In trying to answer this, we might recall the famous line by American author Ernest Hemingway: “How did you go bankrupt? Two ways. Gradually, then suddenly.” This observation suggests that processes unfold over time—one can either track them or ignore them—but when the process ripens, it culminates in an apparent sudden act or event. Only then are questions asked about the causes and whether it could have been prevented. Hamas’s attack on October 7, 2023, fits this description. Israel–US relations also have the potential to follow such a trajectory.

The special relationship between Israel and the United States rests on three pillars, all of which have developed cracks over the years—cracks that are now widening. Some stem from Israel’s own actions; others are the result of internal American and global processes that reflect back on the bilateral relationship. Are these cracks repairable, or are we standing at the end of one era and the beginning of a new, less close and “special” chapter in relations?

First Pillar: Shared Ethos. The first pillar is the shared ethos and the United States’ perception of itself as a nation with a global, benevolent mission. This was evident, for example, in the US entry into World War I, as President Woodrow Wilson declared, “to make the world safe for democracy.” Since the end of World War II—and especially after the Cold War—the United States has seen itself as the leader of the Western world and the liberal/capitalist order, guided by principles of maintaining democratic governance, the rule of law, and civil rights. Israel was seen as guided by a similar ethos, aligned with democratic American society and as part of the Western world—hence the US willingness to engage with and assist it.

However, President Donald Trump’s second term has reflected a shift that has already become noticeable during his first term as president: a vision entirely different from most previous US administrations. This includes abandoning the liberal order, questioning the importance of alliances on the international stage, and embracing “America First” (and, simultaneously, “Trump First”) doctrine. Trump also initiated significant internal changes steering the US political system toward an authoritarian-populist regime and undermining the democratic order. Similarly, Israel has been undergoing internal changes that threaten the foundations of its democracy—moving in a direction akin to developments in the United States. In other words, there has been an erosion of the liberal value base, which was once a central pillar of the relationship. Added to this is the ongoing decline in support for Israel within the Democratic Party, turning US support for Israel from a consensus issue into a controversial one—due in part to Israeli policies aligning more closely with the Republican Party.

Second Pillar: Shared Interests. The second pillar is shared interests, which were shaped during the Cold War and the bipolar global struggle. This era was marked by aligned interests in the face of a common enemy—the Soviet Union and its Middle Eastern partners, who sought Israel’s destruction. The United States then viewed Israel as an ally in the global and regional effort to contain Soviet influence. With the end of the Cold War and the Soviet threat, a new shared concern emerged: the fight against Middle Eastern regional and global terrorism. Israel, determined to fight terrorism, remained relevant to US interests. However, Iran’s support for terror organizations—Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthi militia, and other Iran-backed militias—has been perceived more as a direct threat to Israel than to US interests in the Middle East.

Regarding Iran, on the surface, it seems to be a shared threat, even if of a limited nature. While many in Israel see the Iranian threat as existential, this is not the case in the United States. The United States sees Iran as a threat to its regional allies, and thus as undermining American interests. Of the three threats that Iran poses to Israel—nuclear, missile, and subversion—Washington views the nuclear issue as central, both in terms of efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation in general and due to the possible regional ramifications of Iran possessing nuclear weapons. Currently, the uncertainty and lack of clarity around the US position on the critical issue of uranium enrichment, alongside Trump’s push to advance economic, technological, and military deals (with the Gulf states) without the use of force, present a potential point of friction with Israel, which seeks to significantly roll back (since it cannot fully eliminate) the nuclear project.

Another point of contention is the Palestinian issue, which has recently gained additional urgency amid the war in Gaza and Trump’s far-reaching plans to reshape the Middle East, centered on improved relations with Gulf states (and in line with his family’s economic interests, as seen during his visit to the Gulf in May 2025). The ongoing war in Gaza—particularly the issue of the Israeli hostages held by Hamas—poses an obstacle to the president’s efforts to create a new geopolitical reality in the region, aimed at forming a pro-American coalition to counterbalance Iran and its allies, including Russia and China. One intermediate goal of this strategy is the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, yet Israel’s refusal to take steps toward a two-state solution remains a key obstacle. As of now, Israel is hindering Trump’s efforts to expand the Abraham Accords, and his declarations during his visit to Saudi Arabia suggest he has, for now, decided to forgo this goal. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia’s centrality in Trump’s Middle East policy may diminish Israel’s role as the key American ally in the region. Blocking Trump’s efforts to end wars, as a means of facilitating economic deals, could lead him to leave Israel to its own devices. One test of Israel’s strategic importance in the eyes of the American administration will be the upcoming decision on security aid to Israel for the coming years.

Third Pillar: The American Jewish Community. The third pillar is the American Jewish community, seen as a bridge between the two societies and states. This pillar, too, has shown cracks in recent years. Israel’s transformation into a partisan issue has fueled divisions within the Jewish community, most of which continues to vote for the Democratic Party despite its critical stance on Israeli policies regarding the Palestinian issue. The entire community now faces the challenge of coping with the surge in antisemitism since October 7 and the outbreak of the war in Gaza, with the growing trend of the younger generation turning its back on Israel posing a particular concern.

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The domestic American, regional, and global reality is currently undergoing dramatic changes. Will Israeli–US relations remain immune to these upheavals and their diverse consequences? Will the relations continue as they have (subject to circumstantial adjustments)? Will Israel’s value as an asset outweigh the burden it may pose for the United States? In answering these questions, the significant erosion in the pillars of the “special relationship”—the shared ethos and mutual interests, as well as cracks in the bridge connecting the American Jewish community to Israel—does not bode well.