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North Korea's rocket launch in early April became the latest trigger of a by now well-established pattern of drawing quick comparisons between the two primary nuclear proliferators, Iran and North Korea. The fact that intensive international efforts to stem the nuclear ambitions of both states have unfolded in parallel since 2002 no doubt encourages this tendency. Admittedly, a certain amount of reciprocal learning likely occurs – both between the proliferating states and within the international community when it assesses the consequences of its actions in one case for dealing with the other. Nevertheless, there are important differences between the two cases, and while Iran and North Korea have a history of cooperation in the non-conventional realm, including the presence of Iranians at the latest North Korean launch, this does not mean that they are charting identical nuclear courses.

Simplistic comparisons that draw on automatic assumptions about the similarities between these two proliferators can lead to problematic conclusions. For example, it was commonly assumed thatNorth Korea's nuclear test in 2006 would serve as a wake-up call for the international community, impressing upon it the need to take more determined action vis-à-vis Iran before it reached the stage of North Korea. As if all that was needed was for the international community to recognize the severity of one state's nuclear ambitions in order to be instantly better equipped to deal with another. Unfortunately, this hasn't proven to be the case.

In recent years, nuclear proliferation has become far more a political rather than technical or legal challenge for the international community. The processes of dealing with both Iran and North Koreahave been influenced by a full spectrum of political variables that encompass three broad categories: 1) the proliferators themselves – their motivations, goals, negotiating strategy and style; 2) the identities and interests of the states that decided to intervene; and 3) the specific regional context of the proliferators.

Beyond the proliferators' common goal to attain nuclear weapons, Iran and North Korea actually have different aims in the nuclear realm, and quite distinct negotiating styles.

North Korea tends to treat its nuclear advances as bargaining chips vis-à-vis the US, in order to attain political and economic security. North Korea has consistently attempted to negotiate directly and bilaterally with the US to ensure its security, a tendency underscored last summer when it announced that it would halt the process of disabling Yongbyon because the US did not remove it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

North Korea's negotiating style is to bring dynamics to the brink. It tends to ignite crisis situations purposely – such as withdrawing from the NPT in 2003, carrying out a nuclear test in 2006, and in response to the latest UN Security Council statement condemning its recent launch, declaring that the six-party talks are over – and then tries to get the best deal possible, again, with its sights set primarily on the US.

Regional neighbors matter to North Korea, but not because of any hegemonic ambitions; the issue is rather regime survival. The 2008 elections in South Korea, which brought to power a government that is no longer willing to extend unconditional economic aid to the North before seeing results on the nuclear front, has escalated the situation.North Korea's recent saber-rattling contains an implicit message to the Obama administration regarding its resolve.

Iran has developed a very different approach. It has come to regard uranium enrichment as something of a national project, with support from across the political spectrum and with no indication that it will forego it for anything.

Yet in stark contrast to North Korea, Iran's negotiating strategy has been to try to avoid approaching the brink. Even with Ahmadinejad's more controversial approach, if Iran enters negotiations with the Obama administration, it can be expected to demonstrate again just enough cooperation to get the international community off its back, while both not giving up on its core interests and continuing to advance its program.

There is a duality in Iran that does not exist in the case ofNorth Korea: while Iran wants to stand up to the West and demands its respect, it also wants to be a member in good standing of the international community. Finally, Iran clearly has hegemonic interests in the Middle East that it believes it will be better able to promote as a nuclear state.

All of these factors influence the states confronting Iran andNorth Korea and the nature of their interactions with the proliferators. Moreover, a host of additional interests come into play for each of the relevant strong states. Indeed, stopping proliferation is only one interest that they have, and in some cases not the strongest. Regarding Iran, for example, it has become a commonplace to note the economic interests of Russia and China that deter them from taking a tougher stance on sanctions. For Russia in particular there are also important strategic interests that shape its position on Iran, and clearly Europe is also driven by trade related interests.

A closer look at the approaches adopted by the US and Europe toward both Iran and North Korea reveal additional complexities. The Bush administration, for example, was accused of taking a unilateral stance on Iran, and was criticized for favoring a more militant approach over negotiation. At the same time however, the USexhibited a strong commitment to diplomacy in the North Korean sphere, to the point that it was willing to overlook some extreme steps taken by North Korea in order to keep diplomacy alive. Clearly, there is not one US policy vis-à-vis all proliferators; in fact, what we see is a policy of "different strategies for different threats."

Interestingly, although Bush was criticized for being unwilling to negotiate directly with Iran, Obama's expressed willingness to engage unconditionally has not been embraced in the way one might have expected. In fact, it has raised concerns and even fear in Europe (afraid the US might leave them outside the process); the Persian Gulf states (afraid the US might go for a deal with Iran that would be at their expense); and even Iran itself (afraid Obama might be more dangerous than Bush himself: hard-nosed but enjoying popular support). From the start Europe also adopted a different approach to the two cases: it wanted to be heavily involved in confronting Iran, but had very little interest in North Korea, and was perfectly happy to leave the latter to the US.

Finally, regional realities have also influenced the approaches adopted. States in Northeast Asia set up a regional framework for dialogue fairly easily, while in the Middle East this seems next to impossible. However, while it was deemed important to address regional stability in Northeast Asia, this is all the more so in Middle East. Moderate Arab states in the Persian Gulf and Egypt have in recent months become much more vocal in their opposition to Iran and its nuclear and regional ambitions.

In sum, the policy dilemmas posed by nuclear proliferators are similar to the dilemmas that would arise in the face of any threatening state behavior. The ensuing reality is that each case of attempted nuclear proliferation is confronted as a security challenge in its own right. It is only within the parameters of the matrices of variables – proliferators, "confronters," and regional conditions – that we can come to a better assessment of the direction each of these processes has taken, and devise better strategies for dealing with each case.