Table of Contents:

Summary of the Results

A large majority of the Israeli public (62.5%) assesses that Israel will be required to renew fighting against Iran within the next six months. At the same time, the public is divided regarding a proactive Israeli strike against Iran at this time: 45% of the public supports such an action, while 43% opposes it. In parallel, only one-third of the public (33%) believes that Israel should intervene in Iran’s internal developments in light of the wave of popular protests, while a majority of 54% opposes such intervention. A majority of the public (58.5%) reports low or very low satisfaction with the enforcement of the ceasefire agreement in Gaza; 55% of the public believes that the security situation in the north necessitates a return to fighting, primarily in the form of limited combat; and 51% supports the measures being implemented on the ground following the decision to repeal the Disengagement Law in northern Samaria.

Methodology

The survey was conducted between January 14–16, 2026, by the Data Analytics Center at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). Fieldwork was carried out by the iPanel company and included online interviews with 805 respondents in Hebrew and 151 respondents in Arabic, constituting, after sectoral weighting, a representative sample of Israel’s adult population aged 18 and over. The maximum sampling error for the full sample is ±3.17% at a 95% confidence level.

Click here to download the full survey data | Survey results in Arabic – نتائج الاستطلاع باللغة العربية | Click here to view trends among the Jewish public |

Click here to view trends among the Arab public

the complete data

Perception of Threats and Challenges

• About one-third of the Israeli public (32%) assesses the current national security situation as good or very good; 30% views it as poor or very poor; and 37% rates it as moderate. On an average scale of 1 (very bad situation) to 10 (very good situation), national security received a score of 5.8—no substantial change compared to December (5.7).
• A sharp gap is evident between sectors:
• Within the Jewish public, 38% rates the security situation as good or very good, compared to only 9% among the Arab public. Conversely, 54% of the Arab public considers the situation as bad or very bad, compared to 24% within the Jewish public. Accordingly, the average rating of national security stands at 6.1 among Jews versus 4.4 among Arabs. Compared to previous months, a gradual decline in the sense of security is apparent within the Arab public (4.4 in January, 4.8 in December, and 5 in November), while no substantial change was recorded among the Jewish public (6.1 in January, 5.9 in December, and 6 in November).
• Significant gaps were also recorded along the political axis: 48% of coalition voters assess the security situation as good, compared to only 22% among opposition voters. Accordingly, 47% of those in the right-wing camp rate the situation as good, compared to only 19% in the center-left camp.
• Looking ahead to the next five years, the public’s assessment of the future of national security shows improvement. Forty-seven percent of the public believes that national security will improve, of whom 34% thinks it will improve somewhat, and 13% expects that it will improve significantly. By contrast, 19% predicts the situation will deteriorate, and 23% foresees no change. On an average scale of 1 (will deteriorate significantly) to 10 (will improve significantly), the future of national security received a score of 6—an increase compared to December (5.4) and November (5.7).
• Differences between population groups were also recorded:

  • Among the Jewish public, 53% foresees an improvement in national security, while only 12% predicts deterioration (average rating 6.3, a significant increase compared to 5.6 in December and 5.9 in November). Among the Arab public, the picture is more pessimistic: 46% foresees deterioration and only 23% expects improvement (rating 4.8, with no substantial change compared to December [4.6] and November [4.9]). That is, the improvement in assessments of future national security is evident primarily among the Jewish public in Israel.
  • When segmented by politics, 65% of coalition voters foresee improvement, compared to only 40% of opposition voters. Accordingly, 61% of respondents in the right-wing camp predict improvement, compared to only 35% in the center-left camp.

• Concern over social tensions in Israel remains high and stable: 83% of respondents report being concerned about social tensions, including 41.5% who are fairly concerned and 41.5% who are very concerned. By contrast, 13% are fairly unconcerned and only 3% are not concerned at all. No significant change was observed compared to December and November (83%).
• High levels of concern are evident across all population groups:

  • 84% concern among the Jewish public and 76% among the Arab public.
  • In political terms as well, a clear majority is evident, although concern is higher among opposition voters (92%) than among coalition voters (79%). Accordingly, 88% of respondents in the center-left camp are concerned, compared to 79% in the right-wing camp.

• The public also expresses concern about external security threats to Israel, although at a more moderate level than internal threats. Sixty-nine percent of the public reports being concerned about external security threats, including 50% of respondents who are fairly concerned and 19% who are very concerned. By contrast, 24% are fairly unconcerned and only 6% are not concerned at all. No significant change was recorded compared to December (70.5%) and November (72%).
• High levels of concern characterize all population groups, though some differences were observed:

  • By sector, the share concerned about external threats stands at 69% among the Jewish public (down from 74% in December), compared to 66% among the Arab public (up from 59% in December).
  • Politically, the gaps are more pronounced: 78% of opposition voters are concerned about external threats, compared to only 62% of coalition voters. In terms of segmentation by political camp, the level of concern stands at 73% within the center-left camp, compared to 64% on the right.

• The public’s sense of personal security is stable but not particularly high. Twenty-eight percent of respondents report having a high or very high sense of personal security; 44% claim having a moderate sense of security; and 27% report having a low or very low sense of security. On an average scale of 1 (very low sense of security) to 10 (very high sense of security), personal security received a score of 5.8, similar to December and November (5.9).
• Significant gaps were observed between population groups:

  • 33% of the Jewish public reports having high personal security, while 20% reports low security (average score 6.1). By contrast, only 7% of the Arab public reports having high personal security, with 55% reporting low or very low security (average score 4.5).
  • When segmented by politics, 41% of coalition voters report having high personal security, compared to only 17% of opposition voters. Conversely, 29% of opposition voters report having low personal security, compared to only 17% of coalition voters.

Trust in Individuals and Institutions

The Security Establishment

Public trust in the security establishment remains relatively high, though gaps are evident between population groups and political camps.

• 73% of the Israeli public expresses high trust in the IDF (38% to a great extent and 35% to a fairly great extent), compared to about 25% reporting low trust. No significant change was observed in the level of trust compared to previous months.

  • In terms of sectors, a sharp gap is evident: Trust among the Jewish public is very high (84%), while only 28% of the Arab public expresses high trust, with the majority (65%) reporting low trust.
  • When segmented by politics, gaps are present but more moderate. Both coalition voters (83%) and opposition voters (78%) report high trust, but in a breakdown by political camps, trust is higher on the right (85%) than in the center-left camp (68%).

• 75% of the Israeli public expresses high trust in the Air Force (45% to a great extent and 30% to a fairly great extent), compared to about 22% reporting low trust.

  • Here too, a pronounced sectoral gap is evident: 86% of the Jewish public has high trust, compared to only 33% among the Arab public.
  • In terms of political segmentation, the level of trust is similar among coalition voters (82%) and opposition voters (83%). However, in a breakdown by political camps, a gap is apparent: 84% on the right compared to 74% in the center-left camp.

• A majority of the Israeli public (61%) expresses high trust in the Chief of the General Staff, Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir, compared to 32% reporting low trust and 8% answering “don’t know.” This reflects relative stability compared to December (58%) and to November and October (63%).

  • Among the Jewish public, a majority (71%) has high trust in the chief of the general staff, compared to only 19% among the Arab public.
  • When segmented by politics, a gap becomes evident: 69% of those in the right-wing camp express high trust, compared to 59% in the center-left camp. By contrast, in a breakdown by voters, only a negligible gap was recorded (68% among coalition voters and 71% among opposition voters).

• 49% of the Israeli public expresses high trust in the head of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), David Zini, compared to 38% reporting low trust and 12% answering “don’t know.”

  • Here too, the principal gap is sharp: 58% of the Jewish public expresses high trust, compared to only 15% within the Arab public.
  • The polarization becomes pronounced when segmented by politics. A majority of coalition voters (74%) express high trust in the head of the Israel Security Agency, compared to 40% of opposition voters. In a breakdown by political camps, 69% on the right has high trust, compared to only 34% in the center-left camp.

The Political Leadership

Public trust in the political leadership is especially low, characterized by sharp sectoral gaps alongside pronounced polarization between political camps.

• 27% of the Israeli public expresses high trust in the government, compared to 71% reporting low trust. Of those reporting low trust, 44% does not express any trust at all and 27% expresses trust only to a small extent. Compared to December, the percentage of the public reporting high trust increased slightly (from 23% in December to 27% in January), alongside a parallel decrease in the percentage reporting low trust (from 76% to 71%).

  • In terms of sectoral segmentation, a sharp gap is evident: 32% of the Jewish public express high trust in the government, compared to only 9% among the Arab public.
  • When segmented by politics, the gaps are especially pronounced: 58% of coalition voters express high trust in the government, compared to only 7% of opposition voters. In a breakdown by political camps, 49% in the right-wing camp expresses high trust, compared to only 7% in the center-left camp.

• 36% of the Israeli public expresses high trust in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, while 63% has low trust in him. Here too, a slight increase is recorded compared to December, when only 32% reported high trust.

  • In terms of sectoral segmentation, 42% of the Jewish public expresses high trust in the prime minister, compared to 10% among the Arab public.
  • When segmented by politics, polarization becomes especially sharp: 74% of coalition voters express high trust in the Prime Minister, compared to only 10% of opposition voters. Accordingly, 64% in the right-wing camp has high trust, compared to only 10% in the center-left camp.

Security and Diplomatic Threats and Challenges

The Various Arenas

Iran, as well as Judea and Samaria, tops the list of the Israeli public’s security concerns, while Yemen and Syria rank at the bottom.

• An increase is evident in the percentage of the public concerned about the Iranian arena—from 67% in December to 74% in January—alongside a decrease in the percentage concerned about the Syrian arena (from 44% to 35%) and the Lebanese arena (from 58% to 52%). Overall, Iran is the arena whose security situation is of greatest concern to the Israeli public (74%), followed by Judea and Samaria (66%), Gaza (56%), Lebanon (52%), and Syria (35%). At the bottom of the list is the Yemeni arena, about which only 27% of the public is concerned.
• In terms of sectoral segmentation, the gap regarding Judea and Samaria is especially pronounced: 73% of the Jewish public reports being concerned about the situation in this arena, compared to only 37% among the Arab public. Significant gaps are also evident regarding the Gaza arena, where 60% of the Jewish public is concerned about the security situation compared to 40% among the Arab public, as well as regarding the Lebanese arena—55% among the Jewish public compared to 40% among the Arab public.
• The gaps are also apparent when segmented by politics. Regarding the Iranian arena, 82% of opposition voters report concern, compared to 71% of coalition voters. Regarding the Lebanese arena, 60% of opposition voters are concerned about the security situation, compared to 52% of coalition voters. However, in a breakdown by political camps, the percentage concerned about the Iranian arena is relatively similar—74% on the right and 73% in the center-left camp.

Iran Front

• A majority of the Israeli public (62.5%) believes that Israel will be required to renew the war against Iran within the coming six months, compared to 19% of the public who thinks it will not be required, and 18.5% who answered, “don’t know.”

  • A sharp gap is evident between the sectors: A majority of the Jewish public (70%) assesses that another campaign against Iran will be required, compared to only 33% among the Arab public.
  • When segmented by politics, the gaps are also apparent: 76.5% of coalition voters believe another campaign will be required, compared to 58.5% of opposition voters. In a breakdown by political camps, 77% of respondents in the right-wing camp hold this position, compared to 52% in the center-left camp.

• As for support for a proactive Israeli strike against Iran at the present time, public attitudes are almost evenly split. 45% of the Israeli public supports a proactive strike (27% somewhat supports and 18% strongly supports), compared to 43% opposing it (25% somewhat opposes and 18% strongly opposes). Another 12% answered “don’t know.”

  • The gap is pronounced when segmented by sector. Among the Jewish public, 51% supports a proactive strike, compared to only 20% among the Arab public, where a clear majority (67%) opposes the move.
  • When segmented by politics, polarization is also evident: 62% of coalition voters support a proactive strike, compared to only 37% of opposition voters. Accordingly, 61% of the right-wing camp favors this move, compared to only 28% in the center-left camp.

• A majority of the public (54%) opposes Israeli intervention in Iran’s internal developments in light of the wave of popular protests, while about one-third (33%) supports such intervention, and 13% answered “don’t know.”

  • In terms of sectoral segmentation, 76% of the Arab public opposes intervention, compared to 49% among the Jewish public.
  • The picture is more complex when segmented by politics. Among coalition voters, an equal split was recorded (44% in favor; 44% against), while among opposition voters, a clear majority (59%) opposes intervention, compared to 30% supporting it. In a breakdown by political camps, attitudes on the right are almost evenly split (43% supports; 45% opposes), while in the center-left camp, a clear majority opposes intervention (62%), compared to only 24% supporting it.

Gaza Front

• Satisfaction with the enforcement of the ceasefire agreement in Gaza is relatively low: 58.5% of the public is dissatisfied (45.5% to a small extent and 13% to a very small extent), compared to 33.5% of the public who is satisfied (29% to a great extent and 4.5% to a very great extent). Another 8% answered “don’t know.”

  • According to sector, 64% of the Jewish public is dissatisfied, compared to 36% of the Arab public. Conversely, 49% of the Arab public reports satisfaction, compared to only 30% of the Jewish public.
  • In terms of political segmentation, levels of dissatisfaction are similar among coalition voters (63%) and opposition voters (61%). In a breakdown by political camps, 64% of the public on the right is dissatisfied, compared to 55% in the center-left camp.

• Regarding the question of disarming Hamas and the actor responsible for doing so, attitudes are split: 40% of the public believes that only the IDF is capable of carrying out the task. By contrast, 23% thinks that there is no real possibility of disarming Hamas. Another 23% believes the task should be assigned to a multinational and Arab force, while only 7% supports assigning responsibility to the Palestinian Authority.

  • In terms of sectoral segmentation, a significant gap is evident: 48% of the Jewish public believes that only the IDF can disarm Hamas, compared to only 11% among the Arab public. Among the Arab public, 30% thinks there is no real possibility of disarming Hamas, and 15% supports assigning the task to the Palestinian Authority.
  • When segmented by politics, the gap becomes especially sharp: 69% of coalition voters believe that only the IDF can carry out the task, compared to only 23% of opposition voters. In a breakdown by political camps, 63% of the right-wing camp holds this position, compared to only 20% in the center-left camp.

Lebanon Front

• A majority of the public is satisfied with the enforcement of the ceasefire agreement in the north. 47% of the public reports high satisfaction (46% to a great extent and 11% to a very great extent), compared to 34% reporting low satisfaction (26% to a small extent and 8% to a very small extent), and 9% who answered, “don’t know.” Compared to December, an increase was recorded in the percentage reporting high satisfaction, from 49% to 58%.

  • In terms of sectoral segmentation, 60% of the Jewish public is satisfied, compared to 50% among the Arab public.
  • No substantial gaps are observed when segmented by politics. Satisfaction levels are similar among coalition voters (59%) and opposition voters (60%), as well as between the right-wing camp (59%) and the center-left camp (58%).

• At the same time, the majority of the public (55%) believes that the security situation in the north still does not provide security for residents. Of these, 42% thinks that Israel should return to limited fighting without a ground maneuver, while 13% supports a return to intensive fighting that includes a ground maneuver. In contrast, 30% believes the situation provides security for residents, and 15% answered, “don’t know.”

  • In terms of sectoral segmentation, 43% of the Arab public believes the situation provides security, compared to only 26% among Jews.
  • When segmented by politics, 34% of opposition voters believe the situation provides security, compared to 25% of coalition voters. Similarly, 36% in the center-left camp holds this view, compared to 25% in the right-wing camp. Conversely, the percentage supporting a return to intensive fighting is higher among coalition voters (20.5%) than among opposition voters (8%).

Syria Front

• Regarding the IDF’s presence in southern Syria, 44% of the public believes Israel should hold the territory on a permanent basis. By contrast, 30.5% supports a gradual withdrawal within the framework of an arrangement, 12.5% thinks Israel should leave immediately, and 13% answered, “don’t know.”

  • In terms of sectoral segmentation, the gap is especially sharp: 53% of the Jewish public supports permanently holding the territory, compared to only 7% within the Arab public. Conversely, 51% of the Arab public supports immediate withdrawal, compared to only 3% within the Jewish public.
  • When segmented by politics, 72% of coalition voters support permanently holding the territory, compared to only 30.5% of opposition voters. In a breakdown by political camps, 69% on the right supports permanently holding the territory, compared to 23% in the center-left camp.

Judea and Samaria Front

• A majority of the public (51%) supports the measures being implemented on the ground following the cabinet decision to repeal the Disengagement Law in northern Samaria, including reestablishing settlements, establishing a military base, and paving roads. Of this majority, 26% somewhat supports these measures, and 25% strongly supports them. By contrast, 34% oppose the measures (16% somewhat oppose; 18% strongly oppose), and 15% answered, “don’t know.”
• In terms of sectoral segmentation, 60% of the Jewish public supports these measures, compared to only 16% of the Arab public, where 62% opposes them.
• A sharp gap becomes apparent when segmented by politics: 82% of coalition voters support these measures, compared to only 29.5% of opposition voters. In a breakdown by political camps, 79% on the right favors them, compared to only 25% in the center-left camp.

Israel’s Foreign Relations

• Regarding Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, 35.5% of the public believes it has no impact on Israel’s national security. In contrast, 33% thinks it has a positive impact (25% somewhat positive and 8% very positive), while 10% believes it has a negative impact, while 21.5% answered, “don’t know.”
• In terms of sectoral segmentation, 38% of the Jewish public believes the move has a positive impact, compared to only 11% within the Arab public. Conversely, 32% of the Arab public thinks the move has a negative impact, compared to only 5% within the Jewish public.
• When segmented by politics, 44.5% of coalition voters believe the move has a positive impact, compared to 28% of opposition voters. In a breakdown by political camps, 43% on the right holds this view, compared to 24% in the center-left camp.
• The public is divided regarding the prime minister’s statement about a gradual reduction—down to zero—of US security assistance to Israel ($3.8 billion per year). 41% opposes the move (27% somewhat opposes; 14% strongly opposes), compared to 39% supporting it (25.5% somewhat supports; 13.5% strongly supports), while 20% answered, “don’t know.”
• In terms of sectoral segmentation, within the Arab public, the percentage of “don’t know” responses is especially high (37%), compared to 16% within the Jewish public.
• When segmented by politics, 55.5% of coalition voters support the move, compared to only 25% of opposition voters. In a breakdown by political camps, 51% on the right supports it, compared to only 26% in the center-left camp.

Internal Societal Threats and Challenges

Civil-Military Relations

• A majority of the public (63.5%) believes that approving an amendment to the law that would exempt most of the ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) public from IDF service would harm motivation to serve. Out of this majority, 26.5% thinks approval would somewhat harm motivation, and 37% believes it would greatly harm motivation. In contrast, 31.5% of the public thinks the move would not harm motivation (17% believes approval would not harm motivation very much; 14.5% claims it would not harm motivation at all).
• In terms of sectoral segmentation: 64% of the Jewish public believes the move would harm motivation to serve, compared to 60% of Arabs; however, among the Arab public, the percentage answering “don’t know” is higher (15% within the Arab public compared to 3% within the Jewish public).
• Polarization is pronounced when segmented by politics: 82% of opposition voters believe the move would harm motivation, compared to 44% of coalition voters. In a breakdown by political camps, 76% in the center-left camp thinks so, compared to 53% on the right.
• About half of the Israeli public (55%) believes the defense establishment is acting too leniently in dealing with nationalist crime by Jews in Judea and Samaria. 25% thinks the defense establishment is acting appropriately; 16% believes it is acting too harshly; and 10% answered, “don’t know.”
• In terms of sectoral segmentation, 57% of the Arab public believes the defense establishment is acting too leniently, compared to 48% of the Jewish public.
• A sharp gap becomes apparent when segmented by politics. Among opposition voters, 67% believe enforcement is too lenient, compared to only 33% among coalition voters. In a breakdown by political camp, 67% of respondents in the center-left believe enforcement is too lenient, compared to 36% on the right. Conversely, 24% on the right think that enforcement is too harsh, compared to 6% in the center-left.

Jewish-Arab Relations

• A majority of the public (65%) is concerned about the rise in incidents of violence in Arab society (32% fairly concerned; 33% very concerned), compared to 33% of this public who is not concerned.
• In terms of sectoral segmentation, a large majority of the Arab public (90%) is concerned, compared to 58.5% within the Jewish public.
• A sharp gap is evident when segmented by politics: 82% of opposition voters are concerned about the phenomenon, compared to only 40% of coalition voters. In a breakdown by political camps, 83% of the respondents in the center-left camp are concerned about it, compared to 45% in the right-wing camp.
• A majority of the Israeli public (70%) supports the involvement of the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet) in addressing violence and crime in Arab society (36% somewhat supports and 34% strongly supports). In contrast, 22% opposes, and another 8% answered, “don’t know.”
• In terms of sectoral segmentation, support is slightly higher within the Arab public (75%) than within the Jewish public (69%).
• When segmented by politics, 77% of opposition voters support the involvement of the Israel Security Agency, compared to 67% of coalition voters. In a breakdown by political camps, 73% in the center-left camp support it, compared to 67% on the right.

The “Qatargate” Affair

• A majority of the public (59%) does not believe the Prime Minister Netanyahu’s claim that he was unaware of the involvement of members of his office in the “Qatargate” affair (42% does not believe it at all and 17% does not really believe it). Conversely, 30% believes the claim (17% fairly believes it; 13% strongly believes it), and another 11% answered, “don’t know.”
• In terms of sectoral segmentation, 74% of the Arab public does not believe the prime minister’s claim, compared to 56% of the Jewish public.
• Polarization is especially sharp when segmented by politics: 59% of coalition voters believe the prime minister’s claim, compared to only 8% of opposition voters. In a breakdown by political camps, 50% of the right-wing camp believes the Prime Minister, compared to only 8% in the center-left camp.

The Resilience of Israeli Society

• A majority of the public (65%) believes solidarity in Israeli society does not exist at all or exists to a small extent (50% thinks it exists to a small extent and 15% believes it does not exist at all). In contrast, 28% believes solidarity exists to a great or very great extent. Compared to December, there has been a moderate increase in the perception of the absence or limited extent of solidarity (from 62.5% in December to 65% in January).
• In terms of sectoral segmentation, 70% of the Arab public believes solidarity does not exist or is limited, compared to 64% among the Jewish public.
• A significant gap is evident when segmented by politics: 78% of opposition voters believe solidarity does not exist or exists to a small extent, compared to only 53% of coalition voters. In a breakdown by political camps, 75% of the center-left camp believes solidarity does not exist or is limited, compared to 56% in the right-wing camp.